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Affirmative Action in college admissions has been a source of controversy since its 
inception. Historically, the argument has been framed as a cost benefit analysis between the 
consequences to Whites denied admission to an institution because of Affirmative Action 
policies versus the benefits to historically underrepresented minorities admitted in their stead. 
This dissertation furthers the conversation by introducing a theoretical model grounded in the 
literature that explains why employers might seek college graduates who have been exposed to 
more diversity and then empirically explores the benefits to graduates who attend more racially 
and ethnically diverse institutions. It posits a parabolic empirical relationship between an 
institution’s racial and ethnic diversity and the salaries of its graduates, with too much diversity 
being as undesirable as too little diversity. It does not assume that the benefits to diversity are 
necessarily academic but may be another set of skills—a "cosmopolitan" skill set—that 
employers value. 
Using the Bachelor & Beyond Database (BB: 93), U.S. News Rankings, and the College 
Board’s Annual survey of colleges, the empirical work looks at 8,054 college graduates from 466 
colleges. The empirical work uses three models: Ordinary Least Square with Controls, 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling, and Propensity Score Matching. All models control for both 
individual and institutional variables the literature has found to impact salaries of college 
graduates.  The three models use two continuous variables as the variables of interest in terms of 
 
 
institutional diversity—percent Black and percent minority—as well as dummy variables for 
percent Black and percent minority. 
The findings were modest but consistent across the models, suggesting first that there is a 
parabolic effect and that modest racial and ethnic institutional diversity is beneficial to White 
graduates but has no benefit to Hispanic or Black graduates. The benefits in terms of percent 
increase of earnings for White students ranged from 4.6% using an OLS model for students at 
non-selective institutions to 10.5% percent increase in earnings for White graduates of more 
diverse institutions using the propensity score matching model at selective institutions. 
The findings suggest that for individual White students, there is an economic benefit to 
attending a slightly more diverse institution, but not for minorities, who should simply attend the 
most selective institution to which they are admitted. For institutions, it suggests that if their goal 
is to maximize earnings of their graduates, they should build a diverse cohort of students. For 
policymakers, the findings suggest that eliminating Affirmative Action may penalize White 
students more than any other racial or ethnic group. 
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Affirmative Action in college admissions has gone from being challenged in state courts 
and by ballot measures to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling. The Court ruled in late June of 2003 that 
race can be a factor in admissions, but that it cannot be the overriding factor in an admissions 
program. This decision was the culmination of a significant debate. The Court’s split decision on 
the ruling, and the narrowly defined scope of the decision, indicates a great deal about the values 
our society places on diversity. However, as the debate has been framed, its focus has rested 
squarely within the notion that the fundamental issue is a moral dilemma––how to achieve 
fairness, justice, and individual rights while still protecting the rights of under-represented 
groups of people. The debate surrounding this dilemma is important (and by many accounts far 
from over) and should in no way be minimized. Truly, as a society we must grapple with what 
we collectively believe to be the right thing to do. 
However, beyond the issue of fairness and rights, universities’ abilities to use Affirmative 
Action as an admissions tool may have consequences that are not presently being debated, and 
this is the focus of this paper. Specifically, the loss of a school’s ability to build a diverse cohort 
of students could have enormous economic consequences for our society. There have been some 
studies that suggest that there are problems with alternatives to Affirmative Action programs 
(e.g., Tienda, 2003). In very pragmatic terms, education is one of the fundamental elements of 
the American dream: Very early on, we are taught that if we work hard and get a good education, 
economic opportunity is available. It is also a cornerstone of our strategy as a country to compete 
in a global market. Thomas Friedman (2005) has called this the “age of talent.” In this way, 
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Affirmative Action becomes a world issue because, if colleges are unable to put together the 
most effective cohorts, it impacts our ability to serve and compete globally. Given that we are 
also the world’s largest exporter of higher education, our ability to continue to deliver “quality” 
to the world matters to both our trade balance and our economy. 
According to Adam Liptak (2011) in a recent New York Times article, the diversity 
argument is the last hope for keeping Affirmative Action in college admissions in place, and 
given the current make-up of the Supreme Court, the chances of its being repealed is quite high. 
With court cases such as the Ricci v. DeStefano, which challenged New Haven’s decision to 
discard tests that suggested that minority firefighters were not qualified for advancement, it is 
only a matter of time before another case is brought before the Supreme Court. 
This paper explores a related question that, if answered affirmatively, seems to fly in the 
face of most arguments put forth by opponents of race-conscious decisions in admissions: Will 
the elimination of using such race-conscious admission policies adversely affect all of a given 
institution’s alumni in the marketplace? Groups like the Center for Individual Rights have argued 
that no matter how heinous past transgressions were against a group of people, it is 
unconstitutional to penalize an individual to right a former wrong. However, if it turns out that 
campus diversity provides all of an institution’s graduates with an edge in the marketplace, then 
eliminating Affirmative Action policies may penalize not only the traditionally underrepresented 
students who would not be able to matriculate but also the “majority” students who do not 
benefit from the exposure to the diverse cohort. 
This is the major focus of this paper. This paper explores whether there may be a plausible 
explanation for employers wanting students from institutions that are more diverse, namely, that 
colleges are key players in facilitating the implementation of diversity in the workplace, which 




Statement of the Problem 
As mentioned in the introduction, Affirmative Action has been controversial since its 
initial application in the college admissions process. There have been both legislative actions and 
court cases limiting the discretion of college admission professionals, with the rationale that it is 
unjust to penalize one group within a society in order to correct a historical transgression, an 
argument that I will review in greater detail shortly. There have been equally passionate 
advocates for college diversity. Most such advocates have framed the question in terms of 
society’s benefiting from underrepresented minorities attending selective institutions (e.g., 
Bowen & Bok, 1998). This paper focuses on the effects that diversity has on the earnings of 
college graduates—all graduates, not just minorities. Clearly if everyone benefits from diversity, 
then from a pragmatic perspective, there should be more support for promoting diversity in 
college. 
At the center of this argument will be a quantitative analytical study that estimates the 
effects of institutional characteristics on samples of students. Specifically, controlling for other 
factors known to influence starting salaries, I explore whether an institution’s racial and ethnic 
diversity statistically is related to the earnings of its graduates––not just minority students but 
majority students as well. If it turns out that there is a statistically significant relationship, then 
barring diversity-conscious decisions may adversely affect recent college graduates’ income. The 
thesis presented in this paper is that there may be a positive relationship between institutional 
diversity and graduates’ salaries. The question of whether such a relation exists is derived from a 
series of logical deductions explained in the review of related literature. The literature review 
presented in this paper demonstrates why the question is reasonable to explore, so that when the 
analytical part is framed, the appropriate theoretical context for the question will have been 
presented. Furthermore, existing literature will be examined for implications with respect to the 
host of empirical issues associated with examining the relationship between diversity in 
academic institutions and graduate income, as well as with regard to where the gaps are in the 
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literature. The methodology and the data used for this piece of research are also discussed. 
Finally, I present the findings and discuss the implications for colleges. 
A Review of the History of Affirmative Action 
The United States is a diverse society and has been since its inception. However, while the 
country has explicit ideals when it comes to fairness and equality, historically it rarely 
manifested those ideals, with barriers such as the Jim Crow Laws. The emergence of the civil 
rights movement in the 1960s began a process whereby the United States started to address the 
curtailed rights and access to resources of women, Blacks and other minorities, and other 
historically disenfranchised groups. 
One manifestation of this desire to “right former wrongs” became know as Affirmative 
Action, where institutions were encouraged to adopt policies to have their institutions better 
reflect American society. In higher education, this began to manifest itself in colleges giving 
preferential treatment in the admission process to these historically underrepresented minorities. 
Bill Bowen and Derek Bok (1998) provide an excellent summary of the history of these race-
sensitive admissions policies in the first chapter of The Shape of the River. For the purpose of 
this paper, I will use the term “diversity”––while it can be broadly construed to mean almost any 
difference––to refer to ethnic and racial diversity in college student bodies and “Affirmative 
Action” to refer to the policy of colleges to give consideration to race and ethnicity in the 
admission process. This is important because my conceptual argument could be applied to any 
sort of institutional diversity, and I elected––given the controversy around Affirmative Action––
to apply the concept empirically to racial and ethnic diversity. According to Bowen and Bok, by 
the time of the ruling by the Supreme Court in Bakke in 1978, which allowed for some 
consideration of race, public universities were being mandated by federal officials to execute 
Affirmative Action plans (p. 8). 
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The Bakke decision opened the door for a series of judicial decisions and the opinion 
known as Hopwood (the name of the plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit), which began in 1995, 
and which changed college admissions policies in Texas. This was followed by the Banneker 
Scholarships decision in Maryland in 1995, and in 1996 by the Proposition 209 voter referendum 
in California, which did away with that state’s Affirmative Action law. In late 2001, the two 
lawsuits involving the University of Michigan were argued before the Sixth Circuit Appeals 
Court, and unlike in the other appellate courts, a narrow ruling (5-4) in favor of race-conscious 
admission policies ensued. In its decision, the appeals court overturned an earlier ruling by a 
federal judge regarding the University of Michigan's right to use such policies to create a diverse 
class of incoming students. The majority opinion concluded that affirming educational diversity 
is a compelling reason to have race as a "plus" factor in the University of Michigan’s law school 
admissions policies (Steinberg, 2002, p. A16). In August 2002, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the University of Michigan case. The petition noted that the federal appeals courts were divided 
on the issue. In addition to the pro-Affirmative Action decision in the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth 
Circuit Court had also ruled in favor of the University of Washington’s law school. And as noted 
before, in the Georgia and Texas cases, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts had ruled against 
Affirmative Action (Schmidt, 2003, p. A25). 
Collectively, educational administrators viewed these events as an attack on long-standing 
Affirmative Action programs. In each case, excepting to date the Michigan case, despite the best 
efforts by the admissions offices in the public universities in the respective states, admissions 
policies were changed to reflect the decisions, basically ceasing to use diversity as a criterion for 
admission and no longer giving additional weight to representatives of groups that have been 
traditionally underrepresented in higher education. Not surprisingly, institutional diversity 
subsequently declined. Educational policymakers should expect this trend to continue despite the 
Supreme Court ruling. A 2003 poll shows that a majority of Americans are opposed to race-
conscious decisions in admissions (Schmidt, 2003, p. A23), and subsequently to Michigan, other 
states have passed referendums limiting Affirmative Action in admissions. 
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While colleges argued their cases within the federal court system, both the University of 
California (Selingo, 2001, p. A23) and the University of Texas (Selingo, 2002, p. A29), after a 
couple of years with disastrous results, put into place what admission systems critics contended 
were just ways of creating proxies to the race-conscious admissions policies that had been 
banned; an example of which is the ten percent rule adopted in Texas. According to an article by 
Gary Engelgau (1998), who was executive director of Admissions and Records at Texas A&M 
University between 1996 and 1997, in the first year after the Hopwood decision, African 
American and Hispanic freshman applications to Texas A&M decreased 13% and 9%, 
respectively (p. 5). Engelgau also noted that the yield (the percent of admitted students who 
enrolled) dropped to historic lows for the freshman class as a whole and for African American 
and Hispanic applicants in particular. He argued that Hopwood was a cause of this decreased 
yield. 
Since Engelgau’s article (1998), the enrollment statistics have only gotten worse. In a 2003 
analysis focusing on three states that had tried to create “back door” policies to increase diversity 
after anti-Affirmative Action policies (Texas, California, and Florida), the Chronicle of Higher 
Education (Hebel, 2003, p. A25) indicated that the attempts to increase diversity in each state 
had not been the least bit successful. They noted that since Hopwood, at Texas A&M, the 
percentage of Blacks who matriculated had fallen by some 30%, and Hispanic enrollments were 
down almost 20% (p. A25). In the U.S. Department of Education survey of more than 3,000 
colleges, the acceptance rate at 4-year institutions has dropped dramatically for minorities since 
1985. Black acceptance rates were down 18%, while American Indian acceptance rates were 
down 8%, and those for Hispanics were down 9% (Trends, 2000). 
These admissions results have repeatedly caught university administrators unaware. In 
each case, administrators responded by arguing about the gross inequalities in the United States 
that exist and the overall power of education to open doors for the country's marginalized 
peoples. As good an example as any is Tony Carnevale's (2000) paper, “The Opportunity Gap: 
Campus Diversity and the New Economy.” He argued that, in order to be competitive, we need a 
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diverse workforce and that, in order to achieve a diverse workforce, we need diverse colleges. He 
noted that some 41% of African Americans and 33% of Hispanics live in households with 
incomes "below the minimum but adequate level set by the U.S. Department of Labor" (p. 10). 
He then went on to note that in 1995, “more than 62% of both men and women in the economy's 
most elite jobs … had bachelor's degrees and another 23 percent had associates degrees" (p. 10). 
He further argued that if the same distribution for college education that exists in the White 
community were available to African American and Hispanic communities, the subsequent 
higher incomes would substantially raise the standard of living of minority families (p. 10). 
Perhaps a more famous example of the current thinking among education professionals is 
the impressive book already referenced, Derek Bok and Bill Bowen's (1998) The Shape of the 
River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions. 
Educators hail the book as the most comprehensive look ever at how students who benefited 
from racial preferences have fared both during and after college. The authors make a persuasive 
case for the success of higher education for African American students by arguing that, without 
Affirmative Action, these students would not have been given the opportunity to succeed. 
Educators hoped that because of the book's dense and rigorous research, based on a study of 
45,184 students who entered 28 selective colleges in the fall of 1976 and the fall of 1989, the 
work would provide the empirical evidence needed to convince skeptics of Affirmative Action 
policies in our country's institutions of higher education that diversity is valuable. 
Educators present these arguments to make a case of the power of American education to 
right former wrongs and to open doors for minorities to succeed. However, it is more important 
to note that the lower courts have soundly rejected these types of arguments in their briefs, and 
even the Supreme Court hedged its decision by limiting the use of the policy among admissions 
officers. 
In an effort to create a more "empirical" defense of raced-based admissions policies, the 
University of Michigan’s case (technically, Gratz v. Bollinger) heard by the Supreme Court used 
the Bok/Bowen research as the basis of its defense. It was hoped by the admissions community 
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that this approach would stem the legal tide against Affirmative Action. Since the Supreme Court 
decided in favor of Michigan’s use of Affirmative Action, we may therefore deduce that 
empirical research seems to hold more sway than philosophical arguments in the context of 
American Affirmative Action discussion. Nonetheless, the Bok/Bowen research still focused on 
the “underserved” minorities as opposed to considering potential benefits to all students or to the 
institutions themselves. It also focused solely on graduates of highly selective colleges. 
Rather than silencing the debate surrounding Affirmative Action and admissions, the 
Michigan decision seems to have fueled the debate. As mentioned in the first paragraph of this 
paper, there is every indication that the debate will continue, as colleges and universities work 
toward implementing the details of the Court’s decision, and as Affirmative Action opponents 
broaden the focus of their legal and political attacks. 
What This Research Contributes to the Debate 
As noted, the debate has largely been focused on how Affirmative Action impacts 
minorities, and the courts have consistently accepted the notion that it is problematic as public 
policy to deny majority students access to higher education in order to benefit minorities. My 
work explores the impact of Affirmative Action on the White students who attend college as well 
as the minority students. I first use the literature to present a solid theoretical basis to examine 
the research question at hand. My discussion is the only work I could find that proposes a 
theoretical chain of events that might explain why it makes sense to investigate the relationship 
between a college’s student body diversity and the salaries of its alumni. I tie employer needs—
particularly of employees who have “cosmopolitan” skill sets—to salaries of employees and 
conceptually and empirically link them to the colleges that are producing these employees. I then 
put forward a reasoned hypothesis that diversity may be a technology that certain firms 
(colleges) employ to produce these “cosmopolitan” graduates. 
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Empirical studies that investigate relationships between institutional characteristics and 
earnings, which I also discuss in this paper, back this context. While a host of methodological 
issues exist and must be contended with, studies are also widely accepted in the literature. 
Unfortunately, there has been very little work done linking the idea of diversity as an 
institutional characteristic and its relationship to earnings. Sanders (2004) looks at law school 
admissions and pass rates for the bar and focuses solely on minorities. There are only two studies 
that look at the relationship between institutional diversity and income, and both explore that 
question as an ancillary part of the study. Kermit, Black, and Smith (2001) primarily look at the 
benefits of diversity programs and then also look at the benefits to all students. Rumberger and 
Thomas (1993) only note the finding of diversity as a predictor of wages in their footnotes. 
In each of the court cases involving challenges to Affirmative Action, institutions of higher 
education, in addition to focusing almost exclusively on the benefits of higher education to the 
minority community, may have made another fundamental error—ignoring the peer effect in 
education, which argues that students, in addition to being consumers of education, are also 
inputs. This argument is supported by research. This being the case, if it can be demonstrated 
that a diverse student body improves the education of all of its students, one could convincingly 
argue that not allowing admissions offices to use several diversity-seeking criteria puts the 
institution at a competitive disadvantage, because the institution cannot use the best available 
inputs to maximize the production of learning on its campus. Secondly, it would penalize 
minority and non-minority students alike by not affording them the highest education possible, 
due to the lack of diversity, though White students who would then be admitted to the college of 
their choice might benefit more. That said, from the institution’s perspective, it would be less 
able to produce the best cohort of graduates. Indeed, in the Hopwood opinion cited in the 
introduction, it was noted that allowing admission to an individual who can run fast was 
acceptable. If helping the football team allows for different admissions standards, then improving 
the salary of an institution’s graduates might also warrant different admissions standards. 
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Furthermore, this research builds on the body of knowledge in that it includes measures of 
diversity in the measures of institutional characteristics. I also consider diversity in measuring 
peer effects. My work differs from Kermit et al. and Rumberger and Thomas in that it looks at 
several measures of diversity and uses three different ways to estimate the parameters related to 
the relationship between institutional diversity and salaries of alumni. Cook and Frank (1993) 
argue, when discussing student quality, that the distribution of students among colleges affects 
the ability of individual colleges to produce learning. Since I find that earnings are related to a 
college’s diversity, then perhaps part of the reason is that peer effects impact the production of a 
set of skills valued by employers (what I call “cosmopolitan skills”). Rothschild and White 
(1995) argue that a competitive price system will achieve diversity only with great difficulty. If it 
turns out that “diversity matters,” then price discounts in the form of financial aid to increase 
diversity may make some sense in addition to Affirmative Action in admissions. 
The purpose of this research presupposes that understanding the importance of a college’s 
diversity in relationship to its graduates’ earnings may have important policy implications both 
for individual institutions (e.g., financial aid and admission standards) and for government. If 
limiting the ability of individual colleges to set their own standards proves detrimental to the 
quality of education, then government should have an interest in deregulating admissions 




THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A Conceptual Framework Grounded in the Literature 
Despite the focus in the courts and the press surrounding Affirmative Action policies in 
college admissions, there has been surprisingly little research on the topic. Most is either 
normative, advocating Affirmative Action or attacking it, or purely empirical, positing no 
reasoned hypothesis as to why there might be a relationship between the diversity of a college’s 
student body and the salaries of its graduates. In addition, the work has always focused on 
whether Affirmative Action benefits minorities. Therefore, this literature review will serve two 
purposes. It will first use a diverse literature to reason through a conceptual framework that 
explains why one might find a relationship between a college’s diversity and its alumni’s 
salaries, and then it will discuss how one might explore that relationship empirically, including 
some of the challenges that such empirical questions pose methodologically. In the figure below 
I illustrate the conceptual model I have developed and discuss in this chapter. 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Why Employers Pay a Premium for Graduates of More 




One interesting facet of this exploration is that the problem repeats itself across scale. The 
same notion advocated within the academic community—“diversity is good for universities”—
has been advocated within the business community, and it follows a similar history, evolving 
from the social justice/mandated context of the 1960s following Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act to making a “business case” for diversity starting in the 1990s (Kochan et al., 2003). 
The emergence of a business case stems largely from changes in the market and changes in the 
workplace. These changes include: increased intensity of both domestic and international 
competition, a proliferation of products and services, accelerated product and process innovation, 
and general uncertainty (Berryman & Bailey, 1992; Friedman 2005). Berryman and Bailey 
suggest that the changes—both internal and external—that organizations are facing require shifts 
in the nature of work and “the skills and educational needs of that work.” They suggest that there 
are two broad production approaches—a “robust” production system that can be viewed as akin 
to mass production and a “flatter” system that has less hierarchy and more flexibility (Berryman 
& Bailey, 1992). 
The resulting evolution of the internal and external environment has resulted in diversity 
being perceived as a competitive advantage by employers. This has led to an articulation of a 
“business case” for diversity that tends to contain at least one of the following six arguments 
described by Cox and Blake (1991) below: 
(1) Cost. As organizations become more diverse simply because of the demographic 
make-up of the labor market, companies will de facto need to diversify their 
workforce, and there will be an increased cost associated with discrimination. Blau 
and Ferber (1998) discuss the arguments, building on Becker’s work, that frame 
discrimination in terms of tastes against associating with different groups of people. 
The argument is that with changing demographics, companies that cannot integrate 
will be at a cost disadvantage. 
(2) Attracting Talent. Companies that are viewed as great places for women and 
minorities will attract the best talent. One empirical example of this is a recent study 
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by Edmans (2008) that used diversity as a component of an employee satisfaction 
measure and found that this measure was significantly correlated with shareholder 
return. Diversity is also one important factor considered when deciding whether a 
firm is one of the 100 Best Companies to Work For in America. 
(3) Ability to Market. In Friedman’s (2005) “flat world,” having cultural insight—
whether to particular communities in the U.S. or abroad—provides a competitive 
advantage to selling one’s services. 
(4) Increased Creativity. Diversity of perspectives and less emphasis on conformity will 
improve creativity within an organization. 
(5) Ability to Solve Problems. Different perspectives and tolerance for diverse ideas 
increase the ability to solve problems and mitigate against “group think.” 
(6) Flexibility. Cox and Blake (1991) summarize the popular argument as follows: “The 
system will be less determinant, less standardized, and therefore more fluid. The 
increased fluidity should create greater flexibility to react to environmental changes” 
(p. 51). 
The six arguments above, while summarized by Cox and Blake and illustrated by other 
references, are iterated by a large number of researchers (e.g., Dunphy, 2004, Esser, 1998, 
Larkey, 1996, Milikin & Martins, 1996, etc.). One can surmise that, like the academy, when it 
comes to Affirmative Action, the business community has embraced the notion of diversity as 
being an admirable goal. A typography has emerged that has a hierarchyfrom “monolithic” to 
“pluralistic” to “multicultural,” which is the apex and to which all companies ought to aspire 
(Cox, 1991).  This provides the first plausible link—business believes that diversity is good for 
business. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), in undertaking an analysis of the economic value of diversity, 
find that a more “multicultural urban environment makes US-born citizens more productive.” 
(p. 39). However, their study focused on cities rather than individual businesses. The fact is that 
the business case articulated above suffers from the same criticisms posited to the University of 
  
14 
Michigan when it was advocating Affirmative Action in the admissions process, namely, that 
there was a lack of evidence to support the case. It also begs the question, assuming that 
companies largely exist to maximize profits, that if there is a good business case, the market 
would adopt any strategy that succeeds, but since there is still evidence that things like “glass 
ceilings” and other barriers exist, it stands to reason that there is something that prevents every 
business from becoming more diverse and more competitive (Blau & Ferber, 1998). It turns out 
that the empirical evidence complicates matters and provides the second link, namely, that 
achieving diversity poses challenges to businesses. 
In 1996, an initiative called “Business Opportunities for Leadership Diversity” was 
instigated to help American corporations by leveraging their diversity for competitive advantage. 
Kochan et al. (2003) commissioned a study from teams of some top-ranked business schools to 
assess the diversity-performance link. The study manifested as four independent mixed method 
studies of some 20 Fortune 100 companies that were then analyzed. The results when taken out 
of context are surprisingly underwhelming. The overarching finding was that “there are few 
direct effects of diversity on performance—either positive or negative” (p. 10). 
The same study went on to note that “there appear to be some conditions under which 
diversity, if managed well, enhances performance” (Kochan et al., 2003, p. 18). The fundamental 
problem is one that sports teams and music groups have long encountered—bringing together 
talent alone does not ensure success. The five best individual players may not constitute the best 
team, which win the most games. The study suggests that organizations that have in place 
processes that allow for constructive conflict resolution and communication significantly 
outperform other companies, especially when their workforces are diverse. The study goes on to 
recommend that organizations develop strategic training programs to develop those skill sets 
among employees. 
A very nice treatment of the concept is provided by Page (2007), who defines diversity in 
a much more complex way than I address within the confines of this study, and it is a broader 
definition than the courts have dealt with (p. 85). That said, he does an elegant job exploring how 
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diversity enhances robustness in complex systems through responsiveness, synergies, and the 
construction of collective knowledge (p. 182). The author also offers interesting insights on how 
diversity increases accuracy in prediction (pp. 224-227). We now have the second link, that there 
is some set of skills that certain organizations possess that allows them to perform well as diverse 
organizations and capture the benefits made by the business case. We can also infer that these 
skill sets may be learnable based on the study’s recommendation to develop training programs. 
But why might certain people have these skills and others not, even when they come from the 
same racial/ethnic background? Social capital theory may help explain the answer. 
According to Ronald Burt (2004), social capital is the contextual complement to human 
capital. Certain people are connected to others, and these connections can be assets. Burt quotes 
Bourdieu: “Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships” (p. 351). He also notes that, like other forms of capital, social capital is productive 
(p. 351). 
One can think of this social capital manifesting itself in social networks made of 
individuals that are interdependent. Research has shown that social networks play a critical role 
in determining the way problems are solved, organizations are run, and the degree to which 
individuals succeed in achieving their goals (Linn, 2001). 
The more closed or homogeneous the network is, the more efficiently it functions but the 
less likely it is to accept new ideas or opportunities. In other words, a group of employees who 
all have the same background, values, and experiences share the same knowledge and 
opportunities and are less likely to have access to a wider range of information (Granoveter, 
1983). 
Among these networks are “structural holes.” Burt (2001) argues that these structural holes 
create opportunities for brokerage. These holes are the source of innovation and new 
opportunities for organizations. Individuals who can fill these holes are very valued because of 
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their ability to create these opportunities for innovation (Burt 2001). Consequently, cultivating or 
identifying people with these skill sets would be important to employers. 
Sociologist Elijah Anderson (2004) observes that our environment is more racially, 
ethnically, and socially diverse than ever. Social distance and tension, as expressed by wariness 
of strangers, appear to be the order of the day. In this environment, most people are what he calls 
“particularistic” and tend to interact with those people who are like them. However, there is 
another group of individuals who are fundamentally different, he calls them “cosmopolitan,” 
people who can and will interact with people who are unlike them. This group of people creates a 
"cosmopolitan canopy," offering a respite and an opportunity for diverse peoples to come 
together to do their business and also to engage in "folk ethnography," which serves as a 
cognitive and cultural base (Anderson, 2004). I posit that it is this group that is the elixir for 
those organizations that seem to effectively leverage diversity and outperform the competition. 
In more general terms, there is a large literature that articulates both sets of skills that 
employers seek across occupations. These skills include things such as problem solving, thinking 
critically, and working in teams (e.g., Coplin, 2012, Stasz, 2001). And there have been some 
studies that suggest that employers perceive that the workforce largely lacks these skills (ASTD, 
2006, Casner-Lotto, Barrington, & Wright, 2006). 
I would suggest that the reason is that these cosmopolitan people are able to fill the 
structural holes to help companies get their diverse teams to function effectively and address the 
sorts of skills mentioned above. Consequently, they are the major source of innovation, and they 
are the ones who turn diverse groups of individuals into high-performing teams that capture the 
business case made by business leaders for diversity. We now have several pieces of the puzzle. 
Companies want diversity, successfully instituting diversity is difficult, and there are these 
“cosmopolitan people” who are able to make these diverse teams high-performing. 
This concept manifests itself in the generally accepted notion in neoclassical economics of 
compensating wage differentials, whereby there is a market for talent, the wages paid reflect the 
demand employers have in terms of the work needed to be done, and where the wage offered 
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reflects the marginal value added by a particular employee. The supply of labor and the wage 
accepted are a manifestation of the types of jobs and the relative desirability of one job over 
another in both wages and other benefits and reflects the individual preferences of employees. 
Perhaps the most cogent discussion of the non-randomness of the distribution of wages can be 
found in A.D. Roy’s (1951) reasoned essay, " Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings." 
T.W. Schultz’s (1963) The Economic Value of Education also makes powerful arguments 
supporting economic returns to education that are generally accepted. The empirical work 
supporting the concept of economic returns to education goes back at least several decades as 
well (e.g., Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1970). 
To illustrate, we can use as a conceptual model the work by Blau and Ferber (1998) in 
which they use compensating wage differentials to tease out a discrimination coefficient that 
amounts to the tax a firm is willing to pay in order to not have to associate with people not like 
them. One can think of a similar cosmopolitan coefficient that would work in a similar way but 
would have a positive rather than a negative sign and would manifest itself in a wage premium 
paid (as opposed to the Blau and Ferber model, it amounts to a wage gap/differential for the 
same work). One can even envision competing coefficients (e.g., uncomfortableness with others 
versus wanting a high-performing team). The conceptual model can become quite complicated; 
Rosen (1986) discusses the various parts that go into any wage/labor transaction, and one can 
think of all sorts of other externalities that either the firm or the individual would pay (in the case 
of the employee, the “pay” would manifest as a discounted wage). One example is the one 
already referenced in certain organizations being “great places to work” as a result of effectively 
leveraging their diversity; on the employer side, this might lead to less cost to retain, and so 
employers would pay a premium to cosmopolitan workers because they would help retain other 
workers. The argument basically boils down to what Rosen would call a firm choice of a 
technology, where diversity becomes a technology, and then the firm needs to hire workers with 
the cosmopolitan “skill set.” 
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Therefore, the organization that wants diversity and wants these cosmopolitan people will 
pay a wage premium to get them. The next question is where one would find such cosmopolitan 
people, and the answer, to paraphrase Peter Cappelli (2008), is for the employer to either “buy it” 
or “build it.” 
The literature does suggest that we need to be cautious and not overemphasize the benefits 
of diversity. Negative influences of diversity have also been argued. Lau and Murnighan (2005) 
found that it may trigger group fragmentation, and the organizational behavior literature suggests 
that diverse teams may be less cohesive than homogeneous teams, and the lack of cohesiveness 
may hamper the performance benefits of diversity (Flache & Mas, 2008). 
That said, the evidence from literature suggests that training employees to be 
“cosmopolitan” is not something that organizations do well. Indeed, in all the studies, training 
was listed as the single biggest reason as to why diversity initiatives failed (e.g., Allen, 2001; 
Dunphy, 2004; Kochan et al., 2003, Ng & Turn, 1998). Most of the training programs described 
were characterized as “diversity awareness” programs as opposed to the best universities, which 
foster an environment that promotes learning from diversity (I will make the case subsequently). 
Regardless of whether the organization decides to buy or build a set of employees who 
have these cosmopolitan skill sets, the underlying model is a human capital framework that 
relates education to earning and builds on similar research that relates the characteristics of 
education to workers’ earnings. This allows us to make the link between the business need and 
why one might look “upstream” at colleges to see if they are producing these cosmopolitan 
employees. The basic premise is that investing in education leads to higher productivity in the 
form of these cosmopolitan traits, which may be measured in terms of higher earnings. The 
rationale behind this is that wages are determined based on a worker’s contribution to the 
revenues of the employer; more productive workers earn more, other things being equal. This 
concept is generally accepted by economists and traces its theoretical roots to the very beginning 
of economics as a discipline, with economists such as Smith (1952) and von Thünen (1968) 
accepting the premise. 
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There are more modern economists who provide additional theoretical and empirical 
evidence to support my hypothesis. Human capital theory assumes that educated laborers receive 
additional compensation due to their superior cognitive skills. Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 
(2001) challenge this assumption and developed a model to test for the “noncognitive component 
of the returns to schooling” (p. 1149). In one function, the determinants of income (y) include 
schooling (s), parental socioeconomic background (b), cognitive skill level (c), and a dummy 
variable (ε) to account for the residual factors uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
(p. 1148): 
y = βss + βbb + βcc + ε 
Bowles et al. developed a second function that does not include the cognitive skill level (c) 
variable. Instead, cognitive skill development is assumed to be incorporated into the measure of 
the individual’s schooling (s’): 
y’ = β’ss + β’bb + ε’ 
Bowles et al. then took the beta coefficients for schooling from each of the models and compared 
them to determine the non-cognitive affects of schooling on income, represented in the equation 
below as alpha (α): 
 
The alpha (α) variable could fall within a range of 0 to 1. α = 0 signifies that the only effect of 
schooling on earnings is through cognitive skill development. On the other hand, α = 1 suggests 
that the effect of schooling on earnings is uncorrelated with cognitive skills. After running their 
regressions, Bowles et al. found the mean value of α was 0.82, while the median value was 0.84. 
“This suggests that a substantial portion of the returns to schooling are generated by effects or 
correlates of schooling substantially unrelated to the cognitive capacities measured on the 
available tests” (pp. 1149-1150). The conclusions reached by Bowles et al. corroborates the 
previous findings of Huang (1996) and Taber (1997). 
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Bowles and Gintis (2002) contend that there are unobservable characteristics, beyond 
cognitive ability, that are developed through education and rewarded in the labor market. These 
unobservable characteristics are referred to as “behavioral traits” due to their non-productive 
nature (p. 11). One could think of my notion of “cosmopolitanism” as one of these behavioral 
traits. 
Enrico Moretti (2004) provides another theoretical support to my hypothesis and bolsters it 
with empirical evidence. If one thinks of the production of learning as occurring to an individual, 
then one can reason that any benefit or cost accrued to others is an externality. Moretti names 
this notion the external return to education. He posits and finds some evidence that if there were 
only private returns to education, then the number of college graduates in a town should not 
impact the average wages above what one would expect from the aggregate private returns. 
However, if there is a social return to education, then the external return (the combination of the 
social and private) would be greater than the private return alone. Using both NLSY and Census 
data, and controlling for unobservability across individuals and across cities, Moretti finds 
consistently that there seems to be an external benefit to the city for all workers that cannot be 
attributed to private returns. He ends this paper with a nice illustration comparing two towns: 
Compare a city like El Paso, TX, a poor border community, with San Jose, CA, 
which lies in the heart of Silicon Valley. The former, with the eighth lowest average 
education level in the US, experienced virtually no increase in the proportion of 
college graduates in the 1980s. The latter, with one of the highest levels of average 
education, witnessed a 5.1% increase in the proportion of college graduates. 
Findings in this paper suggest that in San Jose the external return to education may 
have accounted for wage increases among high-school graduates and college 
graduates of 8% and 2%, respectively. These increases occurred over the ten year 
period between 1980 and1990. No wage increase was caused by the external return 
to education in El Paso. (p. 209) 
Once can think of “cosmopolitanism” as an externality outside the cognitive component of 
the production function. This externality would manifest itself in several ways—the individual 
would accrue the skill sets of being able to navigate in diverse settings, the college would see a 
relative benefit in terms of its ability to produce graduates who earn more money, and firms who 
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hire such graduates would see benefits relative to hiring graduates with similar cognitive abilities 
but without the skill sets gained by prolonged exposure to students with different backgrounds. 
We have now developed a plausible theory as to why a firm might pay a premium for one 
of these cosmopolitan employees. I must now make the case conceptually as to why diverse 
colleges might be a good source of these cosmopolitan employees. To facilitate an understanding 
of this, in this paper I rely on the education production function. The production function 
represents the process by which students can transform inputs into outputs. The transformation 
occurs in an academic environment, and as such, learning can be viewed as a technology. The 
argument I will make is two-fold. First, that a cohort—a particular student’s peers—is an 
important part of the production of learning, and that the technology of more diverse colleges 
differs from the technology of more homogenous colleges' students. Basically, diversity matters 
if one wants to produce these sorts of cosmopolitan students. To "produce" an academic 
outcome, even one that may be unobservable in itself but is reflected in the income an employer 
pays, economists typically employ an education production function, which models the 
relationship between various college inputs and the ultimate increased perceived productivity of 
the worker as reflected in their salary. In this regard, academic outcomes are comparable to 
learning as a technology (e.g., Hanushek, 1979; Summers & Wolfe, 1977). I posit that 
institutional diversity is an input vector. 
Based on the above description, there are two production functions in the current higher 
education system. Both student types may have a similar vector of outputs, comprised of college-
degree attainment, stable employment, and higher salary, than the counterfactual of not attending 
a post-secondary institution, but the one who went to the diverse college, other things being 
equal, will have benefitted from this exposure and have become “cosmopolitan.” Thus, it is in 
the inputs where the distinction is made between the two, namely, that the quality of one’s peers, 
and in particular their backgrounds, matters. Belfield (2000), in discussing the use of production 
function in higher education, notes, “More desirable students are simply those who are better as 
inputs at generating the output of human capital. Hence they should get a better income or larger 
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financial scholarships” (p. 89). In this framework, if one accepts the premise that students of a 
particular background enhance an institution’s ability to produce cosmopolitan students, then one 
would expect to see more financial aid allocated to traditionally underrepresented groups in order 
to increase diversity, which is exactly what happens. 
To understand the concept, we must examine whether the peer effect has any influence on 
an individual’s productivity, then explain whether diversity is an “innovation” within the peer 
effect that enhances this productivity, and finally make the argument that this innovation is the 
ability to produce cosmopolitan workers. There is some evidence to support the notion of the 
peer effect influencing learning outcomes. In a working paper for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Caroline Hoxby (1997) begins to make the case for thinking of students and 
their peers as inputs. She writes, 
The quality of a college is partly determined by the peers with whom a prospective 
student would be educated. Students, therefore, are inputs into the production of 
college education as well as consumers of it. Furthermore, students must be inputs at 
the same college where they consume. (p. 18) 
Hoxby’s claim is further supported by work done by Gordon Winston (1999), who also 
supported the idea of students as inputs to education (p. 18). In general terms, Winston argues 
that the goal of higher education institutions is to maintain or improve the quality of the 
educational services they supply. This goal is measured relative to other academic institutions 
(p. 16). If this is the case, a factor to note is that if the value of diversity in learning outcomes is 
accepted, then combined with the limited pool of minority college applicants, one would expect 
colleges to pay a premium to get these students to apply and enroll. 
Robert Hauser (1988) conducted a study that found when one controlled for social 
background characteristics and academic performance, Hispanic and African Americans seemed 
to have a net advantage over Whites in college admissions (p. 102). This notion is further 
supported by work done by Hoxby (1997). Namely, because students are both consumers and 
inputs simultaneously, net tuition combines the gross tuition plus the income paid as an input, 
which, it could be argued, manifests itself as financial aid. Hoxby goes on to note that if a 
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college makes an investment in quality, it will achieve expanded returns through the improved 
quality of peers (p. 20). In other words, because students are inputs into the educational process 
and if diversity is valued, then institutions ought to be willing to pay premiums to get these 
students. This logic is supported by these two studies, Hauser (1988) and Hoxby (1997). The 
economic motivation by the college to garner a “premium input” constitutes an important and 
different way to think about financial aid, which again was argued by Belfield (2000). 
Traditional thinking focuses on financial aid to manage yield or increase access for purely moral 
reasons. 
There is surprisingly little empirical, non-attitudinal literature when it comes to exploring 
the effect of peers in educational outcomes. I note this because in the vast majority of the 
literature peer effect is simply implied as a given. Perhaps this is because the grandfathers of 
pedagogy, such as Piaget, talked in philosophical terms about the influence of peers. However, 
most published literature on the subject deals with “how to” achieve a positive peer effect rather 
than whether it is impactful. I will, therefore, spend a fair amount of time exploring this issue. I 
will first explain the two major theories of cooperative learning—Piaget’s cognitive theory and 
Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory—to provide the reader with the theoretical framework to 
understand how cooperative-learning structures might create the peer effect. I will then outline 
current research that supports or refutes these theories of learning and compare this research to 
the current research in economics that suggests a peer effect in education. 
Piaget (1972) outlines various mechanisms to explain how children acquire cognitive 
abilities. Central to his theory is the use of prior knowledge to either build on or reconstruct what 
a child has believed to be true. As a child encounters differing experiences, one of two things 
occurs: the new experiences either maintain or disrupt the balance (equilibrium) of what the child 
thought to be true. If the activity is repeated and consistent with prior knowledge, it fits in easily 
with that prior knowledge (assimilation). If the experience is new or different from what the 
child experienced before, then the child experiences a sense of disequilibrium; the child is forced 
either to alter or reorganize his/her cognitive structure to accommodate the new information. In 
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this case, the child either fits the information in where it is most appropriate (assimilation) or 
must create a new cognitive structure in the case of completely new information 
(accommodation). 
Piaget (1932) distinguishes between two social interactions that give rise to this shift in 
thinking: constraint and cooperation. In his observations of family interactions, Piaget notes that 
relationships defined by constraint tend to have one person who is the authority and another who 
is the novice. In this relationship, the authority figure is permitted to dictate terms, and the 
novice obeys these terms without question. This relationship is defined with one person being in 
a position of privilege and power and the other in the position of a submissive pawn. Piaget 
contrasts this relationship with one based on cooperation, where each member of the relationship 
has mutual respect for the other party. Piaget contends that children’s knowledge based on 
cooperative relationships appears later and is more advanced than those concepts acquired 
through constraint relationships (Piaget, 1932; De Lisi, 2002). 
Piaget (1985) defines knowledge as a relationship between the child’s current cognitive 
domain and the specific object, task, or problem at hand. This relationship can occur alone or 
within a group context. De Lisi (2002) points out that when a child works alone on a task, the 
child’s cognitive system is only minimally or superficially engaged. While children engaged in 
such a way might be aware of some misconceptions in their thinking, their own interpretations 
tend to be overly personal and egocentric. In this context, children are less likely to come in 
contact with ideas or concepts that challenge their thinking, making it less likely that they will 
advance in their cognitive abilities. Thus, De Lisi argues that when students work together on a 
task, they are more likely to engage with learning material more deeply. 
It is useful to consider Piaget’s (1972) model of socio-cognitive conflict and learning when 
considering both the benefits and limitations of peer learning. In this context, students working in 
groups may find differences between what they thought previously and what they eventually 
believe to be true. This tension between old and new ideas generally leads students to recognize 
that their conceptualizations are different from others’, to challenge viewpoints that differ from 
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their own, and to try out new ideas posed by other students in their group. To deal with the 
discrepancies between their own thinking and that of their peers, students might even seek new 
information to help them understand alternative points of view. All of these options promote 
learning (Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Johnson & Johnson, 1979). 
According to Vygotsky (1978), all children naturally develop lower mental capacities, 
such as concrete perceptions and involuntary action, but it is only through interactive social 
activities with more advanced peers and adults that children are able to develop higher mental 
functions, such as language, counting, and problem solving. The lower mental functions do not 
disappear; rather, they are reorganized through social processes into more sophisticated, higher 
mental functions. Vygotsky believes that these transformations occur in a social setting where 
learners engage with others who expose them to new concepts, behaviors, or stances. Eventually, 
Vygotsky contends, the learner internalizes these experiences so that they become part of their 
own mental capacities. 
Vygotsky (1978) argues that there is a potential learning difference between what children 
can accomplish individually and what they can do when they interact with others. If children 
remain alone while learning new concepts, their mental capacities remain on the lower end of the 
learning potential spectrum. If children engage with other, more experienced learners, they are 
able to accomplish more and move toward the higher end of the learning potential spectrum. A 
central tenet of this theory of cognitive development is his theoretical concept of the zone of 
proximal development. It is this central tenet that lends support for a peer effect in learning 
theories. Vygotsky defines the zone of proximal development as the distance between the actual 
development as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential 
development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration 
with more knowledgeable others. The zone of proximal development applies to both the child’s 
learning process and the child’s cognitive development (Doolittle, 1997). Vygotsky (1978) 
writes, “The zone of proximal development defines those functions that have not yet matured but 
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are in the process of maturation, functions that will mature tomorrow but are currently in an 
embryonic state” (p. 86). 
One important factor in the peer effect is the notion of peers as co-learners and co-teachers 
(Piaget, 1932; Vygostsky, 1978). Research has demonstrated that peers can assist each other in 
understanding and learning the material through group discussion, sharing of resources, 
modeling academic skills, and interpreting and clarifying the tasks for each other (Schunk, 1987; 
Schunk & Zimmerman, 1997; Sieber, 1979). When individuals work collaboratively, they work 
together to build new knowledge, skills, and understanding that they did not have before 
engaging in the social learning activity (Damon & Phelps, 1989). Such interactions also enhance 
the quality of analytic reasoning around a topic because students are forced to justify and 
articulate their reasons for understanding and, if necessary, to defend their positions (Joiner & 
Jones, 2003). These interactions also engage students in the learning process so that they remain 
motivated and focused. 
While it is useful to have a theoretical understanding of why learning with others leads to 
deeper understanding of the material, the term peer effect has a slightly different meaning. 
Generally, most researchers use the term peer effect to describe the influence students have on 
one another during a particular interaction. According to Winston and Zimmerman (2003), the 
people involved must be “equals.” When researchers suggest a peer effect occurs, focus on the 
effect is directed toward interactions among students, not among faculty and administrators. 
The difference between cognitive theories of learning and economic theories suggests that 
different research studies and knowledge inform those theories. Several economists studying 
peer effects in higher education point to their importance to educational output, since students 
provide the input critical to their production. If a college or university accepts students who, 
through their interactions, will influence the academic achievement and social decisions of 
others, then this will in turn affect the academic and social reputation of the institution. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that this influence is not always positive. So that students 
who enter will have a positive influence and together raise the achievement and learning capacity 
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of the entering class, the soundness of the admissions process becomes vital to the success of the 
university. 
Unfortunately, research on how peer effect influences learning in higher education has not 
been given much attention. This is relatively understandable since many institutions of higher 
education are run by private, rather than public, sectors, and these institutions receive less 
government funding than their primary and secondary counterparts. However, peer effects might 
actually have a great impact on the economic success of an institution, since college and 
university-bound students “shop” for their top choice in schools. If the types of students the 
college or university admits actually positively influence the type of output the school produces, 
then the school should be focusing its efforts on maximizing the quality of its incoming cohorts. 
The first major study on peer effects was the Coleman (1966) report entitled, Equality of 
Educational Opportunity. Coleman attempted to study the features of a school that led to 
differences in student achievement. He used over half a million students and pulled from over 
3,000 elementary and secondary schools. As noted in Goethals, Winston, and Zimmerman 
(1999), Coleman’s research found that “a pupil’s achievement is strongly related to the 
educational backgrounds and aspirations of other students in the school” (p. 8). In subsequent 
years, this study has been criticized for exaggerating the influences that peer effects have on 
student achievement, because Coleman did not control for variables that have profound 
influences on student achievement, such as parental influences, school choice, and neighborhood 
demographics. 
As Cheslock and Hilmer (2001) point out, higher education institutions actually have a 
rare ability to select the type of students who may positively or negatively affect the academic 
achievement of the student body. Some examples of these decisions include: Should more 
recruiting and aid dollars be spent to secure high ability students? Should high-ability students be 
placed in an honors track, or does the institution benefit from their participation in all classes? 
How can the institution support those students who are not performing well in their courses? The 
admissions process not only influences students’ academic success while in school, but also 
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impacts how future employers view the school, since the past and present student productivity 
shapes employers’ opinions regarding the types of student the school produces. 
Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003) and McEwan (2003) point out that 
measures of peer effects may serve as an alternative explanation for arbitrary or misunderstood 
factors that affect individual achievement, leading to biased results that tend to exaggerate peer 
effects. It is also important to recognize that a student in a learning environment both is affected 
by and affects his/her peers during this interaction. Learners could be the cause or effect of 
academic achievement as a result of social interaction. The simultaneous nature of this 
interaction is extremely difficult to isolate at a given instance, and randomization does not help 
because it is difficult to understand whether a student is learning through the process of teaching 
other students or if it is because they are working with students. 
What is known is that that learning does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, learners build a 
foundation of knowledge and then move to higher ordered skills; thus, Hanushek et al. (2003) 
argue that it is important to look at how history might impact achievement. The authors argue 
that, since students have a history of learning within their families, their schools, and their 
neighborhoods, it is important to factor these variables into a peer effect study. First of all, 
families have a profound impact on student achievement, especially during the years of K-12 
schooling. Two students at the same K-12 school most likely are from families with similar 
demographics, socioeconomic status, and educational and employment achievement. However, if 
research studies do not account for family differences at the college level, they might 
inadvertently attribute student achievement to peer effect instead of family involvement. Second, 
since funding for public schools in the United States is correlated with neighborhood income 
level, researchers might be attributing a peer effect to learning when increases in student 
achievement are actually due to program changes, qualification of teachers, and resources, all of 
which are related to funding. 
For researchers studying higher education, a major methodological challenge in assessing 
the extent to which peer effect exists is that students with similar abilities and interests tend to 
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attend similarly tiered institutions. Once at these institutions, people generally gravitate toward 
those who share similar academic behaviors and social beliefs, especially beyond the freshman 
year (Zimmerman, 1999). This makes it difficult to determine to what extent peers actually affect 
behavior, since the cause could be a peer effect or simply that a person has chosen to associate 
with those who would influence a certain type of behavior. Researchers run the risk of attributing 
a peer effect when, in fact, one does not exist. This challenge makes it difficult to set up an 
experimental situation where researchers could randomly assign people to differing peer 
environments and then measure their effect on educational achievement. For that reason, 
researchers have used randomly assigned freshman roommates to determine the influence 
students have on one another’s academic achievement (Hoover, 2003). 
Hanushek et al. (2003) conducted a study of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
(TAS), which is administered to children in grades 3 through 8. The tests are criterion-
referenced, and they test the student’s mastery of mathematics and reading learning. The study 
focused on the math portion of the test, since research shows that schools have a much larger 
impact on math skills than reading in grades 4 through 6 (Hanushek et al., 2003). This test was 
ideal for their study because each student was provided with a unique student ID number that 
was linked to school data that detailed information on individual teachers, including grade and 
subject taught, class size, years of experience, and student population served. This also provided 
researchers with a way to use Federal Title I compensatory education programs for low-income 
children to evaluate the premise that low-income families lead to low achievement in children, as 
the 1966 Coleman study suggests. The authors acknowledged that this control can be 
inconclusive, since Federal Title I subsidies can be “noisy” (p. 537). The study found that peer 
average achievement has a significant effect on individual achievement, with lower average peer 
achievement pulling down individual achievement and higher average peer achievement 
positively impacting individual achievement. However, they found little or no evidence that 
heterogeneous classes had a significant impact on achievement. 
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Zimmerman (1999) studied peer effects at Williams College, a small, highly selective 
liberal arts college. This quasi-experimental study used assigned freshman roommates to try to 
tease out biases normally found when studying peer effects, arguing that there would be less bias 
in the selection of roommates. Before entering the college, students filled out a housing 
preference sheet indicating whether they had health conditions, smoked, enjoyed frequent 
visitors, had sleeping preferences, and so forth. While this study still allowed students to choose 
roommates somewhat based on preferences, no questions regarding ethnicity, prior academic 
achievement, or athletic affiliations were mentioned. Zimmerman contends that the factors 
would lead to a “problematic selection bias.” Yet, his study does reveal biases in the questions 
asked by the housing office. He states that smokers, on average, have SAT scores 193 points 
lower than non-smokers, which is statistically significant. Thus, smokers who live together might 
exhibit lower academic achievement, whether or not a peer effect exists. Another significant 
statistic is that those who study in silence generally score 237 points higher on their SATs than 
those who do not. So those who choose to live with others who study in silence might exhibit 
greater academic achievement than those who do not, regardless of a peer effect. After 
conducting several sets of multiple regressions, Zimmerman contends that most of the student 
housing variables are not statistically significant for grades, even though they are for SAT scores. 
Zimmerman (1999) finds that peer effects are more strongly linked with verbal SAT scores 
than they are with math SAT scores. A 100-point increase in a roommate's verbal SAT score 
translated into a slight increase (.043 increase) in grade-point average over a student's four years 
at Williams, which is about 15% of a 100 point increase in the student’s own SAT score. 
Students in the middle of the SAT distribution tend to perform lower academically if they are 
paired with someone who is in the bottom 15% of the verbal distribution, while students in the 
top tier of the SAT distribution are least affected by peers. The peer effect found by Zimmerman 
is not large, but it is significantly statistic, suggesting that it exists. 
Sacerdote (2001) studied peer effect at Dartmouth College using a similar roommate-based 
approach as Zimmerman (1999) to determine the peer influence of a student on his/her 
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roommate’s grade point average, as well as on participation in fraternities and choice of college 
majors. The results suggested a non-linear relationship, with weaker students experiencing better 
academic achievement when paired with a roommate in the top 25% of the SAT distribution. 
Furthermore, Sacerdote (2001) found significant peer effect on fraternity participation, but not in 
the choice of college major. However, Dartmouth, like Williams, is a highly selective university, 
so it is difficult to determine whether selectivity influenced these results. 
Hoover (2003) cites a Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2000) study of peer effects at 
Berea College. This study provides a useful contrast to the previous studies because Berea 
College targets low-income students (capping family income at about $65,000). This study is 
also unique because it does not pull from a highly selective college, which allows for a more 
heterogeneous data set. The analysis revealed no correlation between a student's ACT scores and 
a roommate's first-semester grades, but Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2000) noted that a long-
term study might yield different results. The study did find evidence that, for women, a 
roommate's family income had a positive impact on grades and retention. 
We can therefore surmise that there is some reason to accept the notion of a student’s peers 
impacting her learning. The next logical step is to investigate whether the diversity of the cohort 
matters. Some work has been done on the impact of diversity on learning. One example comes 
from a series of papers sponsored by the American Council on Education and the American 
Association of University Professors collectively, and is entitled Does Diversity Make a 
Difference? One of the studies, by Roxane Gudeman (2000), looks at student outcomes as they 
relate to the college mission and its commitment to diversity. In her analysis of mission 
statements of the most selective and highly ranked liberal arts colleges, she found that 61% have 
an explicit commitment to diversity, which she argued implies that they perceive some 
educational value to a diverse campus (p. 43), though there are other plausible explanations, such 
as an institutional commitment to social justice. Gudeman then reports a case study she 
conducted at Macalaster College. She reports, "Faculty members who teach content related to 
diversity found that students in racially and ethnically diverse classes developed a heightened 
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capacity to think critically” (p. 45). While she is not explicit in her findings or in her 
methodology, what is implied is that exposing students to the concept of diversity allows them to 
see different perspectives and therefore think more critically. Gudeman concludes her paper by 
stating: 
The debate about Affirmative Action and current legal cases have deflected public 
discourse away from consideration of the range of qualities that makes individuals 
potentially valued participants in a learning community. It has ignored the 
educational value of a diverse learning environment to all students—a value attested 
to even by expert scholar/teachers who themselves do not teach about diversity in 
their class. (p. 53) 
The final paper in the collection, by Patricia Martin (2000), is a qualitative study of the 
educational value of multi-racial, multi-ethnic classrooms. The study had three major findings: 
(1) racial and ethnic diversity is necessary but not sufficient for creating the most effective 
educational environment; (2) racial and ethnic diversity increases the educational possibilities of 
the classroom; and (3) multi-racial and multi-ethnic classes enhance educational outcomes 
(p. 61). 
Another paper that may present evidence of the value of diversity in learning is from a 
chapter of the Report of the American Educational Research Association (AERA) Panel on 
Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities. Jeff Milem’s (2003) paper is a literature review of 
the findings of the benefits of diversity. Milem argues that the literature suggests that a strong 
case can be made for both institutional and societal benefits of having diverse campuses. Most 
important for my argument is his focus on the individual benefits for students. Milem notes that 
"research evidence regarding individual benefits of diversity suggests that diversity enhances 
student growth and development in the cognitive, affective and interpersonal domains” (p. 4). He 
goes on to write: 
There are also a number of ways in which the learning outcomes of students are 
enhanced by their interaction with diversity in college. Students who engaged in 
more interactions with diversity while in college show greater relative gains in 
critical thinking and active thinking. They are also more likely to show evidence of 
greater intellectual engagement and academic motivation. (p. 15) 
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Milem goes on to mention an uncited study, writing: "In a study of the impact of college 
‘quality’ on men's wages, the findings indicate that white and black men who attended more 
racially diverse institutions were likely to earn more money than their peers who attended less 
diverse ‘high quality’ institutions” (p. 12). Milem cites another study that suggests that this 
benefit is particularly true for White students (p. 15). He concludes by noting that "an emerging 
body of research suggests that students who attend more diverse colleges are likely to enjoy 
greater material benefits than their peers who attend less diverse institutions; this is particularly 
true for students who attend highly selective institutions" (p. 15). 
The University of Michigan court case (Gratz et al. v. Bollinger) revolving around 
Affirmative Action policies presented perhaps the best work with respect to exploring the 
educational value of diversity. During the trial, the lead expert witness for Michigan, Patricia 
Gurin, presented research in the form of a report in which she argued that diversity has a vital 
educational value within the classroom and on campus. Gurin, a professor of psychology at the 
University of Michigan, proposed that diversity allows students to learn better and think in a 
more complex manner. She drew upon identity psychology, the notion of "discontinuity" in 
cognitive-developmental psychology, and many other fields to state the case for the value of 
diversity in the sphere of higher education. Connecting the debate into the broader social sphere, 
she claimed: "Education plays a foundational role in a democracy by equipping students for 
meaningful participation. Students educated in diverse settings are better able to participate in a 
pluralistic democracy” (Gurin, 1999, p. 45). 
A study by Terenzini, Cabrera, Colbeck, Bjorklund, and Parente (2001) found that the 
racial/ethnic composition of a classroom might be related to the development of students' 
problem-solving and group skills. However, the authors found the nature of the effect to be 
curvilinear (p. 526). Scholars such as Alexander Astin  (1977), in his classic study Four Critical 
Years: Effects of College on Beliefs, Attitudes, and Knowledge, have used previous empirical 
studies on student development in college to argue for the benefits of diversity. For example, 
Astin's (1993a) book, What Matters in College: Four Critical Years Revisited, is a revised 
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version of the original and argues that exposure to diversity in the classroom results in higher 
affective and cognitive development. This study, which supplements Astin's original work on the 
issue, provides findings that point to evidence that students exposed to diversity-related activities 
in their college experiences perceive gains in affective and cognitive development. 
Astin (1993b) also conducted a rather extensive  longitudinal survey (with some 146 input 
variables that characterize the entering students, 192 environmental variables relating to 
institutional and faculty characteristics, and 82 outcome variables) of 25,000 students from 1985 
to 1989. The results suggested that an emphasis on diversity is beneficial to student development 
(p. 47). A study by Chang (1999) that surveyed faculty about their perceptions of diversity and 
its benefits suggested that a racially diverse student body has a positive effect on educational 
outcomes through its effects on diversity-oriented student activities and experiences (p. 384). 
The preceding literature is a critical selection of studies and reports that are of interest 
regarding the issue of the educational benefit of diversity. It by no means constitutes a complete 
survey of the topic, but rather reflects a wide range of approaches to the issue in order to give a 
general idea of the different directions in which these studies can lead. Most of the works 
mentioned above are heavily cited in current reports on the educational benefits of diversity. The 
sample represented here ranges from theoretical and empirical work on cooperative learning in 
elementary school to statistics-based surveys of students on campuses, indicating the multitude 
of directions a researcher may take when investigating the value of diversity. While a clear body 
of evidence in one discipline has yet to emerge, this sample indicates that there has been 
disparate research in a number of fields that seems to suggest that there is merit in exploring the 
question economically. We know that it has been argued that college represents a distinctive 
developmental stage and that substantial changes occur both in what is valued and how one 
thinks (Astin, 1993a). Critical to this process is what the theorists call "dissonance" (Astin 
1993a, Erikson, 1946). Astin also argues there is a vast literature that supports the importance of 
peers. I will cover the empirical literature around this later in this literature review. However, the 
crux theoretically is housed within Piaget (1972). 
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I explain my theory linking salaries to a college’s institutional diversity by making a case 
for a business need for diversity, then argue that diverse workplaces tend to underperform unless 
there are these “cosmopolitan” employees that bridge the structural holes. I then use neoclassical 
economics to argue that it is reasonable for firms to pay for the cosmopolitan skill set and that 
human capital theory says that one can see the manifestation of the premium because of having 
developed the skill set. I then make the argument that it is reasonable for employers to look to 
colleges as a source of these cosmopolitan employees because development in general is not a 
core competency of business and diversity-training programs in general tend to fail because of 
their design. I then suggest that colleges may be ideally suited to develop people with these skill 
sets. I first argue that if we think about learning as a production function, then we can think about 
peers as an input and a diverse peer group as a technology, examining the literature to bolster the 
argument. This brings us to the final piece in the puzzle, and we return to the notion of the 
fractal, namely, that colleges have a very similar interest in diversity and can make a “business 
case” for it. Luckily, though, there has been a little more thought put into what it is that the 
diverse cohort teaches all of its students, and it finishes the theoretical mosaic nicely. 
A fundamental difference is that there is teleology to the college experience that is 
different. It is akin to “trial by ordeal” in that the students all want to get through and have to 
work together to succeed; it results in a prolonged shared experience that in some ways forces 
students to learn how to navigate. This may overcome the initial tendency to stay within 
homogenous groups. There has been some work done in this area: Transactional Stress and 
Coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), Uncertainty Anxiety Management Theory (UAM) 
(Gudykunst, 1995, 2005), and Critical Race Theory (e.g., Stevenson, 2008). Stevenson has been 
working on the issue of racially anxious encounters and applying how this plays out in learning. 
Stevenson’s (2008) fundamental argument is that individuals who are fearful of making 
mistakes in racially anxious encounters do so as a function of their threat appraisal (Is this a 
threat or a challenge?) and their self-efficacy appraisal (Can I manage the threat or challenge?). 
Coping strategies flow from these appraisals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The UAM theory 
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suggests that people who are uncertain about what to do in dealing with strangers will have more 
anxiety, and that will lead to more mistakes. They fear that they may say something that will 
offend someone or something inappropriate. These theories did not target racial or ethnic 
diversity per se, but Stevenson (2008) has been integrating it into the area of learning and race. 
This brings up, however, the importance of processes that either help individuals to 
reappraise the threat as a mountain to be climbed rather than a tidal wave of mass destruction 
(according to Stevenson, 2008, often the reaction Whites or others unexposed or inexperienced, 
say, in predominantly White settings where their lack of knowledge and skill in diversity has 
never been tested) and/or increase the skill level (thus increasing one’s sense of control or self-
efficacy with racial encounters). Moreover, according to UAM, mindfulness actually reduces 
uncertainty and anxiety. If one is more mindful, he or she is more focused and less likely to make 
errors, missteps, or inappropriate remarks. Stevenson argues that this is the importance of racial 
socialization in that mindfulness does not come simply from concentration, being a good person, 
having one close best Black friend. It only comes from explicit engagement with the thing that 
most people are afraid of within a racially anxious encounter. Without some direction or 
exposure and experience, but mostly directed practice on this, mindfulness of racially anxious 
encounters will not come. Stevenson posits that bringing folks together for, say, a 4-year 
undergraduate experience can result in exactly the sort of mindfulness that will slowly teach all 
of them to learn how to better assess and navigate interactions with people who are different 
from them. He notes that, in general, it is an American pastime to avoid these encounters. In 
essence, students who have been within diverse environments may be more mindful or skilled at 
managing these stressful racial encounters and are more likely to listen, not overreact, over-
punish, and may be more likely to problem-solve with colleagues or subordinates of color 
because they are less anxious because of their exposure and experience—the crux of what 
Anderson (2004) terms people who are “cosmopolitan.” 
An argument has now been presented that organizations value diversity for business 
reasons but that, in the absence of these cosmopolitan employees, diversity initiatives largely 
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fail. I have then suggested that organizations will pay a premium for these employees, and while 
employers can develop employees with these skill sets, it is more effective for employers to look 
upstream to colleges that produce them. I then argued that certain colleges have a technological 
advantage in their “production” of learning in that they have more diverse student cohorts. The 
result is a cohort of cosmopolitan potential employees. The development of cosmopolitan 
employees is something that the racially and ethnically diverse college does by affirming in its 
recruitment of a diverse student body and bringing this diverse group of students together on 
campus—students who are at an age where they are ready to experience this cognitive 
dissonance and who learn not only how to cope with this heterogeneous environment but to 
value it and leverage it. And it is this ability to leverage, to fill these structural holes created by 
disparate groups, that leads to innovation and that the employer places a premium on. In her 
expert report for the University of Michigan, Patricia Gurin (1999) argued that given the 
diversity in which our country functions, people need to be able to forge alliances that respect 
competing perspectives. Consequently people need to be able to work in heterogeneous 
environments. She went on to posit that skills that make people successful in this environment 
include the capacity to find commonalities among differences, acceptance of differences, and 
interest in the wider social world. She noted that students often arrive at college without these 
skills and can only acquire them if the college environment reflects the diversity of society. What 
Gurin posited is the basis of my hypothesis and does not emerge out of left field. For example, 
diversity carries value in complex social and biological systems. Indeed, as Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006) note, “diversity over several dimensions has been considered by economists as valuable 
both in consumption and production” (p. 10). 
If one buys the arguments of Thomas Friedman (2003), the world today is even more 
heterogeneous and more interconnected, and in that world, what he calls “talent” is paramount. 
According to a report commissioned by the president of Carnegie Mellon University, global 
corporations are beginning to explicitly demand employees that have been exposed to diverse 
ideas, perspectives, and interactions (Ambrose, 2004). Derek Bok argues eloquently that a firm’s 
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productivity in a global economy is largely dependent on whether it has people who are 
comfortable working across lines of race and ethnicity (Bowen, Bok, & Burkhart, 1999). 
An Empirical Framework for Investigating Relationships 
Between Institutional Characteristics and Income 
We have seen that there is existing theory that posits that it is reasonable to look at income 
as an indicator of productivity, that one can think about education as a production function with 
various inputs, and that college students are poised psychologically to benefit from exposure to 
peers, particularly peers who are different. We also know that companies are saying they value 
students with these experiences. We can now look into the empirical world and examine how 
economists have looked at these sorts of relationships. 
Methodologically, this paper is an extension of the work others have done on exploring the 
relationship between institutional characteristics and earnings. Consequently, a review of the 
literature and models used by economists in such attempts is warranted. 
Feldman and Newcomb (1994) did an exhaustive review of the literature surrounding how 
college impacts students, focusing on the idea of accentuation and how college increases traits 
and behaviors already existing in students. The book extensively reviews various empirical 
findings. In addition to the more overt findings, such as how major or college characteristics 
such as culture impact students, peer groups are found to impact students in a variety of ways 
measured sociologically and psychologically through various survey instruments. They devote a 
chapter discussing college culture and how it impacts a student. Of particular note is their review 
of a host of findings that suggest “the college peer group can provide for the student an occasion 
of and practice in getting along with people whose background, interests, and orientations are 
different than their own” (pp. 236-237). 
In another section, Feldman and Newcomb (1994) discuss issues of openness and how this 
unobservable variable may impact students’ opting for particular institutions. As an example, 
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they note that students who are already liberal tend to opt for colleges they perceive as liberal 
and then are more likely to become even more liberal (pp. 295-299). 
The literature reveals that many researchers have asked questions surrounding college 
quality and future earnings (e.g., Behrman, Constantine, Kletzer, McPerson, & Schapiro, 1996; 
Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1998; Dale & Krueger, 2002; James, Alsalam, Conaty, & To, 1989). 
In general, the studies estimate endogenous human capital investment choices, such as time in 
college, college characteristics, pre-college educational attainment, work experience, and so 
forth, attempting to sort based on various measures for quality and controlling for individual 
characteristics, using a variety of economic methods. In general, most studies find some evidence 
that quality matters, though the proxy for quality varies widely. To give one example, Brewer et 
al. (1998) recognize that if some sort of quality is supposed to be an indicator of expected 
returns, i.e., that students pay because they expect a great economic payoff in the form of higher 
income, then college type cannot be an exogenous determinant of earnings. 
Dale and Krueger (2002) attempt to distinguish between the earnings achieved by students 
of similar intellectual capability with and without having attended a highly selective college. 
They use the average SAT score of all schools to which the student was accepted to get at 
unobserved qualities of student ability. In addition to matching average SAT scores of the 
schools to which the student was accepted, the authors also look at the highest average SAT 
score of the school to which the student applied in order to get at the unobserved quality. 
These results suggest that highly selective schools have the most impact on students’ 
social and cultural capital and access to certain jobs for low-income students. Interestingly, the 
amount of school tuition also seemed to have an impact on future earnings in Dale and Krueger’s 
(2002) analysis. The authors speculated that this impact was related to overall school spending 
and quality of teaching. 
Incorporating Dale and Kruger’s (2002) paper into a research framework is useful in 
several ways. First, rather than taking a route that creates a derivative proxy for selectivity, they 
simply use SAT scores, noting, “Past studies have found that students who attended colleges 
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with higher average SAT scores or higher tuition tend to have higher earnings when they are 
observed in the labor market” (p. 2). Another very important factor obtusely informs my thesis. 
The authors argue that while the average SAT score of the school does not seem to have a robust 
effect on earnings once the selection on the unobservables is taken into account, they do find that 
some quality about the school a student attends seems to systematically have an effect on their 
subsequent earnings (p. 24). The authors suggest that there may be a peer effect causing this 
phenomenon. Dale and Krueger’s finding that expenditure per student does not relate 
significantly to the student's future earning, though net tuition does, indicates there is something 
about a school other than its quality as defined by SAT scores and its expenditure per student 
that causes students’ subsequent earnings to increase. 
Interestingly, Breneman (1994) found that second tier schools actually offer more financial 
aid than more competitive schools. In essence, these schools are paying a premium in order to try 
and improve their quality (p. 106). And this idea of quality is closely tied to the quality of each 
incoming class’s configuration of students and their subsequent strengths, which may be 
explained by the peer effect argument. The final conclusion of Dale and Krueger (2002) is that 
there is some quality about a school that has a robust effect on earnings and that the school-wide 
average SAT score is a crude measure of college quality. 
Dale and Krueger’s (2002) paper makes a number of assumptions in order to create 
simulations that seem illogical. Specifically, the authors assume that within a particular tier of 
competitiveness, colleges are of equal quality and that there are simple “idiosyncratic” error 
terms to explain why a student is rejected at one and accepted at another (p. 5). However, 
admissions committees, rather than being idiosyncratic, are charged with building the best cohort 
of incoming students, because each cohort is an important part of the production function of 
learning at a particular institution. Dale and Krueger also suggest that, for the purposes of their 
model, students randomly select colleges. More critical even is that they assume no relationship 
between students’ choices and the idiosyncratic term. Dale and Krueger also developed weights 
in order to correct for their sample (because it was not nationally representative). The authors 
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then created predictors to fill in when data were missing (e.g., parental income). Finally, they had 
a relatively small sample size. It would seem that these factors—the use of simulations, the 
assumptions about behavior, the arbitrary (though not unreasonable) allocation of weights, and 
then the insertion of data when missing—may complicate the equation and its predictive 
reliability. 
Dan Black and Jeffrey Smith’s (2004) paper, “How robust is the evidence on the effects of 
college quality: Evidence from matching,” addresses the issue of returns to college quality by 
using what they characterize as “matching methods” (p. 99). They point out that the problem 
with most of the solutions to the selection bias issue is that they rely on the assumption of 
“selection on observables” (p. 100) to identify the presence of non-random selection. While this 
paper is the basis for one of my estimation techniques, it is problematic in a few areas. The first 
is that they use the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which is a different 
psychometric assessment not as directly correlated with college performance as the SAT or ACT, 
which were designed for that purpose. 
Another issue with the model is that Black and Smith (2004), in part to keep their model 
simple, create one variable for college quality that is a combination of faculty salary, average 
student SAT, and student retention rate. This is a concerning choice, since by not allowing the 
variability to flow freely within a cohort the way that nested models do, one forces an arbitrary 
ranking that may or may not reflect true college quality Are Stanford, MIT, Yale, Princeton, and 
Penn the “best” colleges in the country? They are neither the most selective as measured in the 
acceptance rate nor the most popular as measured by total number of applications, so who can 
say? Because the matching estimates support the overall findings of the regression-based 
literature with respect to college quality, more straightforward models exist that explore the 
question at hand (Black & Smith, 2004). 
As an example, one challenge is the role of self-selection. Brewer et al. (1998) assume that 
it is the individual who determines where she will go to school. Clearly, self-selection is 
involved in the college selection process. If this were not the case, then the “best” school would 
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receive the most applications and the “worst” schools would receive none. However, what, more 
specifically, seems to be happening is what some have called the “great sorting.” Another 
challenge is that it is unclear at this time whether ethnic and racial diversity is a variable that 
influences college choice. Clearly, diversity is a variable for the admissions office (otherwise 
colleges would not have any lawsuits in this area), but it is unclear whether diversity is a variable 
for the individual. It may be implausible to generate a choice model for this reason. That said, the 
model has the benefit of dealing with the common support condition. 
James Monks (2000) conducted a more straightforward study looking at the heterogeneity 
of earnings among college graduates. He also used a large number of individual and institutional 
characteristics, such as in my proposition. His study used data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth and controlled for both individual and institutional characteristics, as it utilized 
selectivity and college type as the institutional characteristics, arguing that these are the most 
observable college characteristics (p. 279). Monks argued that since all individuals will attempt 
to maximize their lifetime wealth, they will enroll in those institutions whose graduates earn a 
premium. Furthermore, he went on to say that this selection process is compounded by selection 
on the institutions’ side, since most institutions have some sort of selection involved in their 
admission process. Consequently, Monks argued that individuals are not randomly allocated 
among institutions and that this raises a huge selection problem. Monks also found flaws with 
both Brewer et al.’s (1998) multinomial logit and the estimation approach used by Behrman, 
Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996). His approach is to simply include individual attributes that he 
argued affect institutional characteristics (such as income and test scores) in his reduced form 
equation. He recognized that by doing so, he did not fully capture the endogeneity, but it is 
sufficient to argue that the coefficients are good reflections of the average earnings of graduates 
from institutions of certain types, conditional upon their observable characteristics. It is a 
straightforward solution to what is a fundamental problem in trying to examine the relationship, 
particularly when one recognizes its complex nature. 
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Economic Studies that Explore Diversity as an Institutional Characteristic 
This next series of articles I will discuss are economic studies that most directly relate to  
my research. I will first examine two studies that focus on gender, and then I will focus on some 
studies that look at race and ethnicity as institutional characteristics and how they relate to 
earnings. I examine the gender studies because conceptually gender can be viewed as a form of 
“diversity.” 
Averett and Burton (1996) examine gender differences in the decision of whether or not to 
attend college. Using the human capital model to examine the decision to attend college, Averett 
and Burton argue that this decision is a function of family background characteristics and the 
expected future earning differential between college and high school graduates (the college wage 
premium). Using data from the NLSY, Averett and Burton found that higher college wage 
premiums induced men to attend college, but the same did not hold for women. In general, 
Averett and Burton report that for both men and women who choose not to attend college, they 
observed behavior consistent with the comparative advantage hypothesis. But men and women 
who choose to attend college appear not to be similarly motivated. For men, the effect of the 
college wage premium is positive and statistically significant. For women, the estimated 
coefficient is much smaller, and its “statistical significance is, at best, questionable.” For women, 
the college wage premium is not nearly as important to the decision to attend college as it is for 
men. A rise in the college wage premium will probably not lead to further increases in female 
college enrollments. Averett and Burton’s article still does not answer why women do not 
respond to the college wage premium in the same fashion as men, nor does it adequately mention 
whether or not women experience the same wage premium as men. Their research also assumes 
that men and women are studying the same content in college, which may not be a safe 
assumption to make. Nonetheless, Averett and Burton establish that men and women react to the 
college wage premium in different ways. 
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Grogger and Eide (1995) look at the sharp rise in the college wage premium that occurred 
for new labor market entrants during the 1980s and examine how much of this change arose from 
changes in the skill level of the typical college graduate. They found that graduation rates fell by 
three percentage points across cohorts for men, but rose by three percentage points for women. 
The study shows that for men in 1978, the initial returns to a college degree were essentially 
zero, and that returns to an advanced degree were significantly positive. Both college and 
postgraduate degree holders enjoyed rapid secular growth in relative wages over time. On 
average, the returns to a college degree grew by 1.7 percentage points per year. Holding the 
effects of experience constant, the college wage premium rose by 13.5 percentage points. For 
women, the picture looked very different. Female college graduates earned a substantial wage 
premium from the very beginning of their careers, with female college graduates earning an 
average of 24% more than female high school graduates, and advanced degree holders earning 
34% more. Additionally, the college wage premium appears to have grown over time for women, 
but at about two-thirds of the rate for men. Overall, the secular wage growth over the 1978-1986 
period was less than eight percentage points. 
While the primary goal of Grogger and Eide (1995) was to determine how changes in the 
distribution of college majors and changes in the major-specific wage premiums contributed to 
the rise in the aggregate college wage premium, their data suggest that there was wide variation 
in the returns to college by major. Engineering majors earned about 15% more on average than 
high school graduates, while education and letters majors initially earned 13% less. They argue 
that substantial changes in the major distribution could lead to substantial changes in the 
aggregate college wage premium. This indicates that changes in the wage premiums for both 
genders will coincide more as men and women begin to pick the same majors in equal numbers. 
Grogger and Eide argue that it is puzzling that the gap between male and female wages narrowed 
so little across cohorts of college graduates. They attribute this at least partially to changes in the 
major distribution. They show that in addition to leaving low-paying fields such as education and 
letters, women also left science, which was the single highest-paying major for women in the 
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earlier cohort. Another part of the answer may have to do with price changes. Only engineering 
and "other" majors show larger cross-cohort increases in wage premiums for women than for 
men, and they account for less than 15% of all female graduates. The authors also point out that 
if major-specific price changes had been the same for women as for men, the wage gap among 
college graduates would have narrowed by at least 4.3 percentage points instead of only 1. This 
is important to understand because, if one is looking at the notion of a cohort, differences among 
groups in terms of their perceived return may make it difficult to evaluate the impact of the 
diversity. 
There is one very interesting study that posits a similar question—a relationship between a 
production system and earnings, with diversity playing a key role, but it looks at cities. The 
study, by Ottaviano and Peri (2006), uses a diversity index to look at the impact on a city’s 
diversity on the earnings of its White inhabitants. This is quite akin to my question in spirit, 
namely, exploring not only if diversity improves the earnings of the “diverse” but whether it 
actually is a technology that improves the productivity of everyone and that manifests itself in 
increased wages of inhabitants of more diverse environments. Ottaviano and Peri note that the 
positive production value of diversity has been stressed in multiple literatures, especially in the 
organization and management of teams, which lends credence to my theoretical framework 
(p. 13). They use a wage regression with controls for other observable characteristics that 
influence earnings (e.g., education) and, in looking at 130 U.S. metropolitan areas, find indeed 
that their data support the hypothesis of a positive productivity effect of diversity, with causality 
running from diversity to productivity of non-diverse and diverse workers (p. 38). 
With respect to looking at the effect of diversity on students’ earnings, Richard H. Sander 
(2004) looked at Affirmative Action in law school admissions. His study analyzed 27,000 law 
school students in order to investigate the costs and benefits to Black students of race-conscious 
admission decisions in law schools and looked at 21,425 aspiring lawyers who took the bar. The 
article is useful to the proposed study on a number of fronts. Sander recounts from a legal 
perspective the evolution of Affirmative Action in law school admissions, and he spends some 
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time discussing the notion of “racial preferences” and then whether it is only limited to the most 
elite schools. The crux of his paper is an analysis of the passage rate on the bar exam. Sander 
used as the dependent variable whether the person passes the bar on one of the first two attempts. 
The independent variables include Law School GPA, LSAT score, Law School quality, 
undergraduate GPA, gender, and race/ethnicity. He does not, however, use any variable that 
characterizes the institution’s diversity. He finds Blacks are nearly six times as unlikely as 
Whites to pass the bar exam. He then projects that eliminating Affirmative Action would 
increase the percentage of Blacks passing the bar 8.8% (p. 468). 
While Sander’s (2004) study is incredibly interesting and engaging, it does present a large 
number of theoretical and statistical challenges. For an excellent review of the issues surrounding 
the study, one can read Chambers, Clydesdale, Kidder, and Lempert’s (2005) empirical critique. 
They make a case that Sander’s (2004) logic is based on a series of assumptions that are each 
flawed and that a critical reexamination suggests that rather than increase the number of Black 
lawyers, one would see a 25-30% decline (Chambers et al., 2005, p. 3). 
The use of logistic regression requires making several assumptions that may or may not 
hold true, since the methods tend to have less stringent requirements than even OLS. It does 
require that observations are independent and that the logit of the independent variables is 
linearly related to the dependent variable. Since there is no explanation of the methodology at all 
in Sander’s (2004) paper and the actual summary reports are not presented, it is hard to make any 
sort of causal inference. Sander (2005) claimed that law schools admit solely on LSAT scores 
and GPAs, but admitted in his response to critics that this view is flawed and that he did not deal 
at all with selection bias issues. 
There are other issues in Sander’s (2004) study that do not make it a good foundation for 
my research. The use of test scores (bar exam) may be problematic. According to Card and 
Krueger (1996), test scores are not strong predictors of students’ success in the labor market and 
may also be a poor indicator of what is learned in school and subsequently rewarded in the labor 
market. As an example, while Sander (2004) argues vehemently against Affirmative Action in 
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law school admissions, he does find that Black lawyers earn 6% to 9% more than their non-
Black peers in the marketplace. It could be that this is simply because there is some market 
phenomenon such as a greater demand for African American lawyers, but if one accepts the 
findings of Card and Krueger (1996), it is also plausible that there may be a disconnect between 
the bar exam as a measure of “value.” If Card and Krueger are correct, then it weakens Sander’s 
(2004) argument that Affirmative Action hurts Blacks because fewer pass the bar after being 
admitted into “elite” schools and performing poorly. There is also a strong statistical relationship 
between law school GPA and performance. Nowhere does Sander acknowledge that the market 
may be capturing something that the bar examination does not. 
For my purposes, it would have been much more interesting—since Sander (2004) argues 
in favor of changing law school admission policies to make them race blind—to look at 
institutional diversity and salaries. The study as conducted makes too many iterative assumptions 
to be useful in this regard. Sander also does not consider the possibility of benefits to peers 
derived from diversity in a law school. Even if one accepts the findings that admitting Blacks 
based on Affirmative Action hurts them, from a law school’s perspective, if it improves the 
overall quality of its cohort’s learning (as realized in earnings), it may be a logical strategy for a 
law school to employ. Finally, Sander’s study’s focus on law schools and its use of Blacks as the 
sole criterion for diversity severely limit its use for my purposes. 
Kermit, Black, and Smith (2001) present a study that used data from the U.S. National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to examine racial differences in the effects of college 
quality on wages. The study investigated whether the economic benefit of college quality might 
be higher for groups helped by diversity programs. However, it also explored whether a racially 
diverse student body would directly benefit all students. The authors approached the questions 
using a structural model. First, they looked at differences in college quality on wages for both 
Blacks and non-Blacks. Second, they estimated the effect on wages of attending a college with a 
more diverse student body. Their data came from three sources and contained 17 different 
college characteristics. The NLSY provided them with the individual characteristics of students 
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as well as identified each graduate’s college. The authors augmented this with the IPDES data 
and the U.S. News & World Report’s Directory of Colleges and Universities to provide the 
institutional characteristics. Based on the work of Daniel, Black, and Smith (1995, 1997), the 
authors knew that the chosen characteristics correlate with one another and that each one 
separately has a positive effect on wages. Therefore, because Kermit et al. (2001) viewed each of 
these as one facet of an underlying notion of quality, they created a quality index (p. 224). This 
index is based on average SAT score, rejection rate, and spending per student for men, as well as 
faculty/student ratio, average SAT score, and fraction of entering class in the top 10% of their 
high school class for women. 
While Kermit et al.’s (2001) study explains the data and spends some time discussing the 
college quality index, there is no discussion of the methodology, nor does it provide any 
discussion of a hypothesis that warrants an exploration of the relationship. Given that this is the 
one study in the literature that deals explicitly and primarily with what has been a politically 
charged issue, the joint shortcoming of neither positing a theory nor discussing the empirical 
process for investigating the relationship is troubling and suggests the need for my work. The 
study’s findings were fascinating, however. The first finding was that school “quality” matters 
much more to Blacks than to non-Blacks, in terms of economic returns. Indeed, the effect of 
college quality on later wages of Black men is roughly triple that for non-Black men (p. 223), 
and they reported a similar finding when comparing Black and non-Black women. 
Even more intriguing is that Kermit et al.’s (2001) study found that attending a college 
with moderate student diversity, as measured by the fraction of Black students, raised earnings 
for both Black and non-Black men. Those who attended colleges with a population of between 
5% and 7% Black students earn more than those who attended colleges with fewer than 5% 
Black students. In addition, men who attended colleges with a population of between 8% and 
17% Black students earn more than do men who attended schools with fewer than 8% or more 
than 17% Black students (p. 228). A troubling finding, though, is that this advantage did not 
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translate to women; there was no relationship for non-Black women and only a weak effect for 
Black women. This may be the result of a specification error. 
Kermit et al.’s (2001) study is the only one that looks at earnings and an indicator of 
diversity as an institutional characteristic, and therefore it provides an excellent guide to how to 
approach the question. That said, there are a number of issues with the study that I addressed in 
my study. The first is that by using the NLSY data, the authors end up having to use the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). While the SAT and ASVAB have been shown 
to correlate, at least one study found that the SAT is both a better predictor of innate cognitive 
ability and of college success (Frey & Detterman, 2004). Therefore, a study should be done using 
the SAT as an individual characteristic rather than the ASVAB. 
The second problem with the Kermit et al. (2001) study is that while there is logic to using 
a college quality index to deal with the statistical noise of all the multicollinearity, one does 
sacrifice some information because the data are being restricted. The second challenge is that the 
authors are obliged to give up data points by creating the index.  If they did not have information 
on each of the three characteristics that describe quality in their index, they would have had to 
throw out all individuals who attended that college. In my study, I am able to better address the 
issue because the College Board has the more robust data set on institutions of higher education. 
The use of different quality indices based on gender, when one could argue that gender 
may be one component of diversity, may create some biases in Kermit et al.’s (2001) data. While 
their logic using different indices was based on the data themselves, rather than using the data, 
they simply developed two different ways of computing quality—one for women and one for 
men. The final issue with the index is that they elected to ordinally rank all the colleges. As I 
noted in the discussion of the Black and Smith (2004) study, it is unclear whether any ordinal 
ranking allows one to differentiate among schools. Or stated more simply: Is MIT really better 
than Williams? Much more useful would be a grouping of similar institutions. For the purposes 
of my study, I am more interested in whether two institutions––that otherwise look similar––
produce “different” graduates based on their institutional diversity. This allows looking at less 
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selective institutions and comparing them in terms of racial and ethnic diversity while 
concurrently looking at more selective institutions and comparing them—in essence, comparing 
the proverbial apples to apples and oranges to oranges in terms of institutional selectivity. 
Finally, the Kermit et al. (2001) study only looked at the percentage of Black students as 
an indicator of diversity. In their model, Native Americans and Latinos do not “count” as 
contributing to diversity. Clearly, a more robust definition of diversity is required, and perhaps 
also a layered notion of diversity that recognizes that a plurality may or may not be more 
beneficial than a diversity index based on one group. 
The final paper I will discuss is Rumberger and Thomas's study (1993), which was the 
only one of its kind when I began exploring the issue in 1996. Interestingly, their finding on the 
relationship of diversity to economic returns was only a footnote in their paper. The focus of the 
paper was on other economic returns—college major, the quality of the institution, and the 
performance of the student. Nonetheless, a discussion of both their data and their methodology 
will be important in understanding their results. By looking at these methodological choices, 
along with their findings,  I can better support the choices I will make in my study. 
Rumberger and Thomas (1993) used two types of data: data on individual college 
graduates and data on their corresponding colleges. The individual data came from the 1987 
Recent College Graduates (RCG). The graduates were selected from 404 institutions from the 
1983-84 Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) XIX. The graduates were then 
sampled from lists supplied by the schools. African American and Hispanic students were over-
sampled. The research then elected to exclude data for various reasons. They excluded graduated 
seniors who went on to graduate school, students who were not working or enrolled in school, 
and students who had no corresponding school data. The end result was a sample size of 8,021 
individuals or about 50% of the original data set (p. 2). 
Rumberger and Thomas (1993) had what seem to be intellectually valid reasons for 
excluding certain groups. For example, they excluded workers who were also enrolled in school, 
because they were concerned that as students they could be working in non-career occupations 
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while attending school (p. 2). However, the end result is an exclusion of over 50% of the 
graduates. 
The school-level data for the study were drawn from the College Board's Annual Survey 
of Colleges for 1985-1986. Rumberger and Thomas (1993) supplemented these data with Astin's 
institutional selectivity ratings. From the initial sample, they dropped schools with missing 
school level data and removed the corresponding students. The end result was 262 schools 
remaining in the data set from an original 404 (p. 2). A troubling factor in this data set is that, as 
anecdotally reported by the College Board, it is the less selective colleges that often elect not to 
complete the surveys. 
A variety of both individual level and school level variables was used in the study 
conducted by Rumberger and Thomas (1993). The individual level variables consisted of four 
types: demographic, family background, education, and labor market. The school level variables 
covered a range of characteristics of schools that, according to the researchers, reflect the 
"quality" of the college. A couple of their variables will be of importance to me in this paper and 
warrant mentioning. The first are the percentage of minority undergraduates and the mean 
educational level of students' fathers. The other variables (other than their selectivity measure, 
which basically reflects the mean SAT scores of matriculating freshman) deal with information 
such as the percentage of full-time faculty and the student/faculty ratio (p. 3). These variables 
may be important when I do my research, as part of my premise is that the labor market pays a 
premium for better-educated students, including those that have the cosmopolitan skill set. It 
may be important to look at these variables to determine if they correlate with not only the 
earnings but with some of the diversity indices that I will use. 
According to his "seminal" work, Applied Multilevel Analysis, by J. J. Hox (1995) at the 
faculty of Educational Sciences of the University of Amsterdam, hierarchical linear modeling 
has become a widely used analytical tool for nested data structures, though as far as my research 
shows, it is mainly used in other disciplines such as sociology and educational psychology. The 
basic premise is that nested data present several problems for analysis. First, people that exist 
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within hierarchies tend to be more similar to each other than to people randomly sampled. 
Second, it is difficult in nested data sets to disentangle individual and group effects. Multilevel 
models are designed to analyze variables from different levels simultaneously (p. 6). 
The basic idea behind Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) is similar to OLS regression. At 
the individual level, an outcome variable is predicted as a function of a linear combination of one 
or more individual level variables, plus an intercept, so that: 
Yij = βoj +  β1jX1 + …βkjXk + rij 
where βoj is the intercept, + β1j is the slope of X1, of group j and rij is the residual. Then at the 
institutional level, the individual level slopes and intercept become dependent variables being 
predicted from level two variables such that: 
βoj = γoo + γo1W1 +… γokWk + uoj 
β1j = γ1o + γ11W1 +… γ1kWk + u1j 
where γoo and γ1o are intercepts, and γo1 and γ11 are the slopes that predict βoj and β1j from 
the W. The idea behind this is that cross-level interactions can be predicted. 
For the purposes of my research, I am only going to discuss the steps requisite with 
arriving at what Rumberger and Thomas (1993) call their "conditional model 2," which has the 
results of interest in my research. In their study, they first estimate an individual level within 
each school, and then estimate between school models using the betas as dependent variables. 
They elect to subdivide the sample of graduates into the same college major. The first step 
Rumberger and Thomas take is to partition the variance in each sub-sample into its within school 
and between school components. They use the following two equations, the first the within 
school and the second the between school equation: 
ln Yij = βjo + Eij 
where Yij is the annual earnings for individual i at school j and βjo is the mean earnings for 
school j, and Eij is the deviation from the school mean for individual i. 
βjo = u + Uj 
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where βjo is the school mean, u is the grand mean, and Uj is the deviation from the grand mean 
for school j. The results they received show that most of the variance occurs within schools 
(p. 9). 
The next step Rumberger and Thomas (1993) take is to estimate an unconditional model 
based on some independent variables, which they assume to vary randomly among schools. They 
center each independent variable on the school mean, so that the mean value of the dependent 
variable represents the log mean earnings for all graduates of that school. They use the following 
two equations: 
Yij = βoj +βlj(Female) + β2j(GPA) + β3j (other job) + Eij 
where βoj is the mean earnings of the graduates from school j, βlj is the differential received by 
female graduates compared to males for school j, β2j is the increment associated with a unit 
change in GPA, and  β3j is the differential for students employed in a job not related to their 
major. 
βjk = uk +Ujk              for k = 0,1,2,3,4 
where βjk represents the within unit regression parameters from the first equation above and uk is 
the mean value for each of the within unit parameters. The results show large earnings 
differences among the majors. In general, the female differential was also statistically significant, 
and in some instances, GPA was significant. With respect to between school variables, it did not 
make a difference where one went to school if one was an engineering major, but for other 
majors, it did (Rumberger & Thomas, 1993, p. 12). 
The final step that I will discuss is that of Rumberger and Thomas’s (1993) last conditional 
model, which includes a wide array of institutional characteristics. They use the following 
equation: 
βjo = Ioo + I10Zlj + … + InoZnj + Ujo 
where βjo is the within-school intercept from the unconditional equation above, Znj are a series 
of school level variables, and Ino are the estimated parameters of the school-level variables. 
Basically, the minority composition of the student body had a positive and significant effect on 
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the starting salaries of business, health, and education graduates. According to Rumberger and 
Thomas, it was from 3% to 7% for each 10% increase in minority concentration (p. 12). 
One limitation that Rumberger and Thomas (1993) noted was that in HLM models, the 
number of variables used in the individual models is constrained by the number of observations 
within the institutional units. Another possible problem is implied by Cameron and Heckman 
(1992) in their work on the bias in estimating differences between majority and minority groups. 
They argue that by measuring the difference between majority and minority outcomes by 
imposing equality of slope coefficients but allowing for different intercepts creates bias in the 
outcomes (p. 152). 
Econometric Challenges Related to Studies Exploring Institutional Characteristics 
There are two fundamental concerns that arise when one posits a causal relationship 
between the diversity of an institution (or any indicator of quality) and wages. Namely, 
endogeneity and selection bias. All of the work that explores college quality and wages suffers 
from this limitation, and short of randomizing the college admission process, there is not too 
much that one can do; students do not randomly select colleges, and colleges do not randomly 
select students, and the sorts of students who opt to go to a particular school may not be similar 
to students who select a different sort of school and schools do not look for the same sorts of 
students. 
Imagine a scenario even if one were comparing two highly selective schools. It is 
reasonable to assume that Reed College looks for “different” sorts of students than MIT and that 
the admission counselors at both schools are also looking for students with somewhat different 
characteristics. This is all confounded by the fact that these differences are not observable to the 
researcher. 
This first bias is what Heckman (1979) terms selection bias. The concept here is that if 
one’s sample is not random, then one has a specification error. In the case of the studies 
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discussed in this paper, because college students are by definition different in some way from 
non-college students as well as differences among students based on the institution they choose 
to attend, a specification error exists. In other words, we can only observe college graduates’ 
income for college graduates, and one can only observe income for Reed College graduates for 
Reed graduates. It is important to note that the variance is significant (Willis & Rosen, 1979, 
note that more than 67% of variance is due to unobservables). There are several ways that one 
might attempt to control for these errors. One popular argument is that the best one can do is to 
control for observable characteristics and assume that is not highly correlated with unobserved 
things that contribute to the variance in income. The literature seems to simply deal with this 
issue by either admitting it or making assumptions. It is interesting to note that in the closest 
comparison literature—that of immigrants and wages—scholars also do not deal with selection 
bias whereby the country must admit the immigrant and the immigrant must elect to be admitted 
into the country. Borjas (1987) writes about self-selection of the immigrant but is silent on the 
role of the country in admitting the immigrant. 
A related but distinct bias is the notion of endogeneity. This phenomenon occurs when the 
dependent variable is somehow related to unobserved variables. In this case, if one conducted a 
study on earnings and institutional characteristics and did not factor in selectivity, even though 
institutional selectivity was related to earnings, the result would be a specification error. To deal 
with this, one must find instruments, namely, a variable whose exogenous variation affects the 
diversity of an institution but not its learning. In addition, one can assume that the endogeneity 
effects differ depending on the student and the institution and that there are interaction effects 
between the two. Feldman and Newcomb (1994) basically devote a whole book exploring such 
effects, dubbing them “accentuations.” So particular sorts of students not only self-select to 
particular schools and those schools concurrently self-select students, but those interactions 
affect subsequent experiences and then in theory earnings. The question to deal with the 
endogeneity issue is to identify a variable that would be related to college quality and diversity 
but not be related to earnings. Scholars seem to have had difficulty finding valid instruments. In 
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a number of papers, beginning with Card (1995), college proximity has been used as an 
instrument for years of education completed. The reasoning is that having a nearby college 
lowers the cost of attendance and thereby prompts students to obtain additional years of 
education. This use of proximity as an instrument for years of education has been challenged 
because of its weak correlation with years of education (e.g., Long, 2006). For the purposes of 
this study, I would need to identify an instrumental variable that would allow me to differentiate 
not only whether or not one goes to school but also the quality of the school and the diversity of 
the school. In effect, if proximity to college is to work in this context, the proximity of the 
college must influence the decision to attend the right school, and it is reasonable to assume that 
neighborhood characteristics interact with college quality to affect outcomes. For example, the 
student likely benefits from some degree of academic fit with the institution, or college towns 
might have more diversity and it would consequently underestimate the impact. 
Another econometric challenge deals with the “common support” condition. In such a 
case, where so-called comparable groups are not comparable, it becomes confounding (Heckman 
1980). As one might expect, there are some issues regarding common support in the college 
admission process. Highly talented students tend to go to selective colleges, and less talented 
individuals go to less selective schools. However, some precocious students go to less selective 
colleges (perhaps for financial aid or some other unobservable reason, such as a learning 
disorder). While we hope it is not as often the case, it could also be that less talented students go 
to more selective colleges for some unobservable reason, like a “legacy admit.” In either 
scenario, one would end up with asymmetrical relationships between the groups (e.g., fewer low 
ability students end up in selective colleges than vice versa). 
The best way to attempt to deal with this issue is through a “quasi-experimental” approach, 
such as that Black and Smith (2004) used to explore the impact of college quality on earnings. 
Consequently, I also adopt this approach as one of my estimation techniques. The principal 
disadvantage to this approach is that it may fail to yield straightforward results that are easy to 
interpret. Furthermore, the matching the authors used also forced such small pairs that the results 
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may not be statistically reliable. Conceptually, it is important to remember that in randomized 
trials, the propensity scores are known, but in these quasi-experiments, they are estimated and 
may not be accurate. Finally, it ultimately does not deal with either unmeasured heterogeneity or 
selection bias. 
In situations like the one we are exploring here, because there are unobservable factors that 
contribute to earnings, we would expect the error term to be correlated with the explanatory 
variable. Some researchers (e.g., Monks, 2000) simply use as many observable variables as 
feasible, rely on OLS, and acknowledge the biases. I discuss my approaches to mitigating these 
specification issues in my methods section, but it is important to note that one cannot over-infer 




METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Data and Samples 
In the most general terms, in order to explore the thesis, one needs two sets of data—data 
that describe individuals and data that describe institutions of higher education. I follow in the 
footsteps of Rumberger and Thomas (1993), using the College Board’s Annual Survey of 
Colleges for the school level data and the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study 
(BB: 93) for the individual students’ data. Rumberger and Thomas used 1985 and 1986 data for 
their study. 
The Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (BB: 93) provides information 
concerning education and work experiences of students after completion of the bachelor’s 
degree. It is a nationally representative sample of students and is structured to provide an 
optimum sample of graduating seniors in all majors. In the 1992-1993 academic year, some 
1.1 million students received bachelor’s degrees from 1,809 institutions of higher education. 
Participants in the 1993 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS: 93) who received 
their bachelor’s degree between July 1992 and June 1993 make up the base sample. 
Approximately 12,480 respondents were deemed initially eligible, though 1,500 were 
subsequently determined to be ineligible and another 900 declined to be interviewed, which 
resulted in a nationally representative sample of that population made up of 10,080 students who 
attended 648 institutions. I limited the present study to graduates of bachelor programs, and I 
excluded individuals who were missing school level data, were not working at the time of the 
survey, or were still enrolled in school. The final sample size was 8,054. 
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It is important to note that by limiting my sample only to college graduates, I am 
influencing the model. If one frames my hypothesis in human capital terms, then the better 
measure would simply be a continuous variable of time in college, hypothesizing that the longer 
one is exposed to people who are different, the better one’s fluency in working within diversity 
increases. In addition, one can hypothesize that diversity might be an unobservable when it 
comes to success in college; in other words those students who have a propensity for succeeding 
in diverse environments succeed in diverse colleges, and those who do not end up not 
persevering. However, since my hypothesis is that employers value this “cosmopolitan” skill set, 
the simplest way to compare is to use college graduates looking for variance with respect to 
institutional diversity. But we should assume that the findings may be biased, with some factors 
positively influencing the coefficient and others negatively influencing the coefficient. 
The college level data I use is for the year prior to the data on individual students because 
the individual data are based on graduates and we need a profile of the college while the students  
were still in school. Perhaps one could make the case that taking an average for each school level 
variable of the whole time of a student’s tenure or, perhaps, using data of students’ first college 
year would be more accurate. However, because students’ tenures vary considerably, taking 
school level data from the year before the BB: 93 survey was conducted is the most reliable and 
consistent way to arrive at data of an institution, as it was when the student was enrolled. 
In addition to the student interview data, BB: 93 collected postsecondary transcripts 
covering the undergraduate period. The second BB: 93 follow-up took place in 1997 (BB: 
93/97). For the purposes of this study, the primary focus is on the initial salary (1993) following 
graduation because the hypothesis is that the employer would recognize some inherent quality 
difference in graduates’ potential productivity, given that they come from a particular institution, 
based on the firm’s prior hiring experiences. In addition, while we all agree that initial salary is 
not the best measure of long-term productivity, it has the added benefits of not creating the 
increased noise of on-the-job training needing to be factored into the equation, and it also allows 
one to capture the signaling effects that come from employers’ perception of the undergraduate 
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institution. The institution’s diversity is argued to contribute to increased productivity, even if 
the employer may not recognize a causative relationship; the employer simply knows that 
graduates of certain schools among a pool “are better” and would consequently pay a premium 
for those employees.  Over time, on-the-job training and other factors may mitigate the 
variability caused by the institutional diversity. 
With respect to the school level data, I use the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges 
from 1992. This survey of 3,171 colleges, including community colleges, consists of information 
on characteristics, programs, and college entrance requirements. I take the set of colleges that 
make up the universe of schools attended by the graduates in the sample data and see if they vary 
significantly from the overall universe of colleges, excluding the community colleges since they 
are by definition not awarding a bachelor’s degree. The Baccalaureate and Beyond sample of 
648 colleges is taken from the 1,978 institutions in the 1988-1989 Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) file. BB stratified the data by whether they represented public 
or private education and by degrees awarded in the field of education (over or under a specified 
number). Within each of these strata, institutions were selected according to size. The 
representative schools also satisfied the following criteria: (1) the institution was accredited at 
the college level by an agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education; (2) the institution 
was in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia; and (3) the institution was one that 
awarded bachelor’s degrees. It is important to note that while the sample is representative of the 
overall population of institutions of higher education, it significantly excludes community 
colleges because I focus on the bachelor’s degree. When I matched the 648 BB schools to the 
College Board data, I was forced to discard some because the College Board did not have a 
complete data set on that institution (the corresponding students were also dropped). The final 
college sample size is thus 466 colleges. I compared the data using a two-sample t-test with 
equal variances for salaries, males, percent minority, and also percentages of each of the 
minorities to see if there were significant differences between the sample and the universe, and 




From these two datasets, I use a variety of both individual and school-level variables. The 
individual data (the “I” variables) consist of demographic, family background, education, and 
labor market variables. Each of these variables has been argued in the literature to affect salary 
(e.g., Behrman, Constantine, Kletzer, McPerson, & Schapiro., 1996; Brewer et al., 1998; Dale & 
Krueger, 2002; James et al.,1989; etc.). 
The list of variables is as follows: 
Demographic Variables 
• Gender (dummy) 
• Ethnicity (dummy) 
Family Background Variables 
• Parents’ Education Attainment 
• Total Undergraduate Debt 
Education Variables 
• Major (dummy variables) 
• G.P.A. 
• Entrance Examination Score quartile 
Labor Market 
• Years of experience 
• Employed part time (dummy) 
• Enrolled in school (dummy) 
• Work in public sector (dummy)  
• Self-employed (dummy)  
• Degree not required for job (dummy) 
• Job not related to field of study (dummy) 
• Age at Graduation 
• Unemployed (dummy) 
• Out of labor force (dummy) 
School Level Variables 
The school level variables that are part of the study reflect a range of characteristics 
describing the institution and have, in the literature, been linked to salaries. I want to control for 
institutional factors other than diversity that the literature suggests may likely contribute to 
  
62 
starting salaries. Examples include selectivity (Brewer et al., 1999; Dale & Krueger, 1999), 
student/faculty ratios (Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996), and average tuition charged 
(Dale & Krueger, 1999). In addition to the variables that the literature has suggested are 
indicators of quality, I use two rankings—College Board groupings based on selectivity and the 
US News and World Report rankings. I also use Carnegie codes to allow proper comparison 
among institutional types. It is interesting to note that the two college quality variables are not 
highly correlated with each other or with any of the diversity variables and may help control for 
some measures of quality not captured by diversity or average test scores. 
The following is a list of variables that relate to “quality” and may affect graduates’ 
income (C): 
• Private university (dummy) 
• Carnegie Code (categorical) 
• Student/faculty ratio 
• Percentage of those admitted who actually enrolled 
• Percentage of applications accepted 
• Average SAT Scores 
• Average ACT Scores 
• Percent of Grads who go to graduate school 
• Tuition charged 
• Aid awarded 
• Two categorical “college quality variable” that groups the colleges into 5 
categories based on College Board and US News and World Report groupings. 
Variables that Relate to Diversity (D) 
Since the crux of this thesis involves defining and measuring diversity, a discussion of 
what diversity is and how it is measured is warranted. The Oxford English Dictionary (2006) 
defines diversity as the “condition or quality of being different or varied.” It is important to note 
that in this definition any sort of variability can be inferred as adding value in the classroom. 
Indeed, as Bowen and Bok (1998) note in The Shape of the River, the concept of diversity in the 
classroom is not new to American higher education and has been stressed for over 150 years. 
However, historically, diversity was thought of mainly in terms of differences of ideas or points 
of view. Bowen and Bok go on to note that the dimensions of diversity were subsequently 
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expanded to include “geography, religion, nation of birth, upbringing, wealth, gender, and race” 
(p. 219). The federal government never overtly defines diversity but suggests that it can be 
thought of (at least in terms of litigation issues) to involve differences in “race, color, national 
origin, religion, gender, age, or disability” (GSA, 2006). Without detracting from the value of 
such an all-encompassing notion of diversity, it becomes untenable to measure it. More 
importantly, it is not where the public policy debate is occurring. While many have written 
eloquently about the subject, as Bowen and Bok (1998) note, “we have yet to explain precisely 
how, in what circumstances and to what degree diversity on campuses has enriched education” 
(p. 156). 
There are three economic studies that deal most directly with diversity and college: 
Sanders (2004), Kermit et al. (2001), and Rumberger and Thomas (1993). All three studies 
discuss diversity broadly but actually explore a much more narrowly focused notion of diversity. 
Rumberger and Thomas (1993) simply use a percentage of minority graduates. Kermit et al. 
(2001) measure “moderate student diversity” by looking at the fraction of Black students. While 
Sanders’s (2004) study (limited to law schools) uses language to suggest that he explores “racial 
Affirmative Action” and does initial work looking at “underrepresented minorities,” the body of 
the study focuses solely on African Americans. My work broadens the focus somewhat to 
include more diversity of groups than just a single racial category. In addition, I explore more 
facets of such diversity than simply using the percentage of the undergraduate population that 
can be categorized as a minority. 
The College Board has eight variables that relate directly to racial and ethnic background.  
For each, it is important to note that the data are for first-time freshmen and do not fully capture 
the ethnic make-up of a campus. One might infer that the undergraduate student body is stable; 
however, transfer students are less likely to be minority (Jenkins, 2006). This picture assumes 
that the trend during a four-year cohort is fairly stable. The eight racial/ethnic variables I use are 
from the College Board: 
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• American Indian/Alaskan Native 
• Black/Afro-American 
• Oriental/Asian-American/Pacific Islander 
• White/Caucasian 
• Mexican-American/Chicano 
• Puerto Rican 
• Hispanic (not included above) 
• Other and/or unknown 
The first transformed variable is an aggregate continuous variable for total percentage of 
minority, which is simply the sum of the following percentages for the institution: 
• American Indian/Alaskan Native 
• Black/Afro-American 
• Oriental/Asian-American/Pacific Islander 
• Mexican-American/Chicano 
• Puerto Rican 
• Hispanic (not included above) 
While the transformed variable made up of the aggregates more aptly captures the crux of 
the current public policy debate, it does lend itself to two problems, and both suggest exploring 
whether to also include variables that aggregate the overall diversity of the institution. There is a 
difference—at least intuitively—between a school that has enormous diversity in its non-white 
population (e.g., many different ethnic and racial groups) and one that simply has a large 
percentage of one group. It is unclear whether it would add more value due to what some 
consider peer “distance” (Winston & Zimmerman, 2003). Another way to approach the same 
issue is not whether there is a plurality of diversity but if one is thinking of diversity as a 
euphemism for percentage minority, if that is the case, then conceptually––too much diversity is 
the same as too little. In this instance, you would expect a parabolic effect, where a low 
percentage of Black or minority students contributes in the same way as a very large percentage 
of Black or minority students. 
A related issue is whether there is a “benchmark” for a particular minority. For example, 
we know that in 1992, the percentage of minorities at college was 25% (O’Hare, 1992). We must 
ask ourselves a similar question then as before: Is Navajo Community College or Spelman 
College more diverse than Michigan State simply because there are more minorities there? I 
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posit that such minority-serving institutions—while noble in their mission—are actually less 
diverse than the average among colleges, and while there may be educational benefits that form 
the foundation of the advocacy for such institutions, they may not provide the set of skills that I 
posit the market values. There has been some work on the quality of decisions and how it relates 
to the diversity of the group making the decision. This work builds on the notion of groupthink, 
where critical analysis is thwarted by a desire to maintain group cohesion. As Cox and Blake 
(1991) note, “decision quality is best when neither excessive diversity nor excessive 
homogeneity are present” (p. 51). Some of the measures of diversity I use are based on the index 
of fractionalization work routinely used in political economics (Ottaviano & Peri, 2006); this 
allows me to get at what we might call the “richness” of a college. Such a low percentage may 
seem odd for describing a college as “Historically Black” or “minority serving,” but such 
approaches have been demonstrated empirically in studies that look at, among other things, 
“White flight” in housing. Kermit et al. (2001) dealt with this issue for Blacks in their study by 
grouping colleges based on the fraction of Blacks. They use categories of 0–4% Black, 5-7% 
Black, 8-17% Black, and more than 17 percent Black (p. 226). 
To explore this phenomenon in my own way, I include some dummy variables to get at the 
question of diversity. Each one represents a category of diversity based on averages within 
higher education of different minority groups and broken out based on groupings to characterize 
the number of minorities. They are below, with explanation: 
(1) African-American fraction (Mean is 9%).  
• Dummy 1: Few African-Americans—less than 6% of enrollments 
• Dummy 2: About average—more or equal to 6% and less than 10% of 
enrollments 
• Dummy 3: Above average—more than or equal to 10% and less than 17% of 
enrollments 




Table 1. Illustrating the African American Fraction Variable 
 
Dummy N % Examples 
1  6022 75.9 Adelphi U, Albright Coll, Lafayette Coll 
2  315 4.0 Temple U, Union Coll, Iona Coll 
3  306 3.8 Delaware State U, Bowie State U, Florida 
Agriculture & Mechanical U 
4  1272 19.8 Alabama State U, , U Mississippi 
 
 
(2) Minority fraction (Mean is 19.6%) 
• Dummy 1: Few minorities—less than 14% of enrollments 
• Dummy 2: About average—more than or equal to 14% and less than 21% of 
enrollments 
• Dummy 3: Above average—more than or equal to 21% and less than 26% of 
enrollments 
• Dummy 4: Minority serving—more than 26% of enrollments 
 
 
Table 2. Illustrating the  Minority Fraction Variable 
 
Dummy N % Examples 
1 1086 13.7 Coll of St. Rose, Concordia Coll, Ithaca Coll 
2 3390 42.7 Albright Coll, Colgate U, Oklahoma State U 
3 1845 23.2 Boston Coll, Duke U, Florida State U 
4 1617 20.4 Alcorn State U, Andrews U, Rutgers Newark 
 
It is important and interesting to note that when one compares the “minority” institution in 
terms of fraction versus the “Black” institutions, there is only a 54% overlap, and in terms of 
other measures of quality, the profiles of the schools are quite different (with fewer in the 
“Black” equivalent dummy being as highly ranked as “minority”). I also posit that while I have 
age and work experience as two variables that may describe non-traditional students, when one 
looks at the list of the minority versus the Black fraction variables, one could also suggest other 
non-observable characteristics, such as the percentage of non-residential students. Unfortunately, 
other than the variables mentioned above, there are no other variables in the data set that would 
allow one to control for this. It is an important caveat because, based on my conceptual 
argument, whether one is living on campus or commuting would impact the extent to which one 
  
67 
is “learning” the “cosmopolitan skill set.” This issue may partially explain the variance in results 
between selective and non-selective institution in the findings. 
Models 
The overall goal of my research is to estimate the differentials in earnings across 
institutional characteristics related to diversity conditional on other institutional characteristics 
the literature informs us are relevant to earnings, as well as individuals’ traits and labor market 
experiences. We know from the literature that controlling for such attributes may enhance our 
understanding of the variation of earnings across characteristics related to an institution’s 
perceived quality, described in the literature by variables such as selectivity, average test scores, 
and student faculty ratios. Since my hypothesis is that diversity may be an input into quality, ipso 
facto this approach allows us to explore the variation of earnings across characteristics related to 
an institution’s diversity. As discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, there are many reasons why 
institutional characteristics may impact earnings, and I posit a human capital theory, but 
empirically, for the purposes of this study, it does not matter whether it is because of human 
capital affects or “signaling.” Indeed, perceived institutional quality may be a more readily 
visible characteristic than an individual’s ability. And perhaps diversity might be a signal; it is 
interesting to note that seven years ago, the College Board started explicitly including an 
institution’s diversity in its profile. 
To accomplish my analysis, I use three estimation procedures: an OLS with controls, an 
HLM model, and propensity score matching. Prior to explaining each of these approaches, I 
discuss further, building on the end of the last chapter, some of the overarching technical issues 
with these sorts of models and vein of empirical work, highlighting the limitations and making 
transparent the necessary caveats when it comes to interpreting the results. As part of the 
explanation of each of the approaches, I will first highlight particular benefits and limitations to 
each approach. In this manner, the reader can understand the limitations of this vein of empirical 
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research, the particular limitations to the approaches used in this study, and yet understand that 
these approaches are the most logical given the questions I posit. 
Once a theory has been posited, the next task is to estimate features of the causal 
relationship—in this instance institutional diversity and salaries of graduates. This study, like all 
empirical studies in economics, has a host of problems implicit in drawing inferences from 
empirical work. Brewer (1995) uses the world of psychology to help us understand what they 
would refer to as threats to validity, namely, the problem of drawing economic conclusions from 
empirical studies because of some challenges with the research design (p. 152). While there are a 
host of potential issues that might impact my study, the large empirical issues are omitted 
variables, selection and endogeneity, and common support condition. I will again review each of 
the issues, review strategies for mitigating some of these challenges, and then explore whether 
the strategies work for my study. 
In their writings on empirical strategies in labor economics, Angrist and Krueger (1999) 
succinctly summarize the challenges this way: “The causal relationships at the heart of these 
questions involve comparisons of counterfactual states of the world” (p. 1297). In my research, I 
can only observe one outcome of one scenario (e.g., where the student went to school and how 
much she earned). And since one cannot create randomized trials for such questions, one ends up 
with what Heckman (1979) terms "sample selection bias." The concept here is that if one’s 
sample is not random, then one has a specification error. In the case of the studies discussed in 
this paper, because college students are by definition different in some way from non-college 
students, a specification error exists. In other words, we can only observe college graduates’ 
wages for college graduates. A related but distinct bias is the notion of endogeneity, where the 
dependent variable is somehow related to unobserved variables. In this case, if one conducted a 
study on earnings and institutional characteristics and did not factor in selectivity, even though 
institutional selectivity was related to earnings, the result would also be a specification error. 
Heckman discusses this sort of specification error as well, but the two types of bias are different 
conceptually. Sample selection can be thought of as the intercept effect and endogeneity the 
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slope effect. So one can think of this as a series of confounding issues: students who opt to go to 
college or not and the recognition that those two groups are different; students who graduate 
from the college they attend or not and that those two groups are different; which college a 
student selects to based on some sort of reasoned approach that in theory maximizes their future 
potential income; and which employees employers hire based on some sort of cost benefit 
analysis of cost of employment and increased organizational value. 
Another econometric challenge deals with the “common support” condition. In such a 
case, where so-called comparable groups are not comparable, it becomes confounding (Heckman 
1980). As one might expect, there are some issues regarding common support in the college 
admission process. High-talented students tend to go to selective colleges, and less talented 
individuals go to less selective schools. However, some precocious students go to less selective 
colleges (perhaps for financial aid or some unobservable reason). While we hope it is not as 
often the case, it could also be that less talented students go to more selective colleges for some 
unobservable reason (e.g., a “legacy admit”). In either scenario, one would end up with 
asymmetrical relationships between the groups (e.g., fewer low-ability students end up in 
selective colleges than vice versa). 
In general, social scientists have widely differing approaches to exploring empirical issues 
related to labor, salaries, performance, and learning, and there is constant debate on the validity 
of these different approaches. Some (Boruch & Mosteller, 2002) have argued that randomized 
trials are the only way to deal with many of the specification issues that arise. Heckman (1995) 
does a nice job of refuting some of these arguments. More importantly for our purposes, the issue 
is moot. No college would forego the admission process and admit a randomized cohort simply 
to participate in a study; no employer would hire ignoring altogether the institution that a student 
attends, and certainly, no student would want to take on such a risk either with an employer or a 
college. For indeed fundamental to the hypothesis is that there are differences among colleges 
and that employers value these differences, as do students. In this instance, what is important 
theoretically is that which creates significant empirical issues. 
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Labor economists have faced these empirical issues for decades, and while researchers 
continue to search for better natural experiments, there is a recognition that other, less perfect but 
still informative approaches might be useful. The classic approach to mitigating in situations like 
the one I am exploring is to control for confounding variables, such as ordinary least squares 
with controls. The argument is to introduce other variables that might contribute to earnings, 
with controls for ability being the first adopted by economists studying the relationship between 
schooling and earnings (e.g., Ashenfelter & Mooney, 1968; Hansen, Weisbrod, & Scanlon, 
1970). This approach, controlling for ability and other measures that have been found to impact 
earnings, is still widely used. The premise is that these other variables help address the selection 
and endogeneity “specification” errors. There are a number of issues in using regression analysis. 
Since it is reasonable to assume that schooling is not randomly assigned, we ultimately cannot 
infer exactly how the process occurs dynamically between the school and the individual. 
Consequently, the variables elected to control are crucial. There is simply no way to find perfect 
variables that could control for the differences in earnings. At the same time, the introduction of 
added variables, particularly if the variable of choice is sensitive, can take away the inference on 
the variable of interest, so one wants to be as parsimonious as possible. The end result is that it is 
reasonable to assume that there will be an upward bias estimate on the returns to schooling. 
Some researchers (e.g., Monks 2000) simply use as many observable variables as feasible, rely 
on OLS, and acknowledge the biases. 
Another popular approach is the fixed effects approach, which uses repeated observations 
of individuals to address the unobservable characteristics. It “fixes” characteristics that are 
unchanging but related to both the inferred causal variables and the outcomes. HLM is quite 
similar to fixed effects but relaxes some of the assumptions. HLM has a number of benefits. 
First, it can help to control for clustering of observations and heteroskedasticity. Second, it can 
improve the efficiency of estimated impacts, given that the assumptions of the HLM are correct. 
Third, even if the assumptions are violated, HLM will still produce a best “HLM” fit, similar to 
the Best Linear Unbiased Estimate property of an OLS model (Goldberger, 1991). 
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HLM has some significant challenges. First, one must limit the number of control 
variables for the multilevel modeling to work. Second, it does not allow for negative within 
group correlations in the error terms. This may be a problem if we assume that college students 
use their peers when it comes to either college selection or employment. In HLM the random 
component of the intercept causes a positive correlation between observations within the same 
school. 
A popular alternative to regression is using propensity scores to create a quasi-experiment. 
Conceptually one creates the counterfactual by finding two individuals that seem similar based 
on a set of characteristics but who can be compared on the variable of choice (in this instance 
school diversity). One creates a “propensity score” that becomes a proxy for the variables in 
question. The appeal of this approach is that it focuses the attention on the variable of interest. It 
also addresses the common support condition in a way that OLS and fixed effect/HLM do not. 
The problem is that the researcher has to make a number of decisions about what goes into the 
score and how to weight the scores.  At least according to Angrist and Kreuger (1998), there is 
little formal statistical theory to guide this process. And as Black and Smith (2004) found, while 
it deals with the common support condition, it works best when it is bifurcated (in their case 
either highly selective college or not). 
Perhaps the most elegant of the approaches in that it is conceptually rigorous and not 
statistically complicated is the use of instrumental variables. In this model, one conceptualizes a 
scheme that uses exogenous field variation to approximate randomized trials. The trick is to 
identify a variable that one could posit is related to the variable of interest but is otherwise 
unrelated to potential outcomes such as earnings. The classic example is using draft eligibility 
status (which was randomly assigned) to see if individuals with lower earnings potential were 
less adept at getting deferments (Hearst, Newman, & Hulley, 1986). The pitfall to this approach 
is the validity of an instrument. There are a number of studies that have used instrumental 
variables to deal with selection issues in higher education when looking at earnings. These 
include things such as quarter of birth to look at years of schooling (Angrist & Krueger, 1998), 
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twins (Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996) and zip codes (Card, 1995). Unfortunately, 
nothing in the literature presented itself as a viable instrumental variable related to college 
selectivity and its diversity that would not be correlated with earnings. 
As a result of the limitations available to me, the empirical part of this work follows 
Monks (2000), Rumberger (1993), and Black and Smith (2004) and uses OLS with controls, 
HLM, and Propensity Score Matching, which give me three of the four major approaches to 
trying to deal with the empirical challenges. None of these approaches fundamentally deals with 
either endogeneity or selection bias, though proponents of each approach argue that each does 
address some of the selection issues. It is important to note, though, that even if one must 
approach the results cautiously, it will offer some insight into the relationships among the 
variables studied, and if one sees patterns across the approaches, it may suggest that the 
relationship has some tenacity. I found Monks's philosophical approach, which errs on the side 
of simplicity, and transparency compelling, though against the grain in current economic work 
generally. Monks (2000) discusses that the flaws of various approaches (e.g., Behrman, 
Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996; Brewer et al., 1998) and then simply uses an OLS with controls 
that includes individual attributes that he argues affect institutional characteristics (such as 
income and test scores) in his reduced form equation. He recognizes that by doing so, he does 
not fully capture the endogeneity, but it is sufficient to argue that the coefficients are good 
reflections of the average. 
While I cannot solve the endogeneity issues, there is a mitigating circumstance. The major 
potential specification error derives from the idea that particular students elect to go to diverse 
schools and that one therefore cannot deduce that the difference in the earnings are a result of the 
institution but are more the result of the type of student selecting the more diverse institution. 
However, the College Board did not publish ethnic and racial diversity until 1999, so the college 
applicants would not have had an easy way of knowing the level of diversity. They would have 
had to rely on reputation or word of mouth. Consequently, this would weaken any effect 
resulting from students choosing to go to a diverse college. 
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Estimation Approach #1 
I have discussed OLS above as an approach, and it is generally accepted within the 
literature (e.g., Brewer et al., 1998; Monks, 2000) that adding controls helps mitigate the 
selection issues. In addition, the OLS approach can hide the failure of the common support 
condition. The key to mitigating is to identify variables that would be correlated with both 
schooling and earnings (e.g., test scores). If one gets the variables correct, one can negate things 
like the negative impact of ability variables on college quality, but then one may create an 
endogeneity issue because the test scores are affected by schooling, and it is reasonable to 
assume that people who do well on tests might earn more regardless of their schooling. We 
should assume, therefore, that in this model we will have negative ability biases. If one adds 
variables to try and isolate diversity in order to protect against biases, the worse we make the 
error of measurement. To address this, one could simply add every available variable, but then 
we need to be mindful of the sensitivity of variables when adding other variables. 
I use a reduced-form equation that explores the relationship between the logarithm of an 
individual’s yearly earnings (ln Yi) relating it to individual (i) who attended college (j) as a 
function of the individual’s characteristics (Ii). In addition, relationships of this nature are 
measured with a set of institutional characteristics other than diversity for the college they 
attended (Cij) and the characteristics that demonstrate diversity of the college they attended (Dij). 
These variables have already been discussed. I include an error term (µi), which consists of two 
components—individual specific error and random error. 
ln Yij = βo +β1Ii + β2Cij+β3Dij + µi  
To attempt to control for the matriculation process, I include among the regressors 
individual characteristics that might affect matriculation. However, the institutional 
characteristics may still be influenced by unobservables, and we should not interpret the 
coefficients as more than a reflection on the average earnings of graduates of the different 




In my analysis, I first regress the log of income against experience, a male dummy variable 
and a White dummy variable as a benchmark for the incorporation of individual other 
characteristics that affect income and college characteristics. Then I expand this regression to 
include the diversity characteristics as well as the test score quartile and total debt. All 
specifications are estimated using ordinary least squares. Finally, because this study focuses on 
issues of diversity––and research has shown that there may be differences in returns to different 
groups ––I estimate regressions for Whites and Blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics. Chow 
tests are performed to test for any variation in the coefficients across groups. 
Estimation Approach #2 
While OLS is the most common approach for estimating earnings equations because of 
individual students, nested data within specific institutions may not be independent. Thus, I may 
have misestimated standard errors (Rumberger, 1993). To accomplish this, in the second model I 
use an HLM approach where I first estimate an individual level model within each school and 
then estimate a between-school model using the estimated within-school parameter as a 
dependent variable. 
Hierarchical linear modeling was specifically developed to model within-school and 
between-school phenomena and lends itself nicely to exploring the notion of institutional 
diversity as an indicator of quality. In theory it helps to better distinguish between individual and 
institutional effects when contrasted with OLS. This is important conceptually because the area 
of interest is diversity as an institutional effect. However, it does not provide a goodness of fit 
measure, and it does not deal with the selection or common support issues. 
Since the HLM approach I take is quite similar to fixed effect models, it falls prey to many 
of the similar issues inherent in fixed effect models. Since both going to college and learning to 
interact with folks who are different involve past experience, I am bound to generate a spurious 
positive effect of both schooling and possibly also of diversity simply because of the nested 
nature of the model and the regression to the mean. 
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There are many steps to HLM, with the ultimate goal of having a conditional model that 
has diversity in it with a number of explanatory variables in the between-school equations. To 
arrive at this model, I start by dividing the variance in earnings within and between schools. I 
then fit within a school model where I specify only a random mean earnings coefficient. Next, I 
create an unconditional between school model to divide the total variance in earnings between its 
within-school and between-school components.  Then, I create an unconditional within-school 
model to explain earnings differences based on individual variables within each school. This 
allows me to estimate the total variance and regression slopes of the different variables and to see 
if they are homogeneous across schools. Since they are, I can specify a common parameter in the 
third step. 
The final step is to use the school-level variables to explain differences that vary 
significantly across schools. To do this, I create a conditional model. It emulates Rumberger and 
Thomas (1993) and is based on selectivity, but replaces selectivity with diversity, and then 
expands the number of explanatory variables in the between-school equations. 
Estimation Approach #3 
The “quasi-experimental” approach that Black and Smith (2004) used has already been 
mentioned. The principal econometric disadvantage to this approach is that it is statistically 
complex and, at least in the study they attempted, ultimately failed to yield straightforward 
results that are easy to interpret. Furthermore, the matching the authors used also forced such 
small pairs that the results may not be statistically reliable. Black and Smith, while arguing that 
propensity score matches deal with the selection issues and the common support condition, end 
up having to severely limit the stratification in order not to compromise the common support 
condition. Indeed, as Angrist and Krueger (1999) note, propensity score matching works best 
when it is a bifurcated choice (e.g., intervention versus comparison group). Because there are 
both a host of institutional characteristics that make up “quality” and then an added criterion of 
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“diversity,” the counterfactual, becomes much harder to find, these limitations impact my work 
as well. 
Using Black and Smith (2004) as a model, I first create propensity scores and then match 
based on sets of characteristics. The goal of propensity score analysis is to balance two 
nonequivalent groups on observed variables to get better estimates of the effect of a treatment (in 
this case, institutional diversity). To do this analysis, I will first use the background variables 
described earlier to build propensity scores and then match on those data on the variables I have 
related to institutional selectivity AND diversity. Shadish (2010) writes extensively on the use of 
propensity scores and suggests using all variables that can be reasonably included in the score 
and the matching. The intuitive leap is that one can imply a similar probability of treatment by 
combining what are a large number of variables.!
Conceptually, one must create two groups. Let Y1 be the outcome in the group treated with 
diversity and let Y0 be the outcome in the undiverse/untreated state. Obviously, both groups go to 
college. Consequently, Y1 corresponds to the potential outcome associated with attending a more 
diverse college, and Y0 corresponds to the potential outcome associated with attending a more 
homogeneous college. It is important to note that I can only observe one o=(either Y1 or Y0) for 
each graduate. I assign D=1 to indicate that a person attended a more diverse college and D=0 to 
indicate that a person attended a homogeneous college. Finally, let X be a propensity score of 
observed covariates affecting both the choice of a more diverse college and economic outcomes. 
The question of interest—the impact of diversity on those who go to a more diverse college—is 
the mean effect of attending a more diverse college rather than a less diverse college on the 
graduate who chose to attend a diverse school. It can be described as: 
!
The generic form for the matching estimator is 
!
for the individual counterfactual for treated observation i. In this equation, j=1,…,J indexes the 
untreated comparison group observations. Per Black and Smith (2004), “all matching estimators 
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construct an estimate of the expected unobserved counterfactual for each treated observation by 
taking a weighted average of the outcomes of the untreated observations” (p. 115). 
Rationale for Approach 
Fundamentally, the focus of this study is to explore empirically my hypothesis as to 
whether there is a difference in quality of graduates of institutions that have similar profiles in 
terms of perceived institutional quality but have different racial and ethnic percentages, and 
whether that perceived difference is manifested in graduates’ starting salaries. This approach is 
different from most work in several ways and presents several potential issues to consider. First, 
it explores whether the market recognizes an initial premium of having gone to an institution that 
has student body diversity, when all other things are equal. Most importantly, fundamentally 
trying to tease out diversity as an institutional “quality” variable in terms of contribution to its 
alumni salaries based on a reasoned use of the literature is what makes my study different from 
other studies that have looked at the relationship between institutional diversity and outcomes, 
particularly since I am exploring different measures of diversity beyond percent African 
American, which is what other studies have done (e.g., Rumberger & Thomas, 1993). 
Short of a randomized experiment in which diversity across colleges was randomly 
assigned, I cannot infer any causal relationship between a college’s diversity and the salaries of 
its graduates. However, this holds true for any study that would look at an institutional 
characteristic and wages. And like other studies that explore quality, my goal is simply to inform 
conversation and to explore whether the reasoning I propose may have some support empirically, 
even while recognizing that there are a host of challenges. A review of the literature involving 
the methodology of looking at the returns to college quality provides support for my approach. I 
rely somewhat on other studies (e.g., Brewer et al., 1998;  Krueger, 1999) to argue for the 
inclusion or exclusion of particular variables. 
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While I explore the impact of institutional characteristics on individual students, my main 
goal is to inform policy discussion. The logic is that if colleges realize that students who attend a 
more diverse college earn more, then they are more apt to embrace Affirmative Action policies 
in their recruiting. It is well known that the sort of reduced-form equation relating the log of 
income to individual and institutional characteristics results in biased estimates of the returns to 
institutional characteristics, since it does not account for the selection process either by the 
student or the institution (Mayer-Foulkes, 2002). Using Rumberger and Thomas’s (1993) initial 
posing of the question as inspiration, I consequently opt also to explore using an HLM model. I 
then explore propensity score matching to try and deal with the common support condition. None 
of these models adequately addresses the issue of students selecting colleges and colleges 
selecting students. However, I also have three different models to compare—one that relies 
solely on the introduction of control variables to control for biases, another that uses the HLM 
approach but has fewer control variables, and a third that has less statistical significance but does 
deal with the common support condition. 
Since this paper’s models add yet further institutional characteristics to the set of 
observables potentially related to income, I may well run into issues of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables are correlated and the more variables 
one adds into the equation, then the higher the likelihood of such an occurrence. It is not a 
theoretical program but rather a practical one. It is doubtful that exact multicollinearity would 
occur, but even approximate linear relationships among the independent variables will lead to 
estimation errors. The main consequence is increased variance in the coefficient. This is because 
OLS only uses unique variance in calculating the coefficient (though it uses common variance 
for the R squared); consequently, it will have high variance and will be less reliable. HLM, while 
having many benefits, does not account for this. In addition, I emulate Monks (2000) and attempt 
to control for college selection by including among the regressors those individual attributes that 
influence the enrollment process for the student. In my data set, they are Total Undergraduate 
Debt and Entrance Examination Score Quartile. As Monks notes, the approach does not fully 
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capture the endogeneity of the institutional characteristics. The results are biased; consequently, 
one cannot view the coefficients on the institutional characteristics and diversity as a true return, 
but what should be reflected are the average earnings of graduates from institutions of different 
levels of diversity conditional to their observable individual characteristics (p. 284). In other 
words, at best I can only make some inferences on institutional performance; I cannot 
fundamentally address the counterfactuals, such as people who did not go to college or for some 
reason elected to go to a more or less diverse college. I can only make inferences about the 
average earnings of graduates from institutions that differ observably only on diversity. 
Because he includes a number of institutional variables, Monks (2000) argues that he can 
use neither a multinomial logit correction, such as Brewer et al. (1998) used, nor an instrumental 
variable approach, as in Behrman, Constantine, et al.'s (1996) approach, which is why he 
attempts to control for college selection by including among the regressors those individual 
attributes that influence the enrollment process for the student.  In his research, he uses the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score and net family income, arguing that those are 
key determinants in the college selection process (Monks, 2000, p. 284). I use the same 
approach, but with entrance score and debt as the two individual characteristics. To ensure that 
this is a reasonable approach, I regressed standard earnings functions with my data, and the 
results are quite consistent with Rumberger’s and Thomas’s OLS results, which used similar data 
sources; consequently I am reasonably confident that my approach is fairly consistent with 
others’ analyses. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a dearth of empirical work exploring the 
relationship between school diversity and income of graduates. The two studies done both 
focused solely on African Americans, and one used fraction of Blacks and the other used 
percentage Black. My work used four different variables—two continuous (percentage Black and 
percentage minority) and two that were sets of dummy variables (focusing on percentage of 
Black and percentage minority) —that group the college based on how close its diversity was to 
the diversity of the nation. 
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I used three models with each of the four variables for diversity, getting a total of eight 
results that explore the relationship. For the first model, I regressed the log of income against 
individual characteristics that affect income and college characteristics and the diversity 
characteristic. All specifications are estimated using ordinary least squares. For the second 
model, I used an HLM approach where I first estimate an individual level model within each 
school and then estimate a between-school model using the estimated within-school parameter as 
a dependent variable. For the third, I used propensity scores matching. The fundamental idea was 




ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Results 
There were three models run—an OLS with controls, a Hierarchical Linear model, and 
Propensity Score Matching. Each of the first two models was run several times using different 
estimations for diversity—two sets of dummy variables that grouped a college’s diversity based 
on difference from the mean, and two continuous variables—minority and black. For the OLS 
with controls, significance was estimated not only for all graduates but also for Whites, Blacks, 
and Hispanics. The dependent variable is the natural log of the salary of the graduate. For the 
Propensity Score Matching, the model was evolved to bifurcate college quality and diversity and 
was run for Whites only. 
Testing the Premise with OLS without Controls 
Recognizing that Ordinary Least Squares without control is the roughest estimation of a 
possible relationship between a dependent and independent variable, given the number of 
empirical challenges behind the question posited, OLS allows one to explore whether there might 
be a relationship, in particular the notion that the relationship might be parabolic rather than 
linear. In this scenario, I did not run separate regressions for Whites, Blacks, or Hispanics but did 
run regressions for each of the estimations for campus diversity. I conducted the OLS solely for 
the two continuous variables. 
First, we notice that in all four scenarios the p values are small enough to indicate that the 
model is statistically significant. What I found is that for both estimations of diversity—percent 
Black and percent minority—in the linear model, the percentage of minority students negatively 
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impacts the log of the salaries. However, in both cases the variable becomes positive with a 
significant quadratic, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the impact of diversity on 
income is first positive as it rises and then decreases in relation to log salary. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison among the OLS Results 
 
 
It also suggests that there is a negative effect for students in minority-serving institutions. 
The amount of variance explained in all the models is modest, but in both cases the likelihood 
test shows that the quadratic model accounts for more variance than the linear model. 
Results of the Two Models: OLS with Controls and HLM 
By design this presents the results as variations on themes. In other words, I ask basically 
the same question of the data using three approaches—OLS with controls and HLM—and in 
each of these there are four runs, two with continuous variables (percent Black and percent 
minority) and two with dummy variables that group the institutions into four categories based on 
the percentage Black and percentage minority). What we are most interested are trends or 
variance among all the models that would either support or not support the hypothesis of this 
paper. 
Consequently, I will first present the results from all of the models with respect to the 
variables other than my measures of diversity. The logic behind this is that it builds on others’ 







Variable Beta 95% CI p value 
Linear Percent Minority 0.003 % Min. -0.002 -0.002 to -0.001 0 
Quadratic Percent Minority 0.018 
% Min. 0.01 0.008 to 0.013 0 
% Min. Sqr. 0.0001 -0.0002 to -0.0001 0 
Linear Percent Black 0.012 % Bl -0.69 -0.86 to -0.53 0 
Quadratic Percent Black 0.014 
% Bl 1.18 -0.12 to 2.48 0.075 
% Bl Sqr. -4.34 -7.33 to -1.36 0.004 
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other indicators of college quality and demographic variables that relate to graduates earnings, it 
may suggest that any evidence we surface of a relationship between indicators of diversity and 
graduates' earnings also might warrant further study. 
I then will present the results of all the models with respect to the variables for diversity, 
noting the signs and the patterns among the models rather than going into depth about any 
particular model. Finally, I will present the runs of all the models, differentiating among the 
different racial and ethnic categories, because if there is variance among these, it may further 
bolster the reasoning behind the hypothesis, namely, if say there is a difference in impact of 
college diversity between Whites and Hispanics, say, it would be different than if the benefit 
were the same among groups, with the latter perhaps suggesting alternate hypotheses. 
I present all the results in their entirety as an appendix to the paper. 
Non-Diversity Variables 
Many of the non-diversity variables were found to be consistent with the literature. Being 
male consistently related to increased salary with at least a 99% confidence level. Being Black or 
Hispanic related to decreased salary, and being Asian related to increased salary but was not 
statistically significant. Other examples again are supported by the literature. College major 
mattered consistently; as an example, majoring in engineering consistently increased salary, 
while majoring in education consistently decreased salary. GPA, age at graduation, and job 
experience all consistently had positive impacts on salary. Table 4 presents the coefficients of 
some of the variables with income as the dependent variable comparing the variables among the 
different models of diversity (e.g., percent minority versus percent Black). One can see that there 
is a fair amount of consistency among the different approaches with respect to the coefficient and 
statistical significance of the non-diversity variables, which again are supported by the literature. 
In terms of variables that describe institutional “quality,” the student faculty ratio was 
consistently related to positive salary, and the US News ranking generally had an impact on 
salary, though interestingly neither the College Board selectivity nor the private institution  
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Table 4. Comparison of Example Variable (Non-diversity) across the OLS Results with Controls 
 
Variable % Minority % Black Black Dummy Minority Dummy 
Male 0.1232246** 0.1237967** 0.1204931** 0.117207** 
Total Debt 0.000000125 0.000000347 0.000000348 0.117207 
Black -0.016234 0.0301164 0.0170731 -0.0142506 
Hispanic -0.00040992 0.0109001 -0.0005349 -0.0192054 
Asian 0.049313 0.0402072 0.0536862 0.0255961 
Cumulative GPA 0.0004392* 0.0005474** 0.0005489** 0.0004834* 
Job Experience 0.0895161** 0.0899818** 0.0871339** 0.0865782** 
Part-time Worker -0.618303** -0.6207115** -0.621586** -0.6227396** 
Age at B.A. 0.0112255** 0.0123307** 0.0124048** 0.0124078** 
Education Major -0.2629436** -0.2687916** -0.2633613** -0.2591345** 
Engineering Major 0.1384565** 0.1437432** 0.1446991** 0.1424413** 
Private Institution 0.0299221 0.0165285* 0.0186794 0.0084634 
Carnegie Class 
(1993) -0.000552 -0.0007377** -0.0007649 -0.0007766* 
Student/faculty Ratio 0.1689399* 0.2086712** 0.218053** 0.17034** 
US News Ranking 0.0207732* 0.0201801* 0.0217381* 0.009341 
College Board 
Selectivity 0.0084505 -0.0088714 -0.0028388 0.0005811 
 
*significant at 95%, **significant at 99% 
 
dummy did. Perhaps this can be explained as a function of using a much broader base on 
institutions with a large number of open access admission policies in the dataset. There are some 
other interesting findings worth noting. In terms of college indicators, while as noted majoring in 
education seems to have a negative impact on earnings generally, it has a positive impact for 
Blacks. Another interesting finding is whether a college is private matters to White graduates’ 
salaries but not to Blacks’ or Hispanics’. In addition, the US News Rank matters to Whites and 
Hispanics, while for Blacks the College Board’s Selectivity Index matters. 
In terms of labor market indicators, being in school while working negatively impacts 
Whites’ salaries but does not seem to matter one way or the other to Blacks or Hispanics. While 
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working in the public sector does not seem to matter for Whites, for Blacks and Hispanics it 
negatively impacts salaries. These findings all reinforce findings in other studies. 
The only variables that did not seem to reinforce others’ findings were whether the 
institution was private, which was positive but wasn’t statistically significant, and total debt, 
which for all intents and purposes did not seem to have any relationship. Perhaps both of these 
findings could be explained in that unlike the vast majority of studies on college quality that have 
focused on highly selective institutions, my data included non-selective colleges. 
Variables for Diversity 
The various regressions using different indicators of diversity produced some interesting 
results. Each of the regressions roughly explained 31% of the variance, so no one combination 
explained more of the variance than another. In terms of general trends, the models seemed to 
support each other; the HLM models did not differ in any compelling way with the OLS with 
control models, so no one approach seemed more powerful than another. 
The first finding is that the relationship between the percentage of Blacks on a college’s 
campus and the starting salaries of its graduates, after controlling for other factors known to 
impact salary, on the surface seems to be linear and negative because the quadratic multivariate 
does not do a better job of explaining the variance and the linear model is small but statistically 
significant, which would tend to support the arguments against Affirmative Action. However, 
when one looks at the dummy model, what is interesting is that it seems to support the notion of 
a non-linear effect rather than a linear one, and one might infer than it is the distribution of 
Blacks on college campuses that may be pulling the linear model into significance in the 
continuous variable model. To explore this further, I conducted another regression that used a 
diversity squared variable, and the findings support the parabolic hypothesis. In the dummy 
model version, at institutions with few Blacks, it seems that there is no impact on percentage 
Blacks impacting salary (which makes sense since there are no Blacks to speak of at these 
institutions). However, at institutions that are about average in terms of percent Blacks or slightly 
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above average, the relationship suggests a slightly positive impact on salary, whereas at 
institutions with a significant number of Black students, the relationship between percentage 
Blacks and starting salaries is negative. 
Taking the broader definition of minority to include Hispanics and Asian Americans as 
well as Blacks, the results seem to better support the hypothesis. Specifically, while controlling 
for factors known or suspected to impact salary, institutional diversity as measured by the 
percent minority on campus accounts for a small yet significant amount of variance, and the 
multivariate model using a quadratic variable for diversity to explore the hypothesis of a 
parabolic relationship accounts for more variance than does the linear model. 
The dummy variable model supports the continuous variable model for minorities. It also 
supports, with statistical significance, the findings from the dummy variable model using Blacks 
only that was not statistically significant. Namely, there is no relationship at institutions with no 
minorities, a positive relationship at institutions that have about the mean or above the mean in 
terms of diversity, and a significant falling off when the institution approaches majority minority. 
 
 
Table 5. Findings for the Diversity Variable across OLS with Control Models 
 





Quadratic Percent Minority 5512 0.3069 
% Minority 0.006812** 
% Min Squared -0.0000787** 
Quadratic Percent Black 4825 0.3057 
% Black -0.7 
% Black Squared -0.11 
Linear Minority Dummy 5512 0.3081 NA NA 
    M1 (few) 0.0004404 
    M2 (avg) 0.0220819** 
    M3 (above avg) 0.0707118** 
    M4 (min.- serving) 0.0041305 
Linear Black Dummy 4825 0.3083 NA. NA 
    B1 (few) 0.0097363 
    B2 (avg) 0.0247544* 
    B3 (above avg) 0.0609683 
    B4 (HBCU) -0.0585005** 
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As mentioned before, the HLM analysis did not differ significantly. To conduct the HLM 
analysis, the total sample was divided into subsamples of graduates who had the same major 
(since this was the most powerful predictor of earnings). The analysis then considers what other 
factors, both individual and institutional, impact earnings with the same major. Because students 
who have the same major can be graduates of different schools, the numbers and the schools 
variables change with each group of majors. 
The first step in the analysis is to partition the total variance in each sub-sample into its 
within-school and between-school components. The next step is to estimate an equation whereby 
individual variables are assumed to be randomly distributed among schools (e.g., Female or Job 
Experience). Each individual variable is also centered at its school means (as explained in the 
models section, this allow the HLM model to be akin to a fixed effect model). The final step is to 
then input the wide array of institutional characteristics. 
The results of both minority variables are small but statistically significant, while both 
Black variables are not statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 6. HLM Findings 
 
Model Variable Beta p value 
Minority dummy AVG Min 0.017 0.025 
N-5634 R.E. Intercept 0.01 <0.0001 
ICC = .04 R.E. Residual 0.25 <0.0001 
Black Dummy HBCU  -0.012 0.065 
N=4825 R.E. Intercept 0.01 <0.0001 
ICC = .04 R.E. Residual 0.25 <0.0001 
Black Quad      % Black -0.57 0.46 
N=4825 % Bl Squared -0.73 0.71 
ICC = .04 R.E. Intercept 0.01 <0.0001 
  R.E. Residual 0.25 <0.0001 
Minority Quad      % Minority 0.007 <0.001 
N-5634 % Min. Squared -0.00009 <0.001 
ICC = .04 R.E. Intercept 0.009 <0.0001 
  R.E. Residual 0.25 <0.0001 
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As one can see comparing the two tables, the conditional HLM results are consistent with 
the OLS with controls. 
Differences by Race/Ethnicity 
Because minority-serving institutions can be perceived as just as un-diverse as institutions 
that significantly lower percentages of minorities attending them compared to the broader 
national population, exploring differences on how institutional diversity impacts graduates’ 
salaries based on the graduates’ own race/ethnicity may be interesting. Breaking the data down 
this way by race of graduates—to explore the benefits of institutional diversity based on 
racial/ethnic groups—produces some results that best support the hypothesis. Specifically, what 
one finds is that there is little relationship that is statistically significant ever for Blacks or other 
minorities in attending a school that has a larger percentage of minorities but that, with certain 
variables used for diversity such as the dummy minority and the continuous variable for minority 
in the quadratic, one finds that some diversity has a positive impact on the salaries of White 
students, and it is the benefit to White students that ends up pulling the overall result of the 
benefit to all students when it is not broken down by race/ethnicity. 
In other words, in these models, the graduates who seem to benefit the most from 
attending more diverse institutions are White students; one might reason that non-White students 
have had more opportunities than Whites to interact with students who are different and have 
learned some of the skills detailed in earlier chapters of this paper. It also suggests that other 
studies may have made improper inferences based on averages and not differentiating by race 
and ethnicity as well as by institutional diversity. In working through the propensity scores 
empirically, I had to make certain choices to ensure that the common support condition will fail. 
Since the crux of my hypothesis is the impact diversity has on Whites, I elected only to 
investigate the diversity treatment on White students. I also created a dummy variable for major 
that puts all the majors that have negative coefficients into one (education and social sciences) 
and those that have positive coefficients in the other (e.g., health and engineering). I then have a 
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propensity score with gender, major, GPA, job experience, age, and total debt. I then estimate the 
propensity scores for men and women using a logit model. 
 
 
Table 7. Differences among Race/Ethnicity for Diversity Variable: OLS with Controls 
 
Variable All Whites Black Hispanics 
% Minority -0.0008077 0.0035408** -0.0014409 0.0017095 
% Minority 0.006812** 0.0034825* 0.0025134 0.0032878 
% Min Squared -0.0000787** 1.19E-06* -0.0000369 -0.0000167 
% Black -0.75** -.8012* -.06713  -.2453*  
% Black -0.7  -.7431 -.06532   -.2241 
% Black Squared -0.11 -.131 .0054  -.00462  
M1 (few) 0.0004404 0.0125209 -0.120998 -0.2605975 
M2 (avg) 0.0220819** 0.0414385** -0.2129427 -0.2160535 
M3 (above avg) 0.0707118** 0.089153** 0.0551102 -0.4677416 
M4 (min.- serving) 0.0041305 0.0994517 -0.1269945 -0.1277531 
B1 (few) 0.0097363 0.0227325 0.0746755 -0.1329021 
B2 (avg) 0.0247544* 0.0315921* 0.0196601 (dropped) 
B3 (above avg) 0.0609683 0.2909298 0.2171659 (dropped) 
B4 (HBCU) -0.0585005** -0.0183267 -0.0529779 -0.0508954 
 
This was exactly the issue that Black and Smith (2004) confronted, and so I modeled what 
they did in their study, focusing on the region that has lots of observations rather than the tails. 
To help increase the number of observations, I create two categories for type of school—
selective and non-selective—based on whether they are ranked in US News and whether they are 
selective or not in the College Board data. In other words, I assume that if one is ranked (no 
matter how poorly) and if one is selective (even if moderately), then that is a “selective” college, 
and if not, then it is a non-selective college. 
I then take a similar approach with diversity, taking the four categories of “minority” and 
breaking it down into two—“diverse.” Since the mean is 19.6%, I simply use it as the dividing 
line, taking those close to the mean as diverse similarly to how I divided the dummy variables in 
the HLM and OLS models but using 2 rather than 4 dummies in order to explore the 
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hypothesized parabolic effect. I consequently end up with only 4 categories of college as 
opposed to 20. 
To remind the reader, the following variables go into building the propensity score. For 
individuals, it is whether they are a part-time student, their race/ethnicity and gender, their major, 
GPA, age, work experience, and total debt. Institutionally, I use the student-faculty ratio, a 
dummy variable for private, and Carnegie classification in addition to the rankings of US News 
and College Board. Table 8 provides the results. 
 
 
Table 8. Propensity Score Matching, White Only Selective vs. Non-selective Colleges 
 
 Non-Selective Selective 
Matching .07589 .104998 
S.E. .1247 .1397 
OLS .0456 .062789 
S.E. .0232 .0329 
Observations N=3271 N=1402 
 
 
Table 9. Comparison of Matching & OLS Analyses for Whites 
 
Method Non-selective Selective 
OLS 4.6% 6.3% 
Matching 7.6% 10.5% 
 
The way to interpret Table 9, which highlights the findings from Table 8 ,is that for 
Non-selective Schools, the OLS estimates indicate a 4.6% increase in income as the effect of 
moving from an homogeneous college to a diverse one. The OLS estimate is statistically 
significant at 5% level. In contrast, the matching estimate suggests a 7.6% increase in income, 
suggesting a larger impact. The matching estimate is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The estimates tell a similar and more dramatic story for selective colleges. Here the OLS 
estimate indicates an income effect of 6.3% associated with attending a more diverse college and 
is significant at the 5% level. The matching estimate is almost 10.5%, but is not statistically 
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significant. As one would expect because observations are dropped, in each case, the standard 
error is larger in the matching estimate than in the OLS. 
Research on employer perceptions by Moss and Tilly (2001) suggest one explanation for 
the weaker findings for “Black” versus the broader “minority” variable. Moss and Tllly argue 
that employer perceptions on race and ethnicity negatively impact hiring (p. 14). One could 
extend their argument of this negative bias against historically underrepresented minorities and 
posit that employers may be negatively biased against institutions that have larger percentages of 
Blacks versus institutions that have larger percentages of minorities (to also includes Hispanics 
and Asian-Americans). Their research falls in line with typical discriminatory arguments that 
explain lower wages paid to Blacks and simply extends the argument to institutions that have 
more Blacks and are less selective. This may explain why the findings indicate that attending a 
college with a high percentage of Black students does not have the same positive pattern of 
effects as attending a college with a high percentage of minority students and would suggest that 
there is some specification error that negatively impacts the variable of choice. 
Revisiting the Question 
In the last generation, the debate surrounding Affirmative Action in college admissions has 
been quite divisive and is far from over. However, the current debate around using Affirmative 
Action in college admissions has been framed almost in a Rawlsian context that creates a moral 
dilemma for admissions professionals and policymakers. Specifically, the debate consistently is 
framed as to whether it is good for society to give preference to one group of students at the 
expense of other groups. In this frame, policymakers and researchers determine whether the 
additional benefits to the admitted group would offset the costs borne by the non-admitted group. 
As a consequence, the few academics who have looked at the question of Affirmative Action 




While not trying to argue against the import of the current frame in the academic literature, 
this paper has explored a fundamentally different question and a different frame—and one that to 
date has not been either posited or researched—specifically, how a school’s diversity, as 
measured by the amount of historically underrepresented minorities on its campus, impacts all of 
its graduates, not just minority graduates. In order to explore the idea, it was important to first 
provide a historical context to how as a country we got to the current state of admissions policies 
by discussing the role of Affirmative Action in admissions and how it has been contested in the 
courts. The point of that discussion was to demonstrate that the issue is not trivial. At the same 
time, there have been some studies that suggest there are problems with alternatives to 
Affirmative Action programs (e.g., Tienda, 2003). It is important to understand that the issue is 
still debated and that there don’t seem to be alternatives to Affirmative Action that meet 
colleges’ needs; it suggests that the current thinking leaves us in a conundrum. 
This is where exploratory work such as in this paper, which suggests a possible different 
frame in which to situate Affirmative Action in admissions, might be useful in providing an 
alternative to the public policy question of the efficacy of “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” The 
alternative frame I suggest in this paper is to think of diversity as an input into the production 
function of the college experience. This frame alters the question significantly because 
Affirmative Action ceases to be framed as a tool of social engineering and rather as a factor in 
college quality, and it offers an additional lens in which to contextualize Affirmative Action in 
college admissions. 
If further research supports this new framework, then barring institutionally based policies 
such as Affirmative Action could be construed as regulation that impedes college quality, that 
impacts colleges’ ability to compete in the marketplace as suppliers of learning, and that serves 
as a barrier to trade, given the size of U.S. higher education as an export. For firms, it would 
mean they would have to come up with different ways of finding the cosmopolitan skill sets they 
currently rely on colleges to produce in their graduates as colleges could no longer use 
Affirmative Action in admissions to produce the cosmopolitan skill sets. 
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One possible explanation surrounding the dearth of research on the topic of the economic 
benefits to individuals who attend a more diverse college may be inherent in the framing of the 
argument in terms of social justice. That said, simply positing an alternative to a prevailing frame 
and then conducting a flawed empirical analysis might cloud the picture rather than reframe it. 
Consequently, for exploratory work that presents a different way of looking at a problem, it is 
useful to use existing literature to make a reasoned case for why it might be plausible to explore 
this new frame empirically. 
The challenge is that one must make an iterative case using the literature and pull from 
diverse literatures in order to build the case. There is actually ample research—if pulled together 
eclectically—that does build a reasoned case for this new frame and that I reviewed in detail 
earlier. The reasoning is as follows. 
I began conceptualizing a theory around linking salaries to a college’s institutional 
diversity by making a case for a business need for diversity. There is literature to suggest that for 
a host of reasons business values a diverse workforce because it improves their bottom line (e.g., 
Dunphy, 2004; Esser, 1998; Larkey, 1996; Milikin & Martins, 1996). I then argued that diverse 
workplaces tend to underperform unless there are these “cosmopolitan” employees that bridge 
the structural holes (Anderson, 2004; Burt, 2001; Kochan et al., 2003). I then used neoclassical 
economics to argue that it is reasonable for firms to pay for the cosmopolitan skill set and that 
human capital theory says that one can see the manifestation of the premium because of having 
developed the skill set (e.g., Roy, 1951; Schultz, 1952). I then made the argument that it is 
reasonable for employers to look to colleges as a source of these cosmopolitan employees 
because development in general is not a core competency of business and diversity-training 
programs in general tend to fail because of their design (e.g., Allen, 2001; Dunphy, 2004; 
Kochan et al., 2003; Ng & Tung, 1998). I then suggested that colleges may be ideally suited to 
develop people with these skill sets. I first argued that if we think about learning as a production 
function, then we can think about peers as an input and a diverse peer group as a technology, 
examining the literature to bolster the argument. 
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I finally argued that the college experience is a “trial by ordeal” that results in a prolonged 
shared experience that in some ways forces students to overcome the initial tendency to stay 
within homogeneous groups. There has been some work done in this area: Transactional Stress 
and Coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), Uncertainty Anxiety Management Theory (UAM) 
(Gudykunst, 1995;,2005), and Critical Race Theory (e.g., Stevenson, 2008). 
The argument is made that organizations value diversity for business reasons but that, in 
the absence of these cosmopolitan employees, diversity initiatives largely fail. I have suggested 
that organizations will pay a premium for these employees, and while they can develop the skill 
sets, it is more effective for them to look upstream to colleges who produce them. I then argued 
that certain colleges have a technological advantage in their “production” of learning in that they 
have more diverse student cohorts. The result is a cohort of cosmopolitan potential employees. 
The development of cosmopolitan employees is something that the racially and ethnically 
diverse college does by affirming in its recruitment of a diverse student body and thrusting this 
diverse group of students—who are at an age where they are ready to experience this cognitive 
dissonance and who learn not only how to cope with this heterogeneous environment but to 
value it and leverage it. And it is this ability to leverage, to fill these structural holes created by 
disparate groups, that leads to innovation and that the employer places a premium on. 
The result is a reasoned chain supported by the literature that takes us from income to 
colleges. What is important to note is that the logic does not require the diversity input to impact 
academic performance. The crux of the argument is that regardless of how it impacts academic 
performance while in college, learning to be cosmopolitan impacts income once one graduates 
from college. This is a fundamentally different argument than even the few academics who have 
argued the benefits of diversity within college (e.g., Terenzini et al., 2001) and is important given 
the mixed results we have seen from the peer effect (e.g., Hoxby, 2000). 
To explore the thesis empirically, I needed two sets of data: data that describe individuals 
and data that describe institutions of higher education. I used the College Board’s Annual Survey 
of Colleges for the school level data and the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study 
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(BB: 93) for the individual students’ data. I supplemented these sets with the US News and 
World Report Rankings and with the College Board selectivity index. The final sample size was 
8,054, and the final college sample size was 466 colleges. The general equation that 
demonstrates my thesis is: 
ln Yij = βo +β1Ii + β2Cij+β3Dij + µi  
which posits a relationship between the natural log of yearly income for individual i in time j as a 
function of individual characteristics (I) such as demographic variables, family background 
variables, education variables and labor market variables, school level variables (C) for 
individual i in time j that focus on school type and quality, and variables for diversity. The 
individual and school level variables were all based on the literature. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a dearth of empirical work exploring the 
relationship between school diversity and income of graduates. The two studies done both 
focused solely on African Americans, with one using fraction of Blacks and the other using 
percentage Black. My work used 4 different variables—two continuous (percentage Black and 
percentage minority) and two that were sets of dummy variables (focusing on percentage of 
Black and percentage minority) —that group the college based on how close its diversity was to 
the diversity of the nation. 
I used three models, and within each model I used 4 variables for diversity, getting a total 
of 8 results that explored the relationship. For the first model, I regressed the log of income 
against individual characteristics that affect income and college characteristics and the diversity 
characteristic. All specifications were estimated using ordinary least squares. For the second 
model, I used an HLM approach where I first estimated an individual level model within each 
school and then estimated a between-school model using the estimated within-school parameter 
as a dependent variable. For the third, I used propensity scores matching. The fundamental idea 
was to see if there was consistency among the results that might support or refute the thesis. 
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Discussion of the Findings 
One might characterize the findings as modest but consistent with the theoretical 
framework that I suggested to inform this exploration. In general terms, many of the 
non-diversity variables were found to be consistent with the literature. Being male consistently 
related to increased salary with at least a 99% confidence level. Being Black or Hispanic related 
to decreased salary, and being Asian related to increased salary but was not statistically 
significant. Other examples again are supported by the literature. College Major mattered 
consistently; as an example, majoring in engineering consistently increased salary, while 
majoring in education consistently decreased salary. GPA, age at graduation, and job experience 
all consistently had positive impacts on salary. Table 4 on page 84 presents the coefficients of 
some of the variables comparing across the models. One striking difference is a graduate’s total 
debt and the fact that consistently in my analysis it was not statistically significant. One can 
conceive of a graduate’s debt as a potential indicator of social economic status (the logic being 
that if one has debt, one could not afford college). Fairly consistently in the literature, debt has 
been found to be statistically significant (e.g., Kermit, Rumberger). While it is quite possible that 
this difference from the majority of the literature is a function of the data and models used, 
another potential explanation is that, unlike all the other studies done on college quality, I 
included non-selective and community colleges in my sample. Consequently, the average cost of 
college tuition among the colleges in my data set is probably significantly lower, and it could 
follow either that because the cost is lower there is less debt per student on average or that 
because socio-economic status is generally associated with college quality (e.g., Krueger, 
Monks, Rumberger), having a broader set of institutions may not create as much variance around 
the mean of the debt. A similar argument may explain why neither the College Board selectivity 
nor the private institution dummy variable was statistically significant. 
In these other institutional variables, future researchers may want to explore further the 
relationship between race , salary, and majoring in education. Another curious finding is that 
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attending a private institution mattered for Whites but not for Blacks. It would be interesting to 
explore further whether minority-serving private institutions are at a competitive disadvantage in 
the marketplace as compared to private non-minority-serving institutions. 
As noted earlier, the various models and combination of variables yielded consistent 
results. Each explained roughly 31% of the variance, so it is important to realize that none of the 
models are compelling as capturing most of the variance that exists among graduates’ salaries. 
My dummy variable approach and the quadratic suggests that perhaps it is a non-linear 
effect, and one might infer than it is the distribution of Blacks on college campuses that may be 
pulling the linear model into significance in the continuous variable model. In the dummy model 
version, at institutions with few Blacks, it seems that there is no marginal impact on percentage 
on salary as the percentage of Blacks grows (which makes sense since there are no Blacks to 
speak of at these institutions). However, at institutions that are about average in terms of percent 
Blacks or slightly above average, the relationship suggests a slightly positive impact on salary, 
whereas at institutions with a significant number of Black students, the relationship between 
percentage Black and starting salaries is negative. This finding is different from the finding of 
Rumberger that the percentage of Blacks at an institution had a positive impact on salaries. These 
findings suggest that further research is needed. 
However, the theoretical construct I am exploring takes a broader definition of minority to 
include Hispanics and Asian Americans as well as Blacks, and the results seem to better support 
the hypothesis. Specifically, while controlling for factors known or suspected to impact salary, 
institutional diversity as measured by the percent minority on campus accounts for a small yet 
significant amount of variance and the multivariate model using quadratic accounts for more 
variance than does the linear model. This finding, while modest, was consistent across my 
analyses. What is perhaps most intriguing is that it suggests a parabolic effect—namely, that 
there is no relationship at institutions with no minorities, a positive relationship at institutions 
that have about the mean or above the mean in terms of diversity, and a significant falling off 
when the institution approaches majority minority. 
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These results in these models suggest that the graduates who seem to benefit the most from 
attending more diverse institutions are White students, although one might reason that non-White 
students have had more opportunities than Whites to interact with students who are different and 
have learned some of the skills detailed in earlier chapters of this paper. It also suggests that 
other studies may have made improper inferences based on averages and not differentiating by 
race and ethnicity as well as by institutional diversity. Hossler (1989) found in surveying 
students that Black students who attend Black high schools would want to attend predominantly 
White high schools to round out their experience, while Black students who attended 
predominantly White high schools attend HBCUs to explore their “roots.” To reconcile the 
empirical discrepancy that not as many Black students attend predominantly White institutions, 
he suggests that they do not have the academic performance to be admitted, and that might 
explain the discrepancy. 
Implications 
For an individual student, one might expect to see institutional racial and ethnic diversity 
become more important in the college selection process. There is anecdotal evidence that this 
information is more readily available now than it was when the cohort analyzed for this paper 
was applying to college (the College Board did not publish percent minority in its College 
Handbook until 1990). However, one could not comfortably posit that this change is a result of 
potential college students recognizing the value of institutional diversity to their future income. It 
could simply be the zeitgeist or the simple increased availability of all sorts of information. 
Perhaps equally important, if such findings ended up to be supported by future research, it would 
suggest different sorts of activities by students when they attend school. One need only think of 
examples where a school seems integrated only to walk into the lunchroom and see only 
segregation (Greene 1998). One would expect students to seek out such opportunities to learn 
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from others in the same way now that students select particular majors or classes based partially 
on perceived potential future income. 
The most intriguing implications for individual students are for Black, Asian American, 
and Latino students. Since the analyses suggest that institutional diversity matters less to them, it 
is reasonable that they might look at less “diverse” institutions, such as minority-serving 
institutions, that might meet other needs, as argued in the literature (Henderson 2001). Equally 
important, if one accepts Fryer and Greenstone’s (2007) argument that HBCUs' value to 
graduates has declined, then minority students, who are a rare commodity, might command a 
premium in the marketplace and could use that to increase the cost to institutions for them to 
matriculate. 
For colleges, if one were to posit that institutional diversity contributed to graduates' 
earnings, then one might expect colleges to attempt to attract, enroll, and retain a more diverse 
student body. They might expect wealthier alumni to donate more money, and they would 
recognize that in the marketplace for students, the ability to attract a more diverse cohort would 
mean a competitive advantage among their peers. 
One could imagine more explicit marketing around institutional diversity as well as more 
explicit admission policies. In addition, one could imagine “diversity aid,” to try and increase the 
institutional yield of students attractive to the institution. One might imagine the system working 
similar to “merit aid” used to attract students with better grades or test scores under the premise 
that it will improve the learning of the students’ peers as well as a school’s rankings based on 
things such as test scores. 
Given the scarcity of minority students, and the “value added” of these students as an 
educational input, one might expect to see significant aid allocated not to need but rather to 
diversity. In essence, a student’s value in contributing to the learning of her peers might require a 
premium paid based on her value in the same way that one pays a premium for higher quality 
steel in the production of buildings or a scholarship to a football player based on potential wins 
and revenues from bowl games. That premium might manifest itself as “diversity aid.” 
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It is interesting to consider the implication for colleges. Given that individual colleges 
compete in a marketplace and that in this world a diverse cohort is a part of the production of 
competitive graduates, any sort of limitation on admission policies amounts to a “barrier to 
trade.” This may sound far-fetched, but one need only remember that when California passed 
Proposition 209, the University of California at Berkeley saw an immediate decrease in the 
number of minority applicants and matriculants (Engelgau, 1998). In this scenario, the state of 
California negatively impacted Berkeley’s ability to compete in the marketplace and forced them 
to produce an inferior product. The issue may be important to colleges because proxies that are 
being put forth in lieu of Affirmative Action do not seem to be generating the sort of cohorts that 
institutions want in terms of ethnic or racial diversity (e.g., Massey & Fischer, 2005). It is 
important to note as well that, while institutions such as the College Board argue that 
performance differences among ethnic and racial groups are largely a result of educational 
experiences, there may be some evidence that suggests that test scores may under-predict the 
potential for academic success of minority students. 
The potential implications for public policy and public perceptions surrounding 
Affirmative Action are also worth pondering. A recent Wall Street Journal poll (Evans, 2010) of 
recruiters asking them to identify the best colleges from which to hire employees only had one 
Ivy League institution among the top 25. One can envision employers getting increasingly 
sophisticated in recognizing talented employees and sourcing their college rather than relying 
either on the simple acquisition of a college degree or traditional selectivity rankings based 
largely on college inputs rather than outcome or learning. One certainly would expect evidence 
that suggests that institutional diversity enhances the salaries of White students to significantly 
change the public policy debate, because the reasonable moral argument that it is problematic to 




We need to develop better measures of diversity. My work explored doing analyses similar 
to work that others had done (Rumberger) using more than one measure, and the findings did 
vary significantly when one looked at African Americans or a broader measure of diversity. 
Other measures of diversity could be used, such as the number of international students or 
variance in socio-economic status or geographic background, as potential other indicators. My 
work looked at both Blacks and other minorities as a way of indicating diversity and looked at 
them both as continuous and dummy variables and whether there was more than one group. It 
was a plausible place to start given the attack on Affirmative Action. However, from an 
institution’s perspective, if geographic diversity, SES diversity, or number of international 
students positively impacts salaries of graduates, that has important ramifications for the 
institution’s financial aid and admissions policies and strategies in the marketplace. Basically, 
the research community needs to come up with better ways of capturing diversity in all of its 
richness, particularly given the public rhetoric about the value of diversity. 
To further explore some of the specification issues that arise empirically, it might be 
insightful to explore further more homogeneous types of institutions (e.g., highly selective or 
community colleges). It would also be useful to find some within-institutional variable that 
describes better whether a student is a commuter. And one could even explore whether students 
who attend but do not finish college receive some benefit from institutional diversity. Finally, it 
is worth noting that there is no way of ascertaining whether students have these skills before they 
enter college. Despite knowing from the College Board that when the students in this dataset 
went to college minority enrollment was not presented in their data on colleges, we cannot really 
know whether the college is somehow sending a signal that sorts students out in such a way that 
only those who either are or are somehow predisposed to be cosmopolitan are going to apply 
rather than it simply being a function of their learning to be cosmopolitan at the institution. In 
essence, not only is it to know in this scenario whether the metaphorical chicken or egg comes 
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first—the student or the institution, it is also, given the selection issues, to know whether the 
student has an interest in poultry metaphorically speaking or it is some curious red herring that is 
indicating some other unobservable value about the individual and the institutional match. 
Hopefully, this exploratory paper on whether a college’s diversity was related to its 
graduates' salaries posed enough questions and through the analysis raised enough other 
questions to encourage other researchers to explore the four areas mentioned above so that the 
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Table 11. Analysis of Impact of Missing Demographic Data 
 
Percent Minority Test           
Group  Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev. (95% Conf Interval) 
0 5729 19.38942 0.2914106 22.05691 18.81815 19.9607 
1 5512 19.08454 0.2953595 21.92833 18.50552 19.66356 
combined 11241 19.23993 0.2074397 21.9935 18.83331 19.64654 
difference   0.3048794 0.4149653   -0.5085252 1.118284 
diff -= Mean (0) - mean (1)      t =   0.7347 
Ho: diff = 0     
degrees of freedom =    
11239 
         
Ha: diff < 0   Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.7687   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4625           Pr(T > t) = 0.2313 
Salary Test        
Group  Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev. (95% Conf Interval) 
0 5865 9.782294 0.0079621 0.6097671 9.766685 9.797903 
1 5512 9.775145 0.008236 0.6114644 9.758999 9.791291 
combined 11377 9.77883 0.0057243 0.6105736 9.76761 9.790051 
difference   0.0071491 0.0114545   -0.0153036 0.0296018 
diff -= Mean (0) - mean (1)     t =   0.6241 
Ho: diff = 0     
degrees of freedom =    
11375 
         
Ha: diff < 0   Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0 




Table 12. Analysis of Impact of Missing Demographic Data 
 
Variable Pre missing Post missing Pearson chi2 Percent 
Total count 5865 5512 NA NA 
Male 3362 3165 0.0151 0.902 
Black 601 571 0.03866 0.844 
Hispanic 204 184 0.1693 0.681 
Asian 134 106 1.7998 0.18 




Table 13. Black OLS Model (Dummy) with Controls 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 5634 
Model 648.27946 35 18.5222703  F( 35,  5598) = 71.3 
Residual 1454.33701 5598 0.259795821  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 2102.61647 5633 0.373267614  R-squared     = 0.3083 
     Adj R-squared = 0.304 
     Root MSE      = 0.5097 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
black_1 0.0097363 0.0363598 0.75 0.452 -0.0439165 0.0986423 
black_2 0.0247544 0.1485483 0.17 0.045 -0.0026645 0.0315966 
black_3 0.0609683 0.1387736 0.44 0.66 -0.2110817 0.3330183 
black_4 -0.0585005 0.0202733 -2.89 0.004 -0.098244 -0.018757 
Male 0.1204931 0.0154286 7.81 0 0.090247 0.1507392 
Black 0.0170731 0.0259269 0.66 0.51 -0.0337538 0.0679 
Hispanic -0.0005349 0.0382963 -0.01 0.989 -0.0756104 0.0745407 
Asian 0.0536862 0.0476479 1.13 0.26 -0.0397221 0.1470944 
amer_indian 0.0735455 0.095252 0.77 0.44 -0.1131854 0.2602764 
TOTDEBT 3.48E-07 9.18E-07 0.38 0.705 -1.45E-06 2.15E-06 
Education -0.2633613 0.0262324 -10.04 0 -0.314787 -0.2119356 
Engineering 0.1446991 0.0338453 4.28 0 0.0783491 0.211049 
health_prof 0.198002 0.0337859 5.86 0 0.1317685 0.2642356 
public_aff~s -0.1088347 0.0434548 -2.5 0.012 -0.1940229 -0.0236465 
bio_science -0.089229 0.0436358 -2.04 0.041 -0.1747721 -0.0036859 
math_science -0.1193894 0.0338025 -3.53 0 -0.1856554 -0.0531234 
social_sci~e -0.1814479 0.0281097 -6.45 0 -0.2365539 -0.1263419 
History -0.6386448 0.0485178 -13.16 0 -0.7337585 -0.5435311 
Psychology -0.1909258 0.0454501 -4.2 0 -0.2800257 -0.101826 
Humanities -0.2691472 0.0314592 -8.56 0 -0.3308195 -0.2074749 
Other -0.1307021 0.0271501 -4.81 0 -0.1839269 -0.0774772 
GPACUM 0.0005489 0.0001625 3.38 0.001 0.0002304 0.0008675 
JOBEXPR 0.0871339 0.014128 6.17 0 0.0594375 0.1148302 
Parttime -0.621586 0.0215702 -28.82 0 -0.663872 -0.5792999 
Inschool -0.1950824 0.0184635 -10.57 0 -0.2312779 -0.1588868 
public_sec -0.0378962 0.0154032 -2.46 0.014 -0.0680925 -0.0076999 
self_emp -0.1651888 0.0869557 -1.9 0.058 -0.3356558 0.0052781 
AGEATBA 0.0124048 0.0012962 9.57 0 0.0098637 0.014946 
Unemployed -0.0740328 0.0333267 -2.22 0.026 -0.1393661 -0.0086995 
out_force -0.372424 0.049403 -7.54 0 -0.4692731 -0.2755749 
Private 0.0186794 0.0184122 1.01 0.31 -0.0174157 0.0547745 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0007649 0.0003606 -2.12 0.034 -0.0014718 -0.000058 
Ratio 0.218053 0.051232 4.26 0 0.1176185 0.3184876 
Usnews 0.0217381 0.0108304 2.01 0.045 0.0005064 0.0429699 
board_sele~y -0.0028388 0.0106197 -0.27 0.789 -0.0236576 0.01798 





Table 14. Minority OLS Model (Dummy) with Controls 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 5634 
Model 647.745545 35 18.5070156  F( 35,  5598) = 71.21 
Residual 1454.87092 5598 0.259891197  Prob > F = 0 
Total 2102.61647 5633 0.373267614  R-squared = 0.3081 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3037 
     Root MSE = 0.5098 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
min_1 0.0004404 0.0217469 0.02 0.984 -0.0421919 0.0430727 
min_2 0.0220819 0.0256446 0.86 0.003 0.0028191 0.0723553 
min_3 0.0707118 0.0320998 2.2 0.013 0.067839 0.1336398 
min_4 0.0041305 0.0263519 1.57 0.117 -0.0103554 0.0929645 
Male 0.117207 0.01542 7.6 0 0.0869778 0.1474362 
Black -0.0142506 0.0265145 -0.54 0.591 -0.0662293 0.0377282 
Hispanic -0.0192054 0.0390827 -0.49 0.623 -0.0958227 0.0574119 
Asian 0.0255961 0.0484078 0.53 0.597 -0.069302 0.1204942 
amer_indian 0.0510764 0.0952472 0.54 0.592 -0.1356452 0.2377979 
TOTDEBT 3.97E-07 9.22E-07 0.43 0.667 -1.41E-06 2.21E-06 
Education -0.2591345 0.0262923 -9.86 0 -0.3106776 -0.2075914 
Engineering 0.1424413 0.0338806 4.2 0 0.0760223 0.2088604 
health_prof 0.198945 0.0337776 5.89 0 0.1327278 0.2651621 
public_aff~s -0.1063702 0.043484 -2.45 0.014 -0.1916157 -0.0211247 
bio_science -0.0904867 0.0436527 -2.07 0.038 -0.1760628 -0.0049105 
math_science -0.1201698 0.033807 -3.55 0 -0.1864446 -0.0538951 
social_sci~e -0.1833267 0.0281409 -6.51 0 -0.2384938 -0.1281596 
History -0.6301575 0.0485743 -12.97 0 -0.7253818 -0.5349331 
Psychology -0.1989663 0.0454591 -4.38 0 -0.2880837 -0.1098489 
Humanities -0.2755885 0.0314327 -8.77 0 -0.3372087 -0.2139683 
Other -0.1317691 0.027183 -4.85 0 -0.1850583 -0.0784799 
GPACUM 0.0004834 0.0001631 2.96 0.003 0.0001635 0.0008032 
JOBEXPR 0.0865782 0.0141286 6.13 0 0.0588807 0.1142758 
Parttime -0.6227396 0.0215915 -28.84 0 -0.6650672 -0.580412 
Inschool -0.1965172 0.0184891 -10.63 0 -0.232763 -0.1602714 
public_sec -0.0384839 0.0153931 -2.5 0.012 -0.0686605 -0.0083074 
self_emp -0.1718659 0.0869691 -1.98 0.048 -0.3423591 -0.0013728 
AGEATBA 0.0124078 0.0012975 9.56 0 0.0098641 0.0149515 
Unemployed -0.0715809 0.0333126 -2.15 0.032 -0.1368865 -0.0062753 
out_force -0.3750454 0.0494537 -7.58 0 -0.4719938 -0.2780971 
Private 0.0084634 0.0185891 0.46 0.649 -0.0279784 0.0449052 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0007766 0.0003575 -2.17 0.03 -0.0014774 -0.0000758 
Ratio 0.17034 0.0516085 3.3 0.001 0.0691674 0.2715126 
Usnews 0.009341 0.0110408 0.85 0.398 -0.0123032 0.0309852 
board_sele~y 0.0005811 0.0108393 0.05 0.957 -0.0206682 0.0218304 





Table 15. Minority Continuous Model OLS with Controls 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 5512 
Model 630.895691 32 19.7154903  F( 32,  5479) = 75.56 
Residual 1429.6061 5479 0.260924639  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 2060.50179 5511 0.373888911  R-squared     = 0.3062 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3021 
     Root MSE      = 0.51081 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority -0.0008077 0.0004492 -1.8 0.072 -0.0016883 0.0000728 
Male 0.1237967 0.0156489 7.91 0 0.0931187 0.1544747 
Black 0.0301164 0.0303896 0.99 0.322 -0.0294593 0.0896921 
Hispanic 0.0109001 0.0403495 0.27 0.787 -0.0682009 0.090001 
Asian 0.0402072 0.0510803 0.79 0.431 -0.0599305 0.140345 
amer_indian 0.0637602 0.0970606 0.66 0.511 -0.126517 0.2540375 
TOTDEBT 3.47E-07 9.35E-07 0.37 0.711 -1.49E-06 2.18E-06 
Education -0.2687916 0.0264879 -10.15 0 -0.3207184 -0.2168649 
Engineering 0.1437432 0.0344698 4.17 0 0.0761686 0.2113177 
health_prof 0.1954766 0.03435 5.69 0 0.1281369 0.2628164 
public_aff~s -0.1043407 0.044007 -2.37 0.018 -0.1906119 -0.0180695 
bio_science -0.1002026 0.0441454 -2.27 0.023 -0.1867451 -0.0136602 
math_science -0.1169562 0.0341861 -3.42 0.001 -0.1839746 -0.0499378 
social_sci~e -0.1807966 0.0284437 -6.36 0 -0.2365575 -0.1250357 
History -0.6436481 0.0490086 -13.13 0 -0.7397244 -0.5475717 
Psychology -0.1887296 0.0464036 -4.07 0 -0.2796992 -0.09776 
Humanities -0.2804114 0.031737 -8.84 0 -0.3426286 -0.2181943 
Other -0.1316584 0.0273405 -4.82 0 -0.1852566 -0.0780602 
GPACUM 0.0005474 0.0001653 3.31 0.001 0.0002234 0.0008714 
JOBEXPR 0.0899818 0.0143206 6.28 0 0.0619079 0.1180558 
Parttime -0.6207115 0.0219393 -28.29 0 -0.6637213 -0.5777017 
Inschool -0.1945618 0.0186869 -10.41 0 -0.2311956 -0.157928 
public_sec -0.0400392 0.0156409 -2.56 0.01 -0.0707016 -0.0093768 
self_emp -0.1746918 0.0871446 -2 0.045 -0.3455299 -0.0038538 
AGEATBA 0.0123307 0.0013202 9.34 0 0.0097426 0.0149187 
Unemployed -0.0667519 0.0335714 -1.99 0.047 -0.1325652 -0.0009387 
out_force -0.3751017 0.049989 -7.5 0 -0.4731 -0.2771034 
Private 0.0165285 0.0189736 0.87 0.384 -0.0206674 0.0537243 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0007377 0.0003657 -2.02 0.044 -0.0014546 -0.0000209 
Ratio 0.2086712 0.0544172 3.83 0 0.1019918 0.3153505 
Usnews 0.0201801 0.0111597 1.81 0.071 -0.0016974 0.0420576 
board_sele~y -0.0088714 0.0108331 -0.82 0.413 -0.0301085 0.0123657 





Table 16. Minority Quadratic Model OLS with Controls 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 5512 
Model 639.914894 29 22.0660308  F( 29,  5482) = 85.15 
Residual 1420.58689 5482 0.25913661  Prob > F = 0 
Total 2060.50179 5511 0.373888911  R-squared = 0.3106 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3069 
     Root MSE = 0.50905 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.006812 0.0012679 5.37 0 0.0043265 0.0092976 
min2 -0.0000787 0.000013 -6.05 0 -0.0001041 -0.0000532 
Male 0.1232246 0.0155201 7.94 0 0.0927991 0.1536501 
TOTDEBT 1.25E-07 9.31E-07 0.13 0.893 -1.70E-06 1.95E-06 
Education -0.2629436 0.026396 -9.96 0 -0.3146904 -0.2111969 
Engineering 0.1384565 0.0342939 4.04 0 0.0712269 0.2056861 
health_prof 0.1951413 0.0342228 5.7 0 0.1280511 0.2622316 
public_aff~s -0.1127433 0.043858 -2.57 0.01 -0.1987224 -0.0267642 
bio_science -0.0994134 0.0439772 -2.26 0.024 -0.1856261 -0.0132007 
math_science -0.1114251 0.0340742 -3.27 0.001 -0.178224 -0.0446262 
social_sci~e -0.1754846 0.0283288 -6.19 0 -0.2310203 -0.119949 
History -0.6374802 0.0488185 -13.06 0 -0.7331839 -0.5417765 
Psychology -0.2023559 0.0462314 -4.38 0 -0.2929879 -0.111724 
Humanities -0.2788534 0.0314481 -8.87 0 -0.3405041 -0.2172027 
Other -0.1313 0.0272216 -4.82 0 -0.1846651 -0.0779349 
GPACUM 0.0004392 0.0001591 2.76 0.006 0.0001274 0.000751 
JOBEXPR 0.0895161 0.0142624 6.28 0 0.0615561 0.1174762 
Parttime -0.618303 0.0218351 -28.32 0 -0.6611084 -0.5754976 
Inschool -0.1971531 0.0186001 -10.6 0 -0.2336166 -0.1606896 
public_sec -0.0306192 0.0155275 -1.97 0.049 -0.0610593 -0.0001791 
self_emp -0.1692498 0.086811 -1.95 0.051 -0.3394339 0.0009342 
AGEATBA 0.0112255 0.0013281 8.45 0 0.0086219 0.0138292 
Unemployed -0.0547491 0.033284 -1.64 0.1 -0.119999 0.0105008 
out_force -0.3883196 0.0498316 -7.79 0 -0.4860093 -0.2906298 
Private 0.0299221 0.0189959 1.58 0.115 -0.0073175 0.0671617 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.000552 0.0003649 -1.51 0.13 -0.0012674 0.0001634 
Ratio 0.1689399 0.0545752 3.1 0.002 0.0619509 0.275929 
Usnews 0.0207732 0.0110848 1.87 0.061 -0.0009574 0.0425038 
board_sele~y 0.0084505 0.0111243 0.76 0.448 -0.0133576 0.0302586 





Table 17a. Black Model (Dummy) by Race, Impact on Whites 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 4674 
Model 556.314763 31 17.9456375  F( 31,  4642) = 66.72 
Residual 1248.54354 4642 0.268966725  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 1804.8583 4673 0.38623118  R-squared     = 0.3082 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3036 
     Root MSE      = 0.51862 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
black_1 0.0227325 0.0402377 0.56 0.572 -0.0561524 0.1016175 
black_2 0.0315921 0.1855812 -0.31 0.075 -0.4211438 0.3065106 
black_3 0.2909298 0.2611282 1.11 0.265 -0.2210056 0.8028653 
black_4 -0.0183267 0.023115 -0.79 0.428 -0.0636432 0.0269897 
Male 0.1323494 0.0172754 7.66 0 0.0984814 0.1662174 
TOTDEBT -1.34E-06 1.04E-06 -1.29 0.196 -3.38E-06 6.93E-07 
Education -0.3373133 0.0292465 -11.53 0 -0.3946504 -0.2799762 
Engineering 0.1393871 0.0379447 3.67 0 0.0649976 0.2137767 
health_prof 0.1577896 0.0373023 4.23 0 0.0846593 0.2309198 
public_aff~s -0.1388555 0.0483657 -2.87 0.004 -0.2336753 -0.0440357 
bio_science -0.1316683 0.0477138 -2.76 0.006 -0.22521 -0.0381266 
math_science -0.1864491 0.0387157 -4.82 0 -0.2623501 -0.110548 
social_sci~e -0.1992076 0.0321985 -6.19 0 -0.2623319 -0.1360833 
History -0.6644041 0.0519948 -12.78 0 -0.7663386 -0.5624696 
Psychology -0.2303712 0.0495768 -4.65 0 -0.3275653 -0.1331772 
Humanities -0.3183777 0.0348183 -9.14 0 -0.3866381 -0.2501172 
Other -0.165786 0.0304153 -5.45 0 -0.2254145 -0.1061575 
GPACUM 0.0006937 0.0001817 3.82 0 0.0003375 0.0010499 
JOBEXPR 0.0735949 0.0158954 4.63 0 0.0424323 0.1047575 
Parttime -0.5877204 0.0242019 -24.28 0 -0.6351677 -0.5402731 
Inschool -0.2448557 0.0208983 -11.72 0 -0.2858262 -0.2038851 
public_sec -0.0166803 0.0171909 -0.97 0.332 -0.0503827 0.017022 
self_emp -0.2349099 0.0925324 -2.54 0.011 -0.4163174 -0.0535024 
AGEATBA 0.0109507 0.001433 7.64 0 0.0081414 0.0137601 
Unemployed -0.045885 0.0406379 -1.13 0.259 -0.1255547 0.0337847 
out_force -0.3514115 0.0557972 -6.3 0 -0.4608006 -0.2420224 
Private 0.0508965 0.0210297 2.42 0.016 0.0096682 0.0921248 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0008637 0.0004092 -2.11 0.035 -0.0016659 -0.0000616 
Ratio 0.1949598 0.0544483 3.58 0 0.0882153 0.3017044 
Usnews 0.0366156 0.0120435 3.04 0.002 0.0130047 0.0602266 
board_sele~y -0.0074743 0.0118401 -0.63 0.528 -0.0306865 0.0157378 





Table 17b. Black Model (Dummy) by Race, Impact on Blacks 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 576 
Model 70.9292632 31 2.28804075  F( 31,   544) = 20.73 
Residual 60.0528103 544 0.110391195  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 130.982073 575 0.22779491  R-squared     = 0.5415 
     Adj R-squared = 0.5154 
     Root MSE      = 0.33225 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
black_1 0.0746755 0.0989566 0.75 0.451 -0.1197085 0.2690594 
black_2 0.0196601 0.1763816 0.11 0.911 -0.3268122 0.3661325 
black_3 0.2171659 0.1246734 1.74 0.082 -0.0277343 0.4620661 
black_4 -0.0529779 0.0617754 -0.86 0.391 -0.1743255 0.0683697 
Male 0.1001838 0.0422782 2.37 0.018 0.0171353 0.1832323 
TOTDEBT 3.28E-06 2.37E-06 1.38 0.168 -1.38E-06 7.94E-06 
Education 0.1933831 0.0590073 3.28 0.001 0.0774731 0.3092932 
Engineering 0.1436466 0.0840711 1.71 0.088 -0.0214971 0.3087902 
health_prof 0.3643533 0.096523 3.77 0 0.1747498 0.5539567 
public_aff~s 0.0555714 0.0989914 0.56 0.575 -0.1388809 0.2500236 
bio_science 0.0429676 0.1229653 0.35 0.727 -0.1985774 0.2845126 
math_science 0.3441348 0.0643358 5.35 0 0.2177579 0.4705118 
social_sci~e -0.0543006 0.0601258 -0.9 0.367 -0.1724079 0.0638066 
History -0.582747 0.207462 -2.81 0.005 -0.9902718 -0.1752222 
Psychology 0.0517232 0.1258872 0.41 0.681 -0.1955614 0.2990078 
Humanities 0.0981529 0.1074772 0.91 0.362 -0.1129682 0.309274 
Other 0.1156156 0.0625058 1.85 0.065 -0.0071668 0.2383979 
GPACUM -0.0002813 0.0004578 -0.61 0.539 -0.0011806 0.0006181 
JOBEXPR 0.1590097 0.0353706 4.5 0 0.08953 0.2284893 
Parttime -0.7667228 0.0557133 -13.76 0 -0.8761624 -0.6572832 
Inschool 0.0295701 0.0377218 0.78 0.433 -0.0445281 0.1036683 
public_sec -0.192802 0.0434644 -4.44 0 -0.2781805 -0.1074235 
self_emp 0.6442511 0.3456994 1.86 0.063 -0.0348182 1.32332 
AGEATBA 0.0258029 0.0035203 7.33 0 0.0188879 0.0327179 
Unemployed -0.3335919 0.0628126 -5.31 0 -0.456977 -0.2102069 
out_force -0.506187 0.1270254 -3.98 0 -0.7557073 -0.2566667 
Private 0.0763016 0.0461804 1.65 0.099 -0.014412 0.1670153 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0003624 0.0008364 -0.43 0.665 -0.0020054 0.0012805 
Ratio 0.1895836 0.1706369 1.11 0.267 -0.1456043 0.5247715 
Usnews -0.0837384 0.0322481 -2.6 0.01 -0.1470844 -0.0203924 
board_sele~y 0.0651703 0.0263156 2.48 0.014 0.0134778 0.1168629 





Table 17c. Black Model (Dummy) by Race, Impact on Hispanics 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 193 
Model 45.7043279 29 1.57601131  F( 29,   163) = 4.83 
Residual 53.1800055 163 0.326257702  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 98.8843334 192 0.51502257  R-squared     = 0.4622 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3665 
     Root MSE      = 0.57119 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
black_1 -0.1329021 0.1943901 -0.68 0.495 -0.5167495 0.2509453 
black_2 (dropped)      
black_3 (dropped)      
black_4 -0.0508954 0.1535003 -0.33 0.741 -0.3540009 0.25221 
Male 0.0940608 0.1109445 0.85 0.398 -0.1250129 0.3131345 
TOTDEBT 2.94E-06 6.99E-06 0.42 0.675 -0.0000109 0.0000167 
Education -0.0114412 0.2178883 -0.05 0.958 -0.4416889 0.4188065 
Engineering 0.3382564 0.2363581 1.43 0.154 -0.1284621 0.804975 
health_prof 0.3507156 0.2306792 1.52 0.13 -0.1047893 0.8062204 
public_aff~s -0.3135018 0.3182944 -0.98 0.326 -0.9420138 0.3150101 
bio_science 0.2046234 0.3002678 0.68 0.497 -0.3882927 0.7975396 
math_science -0.1605947 0.2284822 -0.7 0.483 -0.6117614 0.2905719 
social_sci~e -0.1357985 0.1885948 -0.72 0.473 -0.5082023 0.2366053 
History -0.071928 0.6146633 -0.12 0.907 -1.285657 1.141801 
Psychology -0.149734 0.2902411 -0.52 0.607 -0.7228511 0.4233832 
Humanities -0.5694956 0.2066909 -2.76 0.007 -0.9776325 -0.1613586 
Other -0.284569 0.1682354 -1.69 0.093 -0.6167708 0.0476328 
GPACUM 0.001586 0.0011738 1.35 0.178 -0.0007317 0.0039038 
JOBEXPR 0.2745046 0.0970937 2.83 0.005 0.0827811 0.4662282 
Parttime -0.6272003 0.133395 -4.7 0 -0.8906054 -0.3637953 
Inschool -0.1554984 0.1166071 -1.33 0.184 -0.3857536 0.0747569 
public_sec -0.1237206 0.1225599 -1.01 0.314 -0.3657305 0.1182893 
self_emp 0.8244176 0.6126212 1.35 0.18 -0.3852792 2.034114 
AGEATBA 0.002384 0.0080955 0.29 0.769 -0.0136015 0.0183695 
Unemployed -0.7572256 0.4346292 -1.74 0.083 -1.615455 0.1010039 
out_force -0.5935201 0.2660656 -2.23 0.027 -1.1189 -0.0681404 
Private -0.0472544 0.1142087 -0.41 0.68 -0.2727737 0.178265 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0027498 0.0021452 -1.28 0.202 -0.0069858 0.0014861 
Ratio 0.2685734 0.636524 0.42 0.674 -0.9883225 1.525469 
Usnews 0.2249522 0.0788765 2.85 0.005 0.0692008 0.3807036 
board_sele~y -0.1151185 0.0652497 -1.76 0.08 -0.2439622 0.0137251 





Table 18a. Minority Model (Dummy) by Race, White 
 
Source SS Df MS  Number of obs = 4674 
Model 560.246547 31 18.0724693  F( 31,  4642) = 67.4 
Residual 1244.61175 4642 0.268119723  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 1804.8583 4673 0.38623118  R-squared     = 0.3104 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3058 
     Root MSE      = 0.5178 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
min_1 0.0125209 0.0228158 0.55 0.583 -0.0322089 0.0572507 
min_2 0.0414385 0.0272702 1.52 0.002 -0.0120241 0.0949012 
min_3 0.089153 0.0350117 2.55 0.011 0.0205134 0.1577927 
min_4 0.0994517 0.0303212 3.28 0.001 0.0400078 0.1588956 
Male 0.1308846 0.0172404 7.59 0 0.0970853 0.1646839 
TOTDEBT -1.40E-06 1.04E-06 -1.34 0.179 -3.44E-06 6.41E-07 
Education -0.3331673 0.029262 -11.39 0 -0.3905347 -0.2757998 
Engineering 0.1277333 0.0380209 3.36 0.001 0.0531942 0.2022724 
health_prof 0.1565013 0.037256 4.2 0 0.0834619 0.2295406 
public_aff~s -0.139171 0.0483232 -2.88 0.004 -0.2339075 -0.0444345 
bio_science -0.1349631 0.0476349 -2.83 0.005 -0.2283501 -0.0415761 
math_science -0.1855512 0.0386588 -4.8 0 -0.2613409 -0.1097615 
social_sci~e -0.2004505 0.0321433 -6.24 0 -0.2634667 -0.1374343 
History -0.6534941 0.0519395 -12.58 0 -0.7553201 -0.551668 
Psychology -0.2423676 0.0495166 -4.89 0 -0.3394436 -0.1452916 
Humanities -0.3227839 0.0347549 -9.29 0 -0.3909199 -0.2546478 
Other -0.168139 0.0304152 -5.53 0 -0.2277673 -0.1085108 
GPACUM 0.0006506 0.0001817 3.58 0 0.0002944 0.0010069 
JOBEXPR 0.0706387 0.0158871 4.45 0 0.0394924 0.1017851 
Parttime -0.5896702 0.024193 -24.37 0 -0.6370999 -0.5422405 
Inschool -0.2479178 0.0208972 -11.86 0 -0.2888863 -0.2069494 
public_sec -0.0142292 0.0171401 -0.83 0.406 -0.0478319 0.0193735 
self_emp -0.2313974 0.0923535 -2.51 0.012 -0.4124541 -0.0503407 
AGEATBA 0.0105018 0.0014342 7.32 0 0.00769 0.0133136 
Unemployed -0.0471696 0.040553 -1.16 0.245 -0.1266727 0.0323334 
out_force -0.3592299 0.05575 -6.44 0 -0.4685263 -0.2499334 
Private 0.0457608 0.0211416 2.16 0.03 0.0043133 0.0872084 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0006955 0.0004054 -1.72 0.086 -0.0014902 0.0000992 
Ratio 0.1438535 0.0548599 2.62 0.009 0.036302 0.2514049 
Usnews 0.0286759 0.0122597 2.34 0.019 0.0046411 0.0527106 
board_sele~y 0.0020919 0.0120937 0.17 0.863 -0.0216176 0.0258013 





Table 18b. Minority Model (Dummy) by Race, Black 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 576 
Model 71.3658633 31 2.30212462  F( 31,   544) = 21.01 
Residual 59.6162102 544 0.109588622  Prob > F = 0 
Total 130.982073 575 0.22779491  R-squared = 0.5449 
     Adj R-squared = 0.5189 
     Root MSE = 0.33104 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
min_1 -0.120998 0.1042471 -1.16 0.246 -0.3257742 0.0837782 
min_2 -0.2129427 0.1107507 -1.92 0.055 -0.4304941 0.0046087 
min_3 0.0551102 0.1168387 0.47 0.637 -0.1744 0.2846204 
min_4 -0.1269945 0.1021027 -1.24 0.214 -0.3275584 0.0735694 
Male 0.0746709 0.0421315 1.77 0.077 -0.0080895 0.1574314 
TOTDEBT 3.67E-06 2.38E-06 1.54 0.124 -1.01E-06 8.35E-06 
Education 0.186545 0.0584877 3.19 0.002 0.0716555 0.3014345 
Engineering 0.1521132 0.0841194 1.81 0.071 -0.0131253 0.3173518 
health_prof 0.3105968 0.0955732 3.25 0.001 0.1228591 0.4983345 
public_aff~s 0.0375491 0.0985951 0.38 0.703 -0.1561246 0.2312227 
bio_science 0.0359492 0.1223117 0.29 0.769 -0.2043118 0.2762102 
math_science 0.3196114 0.063713 5.02 0 0.1944576 0.4447651 
social_sci~e -0.0492622 0.0601708 -0.82 0.413 -0.1674578 0.0689334 
History -0.5860293 0.2083501 -2.81 0.005 -0.9952985 -0.1767601 
Psychology 0.0169339 0.1259657 0.13 0.893 -0.2305048 0.2643726 
Humanities 0.097017 0.1078724 0.9 0.369 -0.1148805 0.3089145 
Other 0.1010027 0.0617654 1.64 0.103 -0.0203252 0.2223306 
GPACUM -0.0003862 0.0004723 -0.82 0.414 -0.0013139 0.0005416 
JOBEXPR 0.151356 0.0359065 4.22 0 0.0808237 0.2218884 
Parttime -0.7409474 0.0547857 -13.52 0 -0.8485649 -0.63333 
Inschool 0.0269444 0.0376427 0.72 0.474 -0.0469984 0.1008872 
public_sec -0.2087241 0.04297 -4.86 0 -0.2931316 -0.1243166 
self_emp 0.4419368 0.3506131 1.26 0.208 -0.2467845 1.130658 
AGEATBA 0.0278612 0.0034692 8.03 0 0.0210465 0.034676 
Unemployed -0.3377789 0.0623756 -5.42 0 -0.4603055 -0.2152524 
out_force -0.4956669 0.1270882 -3.9 0 -0.7453106 -0.2460232 
Private 0.0228125 0.0435275 0.52 0.6 -0.06269 0.108315 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0002763 0.0008216 -0.34 0.737 -0.0018902 0.0013375 
Ratio 0.135855 0.1727657 0.79 0.432 -0.2035146 0.4752247 
Usnews -0.0705529 0.0326624 -2.16 0.031 -0.1347128 -0.006393 
board_sele~y 0.0553993 0.0259182 2.14 0.033 0.0044873 0.1063113 




Table 18c. Minority Model (Dummy) by Race, Hispanic 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 193 
Model 47.2116143 31 1.5229553  F( 31,   161) = 4.75 
Residual 51.672719 161 0.320948565  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 98.8843334 192 0.51502257  R-squared     = 0.4774 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3768 
     Root MSE      = 0.56652 
 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
min_1 -0.2605975 0.2628505 -0.99 0.323 -0.7796768 0.2584818 
min_2 -0.2160535 0.2535144 -0.85 0.395 -0.7166958 0.2845889 
min_3 -0.4677416 0.2727314 -1.72 0.088 -1.006334 0.0708506 
min_4 -0.1277531 0.2397238 -0.53 0.595 -0.6011617 0.3456554 
Male 0.1327899 0.1127839 1.18 0.241 -0.0899366 0.3555163 
TOTDEBT 2.75E-06 6.96E-06 0.39 0.694 -0.000011 0.0000165 
Education -0.0351899 0.2184557 -0.16 0.872 -0.466598 0.3962182 
Engineering 0.2720597 0.2367058 1.15 0.252 -0.1953888 0.7395083 
health_prof 0.3253066 0.2332708 1.39 0.165 -0.1353585 0.7859716 
public_aff~s -0.2706527 0.3106003 -0.87 0.385 -0.8840287 0.3427233 
bio_science 0.2608236 0.2976403 0.88 0.382 -0.3269588 0.848606 
math_science -0.1855752 0.2296383 -0.81 0.42 -0.6390668 0.2679163 
social_sci~e -0.1278853 0.1861622 -0.69 0.493 -0.49552 0.2397493 
History -0.0496653 0.6178232 -0.08 0.936 -1.269748 1.170417 
Psychology -0.1391575 0.2865137 -0.49 0.628 -0.7049671 0.4266521 
Humanities -0.597727 0.1949432 -3.07 0.003 -0.9827023 -0.2127516 
Other -0.3220741 0.164769 -1.95 0.052 -0.6474613 0.0033131 
GPACUM 0.0017572 0.0011633 1.51 0.133 -0.0005401 0.0040545 
JOBEXPR 0.2649219 0.0966574 2.74 0.007 0.074042 0.4558018 
Parttime -0.6502625 0.1341677 -4.85 0 -0.9152181 -0.385307 
Inschool -0.1448695 0.1155045 -1.25 0.212 -0.3729687 0.0832297 
public_sec -0.1192908 0.1228963 -0.97 0.333 -0.3619874 0.1234059 
self_emp 0.8048857 0.6001014 1.34 0.182 -0.3801993 1.989971 
AGEATBA 0.0031027 0.0080757 0.38 0.701 -0.0128452 0.0190507 
Unemployed -0.6099078 0.4359823 -1.4 0.164 -1.470889 0.2510737 
out_force -0.6506008 0.2668641 -2.44 0.016 -1.177606 -0.1235953 
Private -0.0637876 0.1121556 -0.57 0.57 -0.2852734 0.1576983 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0025962 0.0021375 -1.21 0.226 -0.0068174 0.0016249 
Ratio 0.042046 0.6487554 0.06 0.948 -1.239121 1.323213 
Usnews 0.1529281 0.0822227 1.86 0.065 -0.0094459 0.3153021 
board_sele~y -0.1003814 0.0671099 -1.5 0.137 -0.2329105 0.0321477 




Table 19a.  Minority Continuous by Race, Impact on Whites 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 4582 
Model 548.05802 28 19.5735007  F( 28,  4553) = 72.85 
Residual 1223.26198 4553 0.268671642  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 1771.32 4581 0.386666668  R-squared     = 0.3094 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3052 
     Root MSE      = 0.51834 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.0035408 0.000828 4.28 0 0.0019176 0.0051641 
Male 0.1360336 0.0174259 7.81 0 0.1018703 0.1701969 
TOTDEBT -1.21E-06 1.05E-06 -1.15 0.251 -3.27E-06 8.53E-07 
Education -0.3349847 0.0294375 -11.38 0 -0.3926964 -0.277273 
Engineering 0.125373 0.0385599 3.25 0.001 0.049777 0.2009691 
health_prof 0.1564208 0.0377692 4.14 0 0.0823748 0.2304668 
public_aff~s -0.1372742 0.0487753 -2.81 0.005 -0.2328974 -0.041651 
bio_science -0.1370502 0.0480534 -2.85 0.004 -0.2312582 -0.0428421 
math_science -0.1852406 0.0390241 -4.75 0 -0.2617468 -0.1087345 
social_sci~e -0.2021464 0.0323693 -6.25 0 -0.265606 -0.1386869 
History -0.6610433 0.0521825 -12.67 0 -0.7633463 -0.5587404 
Psychology -0.2411577 0.0504739 -4.78 0 -0.340111 -0.1422044 
Humanities -0.3304214 0.035063 -9.42 0 -0.3991618 -0.2616809 
Other -0.1674813 0.0305207 -5.49 0 -0.2273167 -0.1076459 
GPACUM 0.0006401 0.0001832 3.49 0 0.000281 0.0009993 
JOBEXPR 0.0751405 0.0160732 4.67 0 0.0436291 0.1066518 
Parttime -0.5897494 0.0244956 -24.08 0 -0.6377727 -0.5417262 
Inschool -0.2459406 0.0210782 -11.67 0 -0.2872641 -0.2046172 
public_sec -0.0159363 0.0173604 -0.92 0.359 -0.0499711 0.0180985 
self_emp -0.2305068 0.092459 -2.49 0.013 -0.4117712 -0.0492423 
AGEATBA 0.0103107 0.0014562 7.08 0 0.0074557 0.0131656 
Unemployed -0.038323 0.0408419 -0.94 0.348 -0.1183929 0.0417469 
out_force -0.3600962 0.0563996 -6.38 0 -0.4706668 -0.2495256 
Private 0.0471368 0.0213238 2.21 0.027 0.0053319 0.0889417 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0007358 0.0004126 -1.78 0.075 -0.0015447 0.0000731 
Ratio 0.1653951 0.0573827 2.88 0.004 0.0528972 0.277893 
Usnews 0.0270181 0.0120664 2.24 0.025 0.003362 0.0506742 
board_sele~y 0.0044458 0.0123137 0.36 0.718 -0.019695 0.0285867 








Table 19b. Minority Continuous by Race, Impact on Blacks 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 571 
Model 70.5816978 28 2.52077492  F( 28,   542) = 22.9 
Residual 59.6517283 542 0.110058539  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 130.233426 570 0.228479695  R-squared     = 0.542 
     Adj R-squared = 0.5183 
     Root MSE      = 0.33175 
 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority -0.0014409 0.0008158 -1.77 0.078 -0.0030433 0.0001615 
Male 0.0993821 0.041988 2.37 0.018 0.0169028 0.1818613 
TOTDEBT 2.80E-06 2.46E-06 1.14 0.255 -2.03E-06 7.63E-06 
Education 0.1791419 0.0584015 3.07 0.002 0.0644209 0.2938629 
Engineering 0.1296382 0.0835446 1.55 0.121 -0.0344726 0.293749 
health_prof 0.272254 0.0983628 2.77 0.006 0.0790349 0.4654731 
public_aff~s 0.036764 0.0987354 0.37 0.71 -0.1571869 0.2307149 
bio_science 0.0531307 0.122528 0.43 0.665 -0.1875571 0.2938186 
math_science 0.3344349 0.06391 5.23 0 0.2088933 0.4599766 
social_sci~e -0.0485592 0.0601883 -0.81 0.42 -0.16679 0.0696716 
History -0.6038728 0.2071924 -2.91 0.004 -1.010871 -0.1968743 
Psychology 0.0210313 0.1255657 0.17 0.867 -0.2256238 0.2676865 
Humanities 0.0866998 0.1066605 0.81 0.417 -0.1228189 0.2962184 
Other 0.0893449 0.0626197 1.43 0.154 -0.0336621 0.2123519 
GPACUM -0.0000973 0.0004583 -0.21 0.832 -0.0009976 0.000803 
JOBEXPR 0.1603351 0.0357198 4.49 0 0.0901689 0.2305014 
Parttime -0.7657319 0.0552135 -13.87 0 -0.8741906 -0.6572732 
Inschool 0.0373566 0.0378203 0.99 0.324 -0.0369356 0.1116488 
public_sec -0.1955513 0.0435085 -4.49 0 -0.2810173 -0.1100853 
self_emp 0.6523018 0.3453281 1.89 0.059 -0.0260437 1.330647 
AGEATBA 0.0257553 0.0035477 7.26 0 0.0187865 0.0327242 
Unemployed -0.3150527 0.0644382 -4.89 0 -0.4416318 -0.1884735 
out_force -0.503582 0.1270719 -3.96 0 -0.7531956 -0.2539683 
Private 0.0527612 0.0455017 1.16 0.247 -0.0366201 0.1421425 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0001123 0.0008337 -0.13 0.893 -0.0017499 0.0015254 
Ratio 0.3071751 0.2099132 1.46 0.144 -0.105168 0.7195181 
Usnews -0.0456027 0.0338518 -1.35 0.179 -0.1120995 0.0208941 
board_sele~y 0.0525496 0.0260899 2.01 0.044 0.0012998 0.1037994 







Table 19c. Minority Continuous by Race, Impact on Hispanics 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 184 
Model 43.7736032 28 1.56334297  F( 28,   155) = 4.67 
Residual 51.8553056 155 0.334550359  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 95.6289089 183 0.522562344  R-squared     = 0.4577 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3598 
     Root MSE      = 0.5784 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.0017095 0.0024378 0.7 0.484 -0.0031061 0.0065251 
Male 0.056405 0.1146177 0.49 0.623 -0.1700093 0.2828193 
TOTDEBT 5.49E-06 7.50E-06 0.73 0.465 -9.32E-06 0.0000203 
Education -0.0362716 0.2293308 -0.16 0.875 -0.4892888 0.4167456 
Engineering 0.343486 0.2569739 1.34 0.183 -0.164137 0.851109 
health_prof 0.3746443 0.2339424 1.6 0.111 -0.0874824 0.836771 
public_aff~s -0.3230412 0.3181053 -1.02 0.311 -0.9514223 0.3053399 
bio_science 0.2365855 0.3087314 0.77 0.445 -0.3732785 0.8464495 
math_science -0.1233736 0.245499 -0.5 0.616 -0.6083292 0.3615821 
social_sci~e -0.1365142 0.1909739 -0.71 0.476 -0.5137615 0.2407332 
History 0.0151043 0.6232957 0.02 0.981 -1.216146 1.246355 
Psychology -0.1705505 0.2959718 -0.58 0.565 -0.7552095 0.4141084 
Humanities -0.6504083 0.2045614 -3.18 0.002 -1.054496 -0.2463204 
Other -0.3328472 0.1740722 -1.91 0.058 -0.6767072 0.0110129 
GPACUM 0.0016153 0.0012102 1.33 0.184 -0.0007752 0.0040059 
JOBEXPR 0.2979996 0.1009591 2.95 0.004 0.0985663 0.4974329 
Parttime -0.6131029 0.141754 -4.33 0 -0.893122 -0.3330838 
Inschool -0.1333808 0.1231505 -1.08 0.28 -0.3766507 0.1098892 
public_sec -0.1433907 0.1281938 -1.12 0.265 -0.3966231 0.1098418 
self_emp 0.9625295 0.6177294 1.56 0.121 -0.2577251 2.182784 
AGEATBA 0.0046796 0.0085846 0.55 0.586 -0.0122783 0.0216375 
Unemployed -0.7499376 0.4445865 -1.69 0.094 -1.628168 0.1282928 
out_force -0.5806712 0.2705377 -2.15 0.033 -1.115088 -0.0462545 
Private -0.1154564 0.1338401 -0.86 0.39 -0.3798423 0.1489295 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0025218 0.0024116 -1.05 0.297 -0.0072856 0.0022421 
Ratio 0.1936741 1.520508 0.13 0.899 -2.809918 3.197266 
Usnews 0.1787648 0.0849176 2.11 0.037 0.0110196 0.3465099 
board_sele~y -0.1139799 0.0714968 -1.59 0.113 -0.2552138 0.027254 




Table 20a. Quadratic Minority Model, Impact by Race, Whites 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 4582 
Model 548.058274 29 18.8985612  F( 29,  4552) = 70.33 
Residual 1223.26173 4552 0.268730609  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 1771.32 4581 0.386666668  R-squared     = 0.3094 
     Adj R-squared = 0.305 
     Root MSE      = 0.51839 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.0034825 0.00207 1.68 0.093 -0.0005757 0.0075406 
min2 1.19E-06 0.0000386 0.03 0.975 -0.0000746 0.0000769 
Male 0.1360152 0.0174381 7.8 0 0.1018282 0.1702023 
TOTDEBT -1.21E-06 1.05E-06 -1.15 0.251 -3.27E-06 8.53E-07 
education -0.3350153 0.0294575 -11.37 0 -0.3927664 -0.2772643 
engineering 0.1253838 0.0385657 3.25 0.001 0.0497763 0.2009912 
health_prof 0.156395 0.0377827 4.14 0 0.0823227 0.2304674 
public_aff~s -0.1373337 0.0488189 -2.81 0.005 -0.2330423 -0.041625 
bio_science -0.1370613 0.0480601 -2.85 0.004 -0.2312823 -0.0428403 
math_science -0.1852408 0.0390284 -4.75 0 -0.2617553 -0.1087262 
social_sci~e -0.2021496 0.032373 -6.24 0 -0.2656165 -0.1386828 
History -0.661108 0.0522304 -12.66 0 -0.763505 -0.558711 
psychology -0.2411904 0.0504906 -4.78 0 -0.3401765 -0.1422044 
humanities -0.3304231 0.0350669 -9.42 0 -0.3991712 -0.261675 
Other -0.167506 0.0305346 -5.49 0 -0.2273686 -0.1076434 
GPACUM 0.00064 0.0001833 3.49 0 0.0002806 0.0009994 
JOBEXPR 0.0751536 0.0160807 4.67 0 0.0436277 0.1066796 
Parttime -0.5897447 0.0244988 -24.07 0 -0.6377742 -0.5417152 
Inschool -0.2459118 0.0211013 -11.65 0 -0.2872806 -0.2045431 
public_sec -0.0159433 0.0173638 -0.92 0.359 -0.0499848 0.0180981 
self_emp -0.2305375 0.0924745 -2.49 0.013 -0.4118325 -0.0492426 
AGEATBA 0.0103109 0.0014564 7.08 0 0.0074556 0.0131662 
unemployed -0.0383111 0.0408482 -0.94 0.348 -0.1183934 0.0417712 
out_force -0.3600591 0.0564187 -6.38 0 -0.4706671 -0.249451 
Private 0.0471722 0.0213572 2.21 0.027 0.0053017 0.0890428 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0007377 0.0004172 -1.77 0.077 -0.0015556 0.0000801 
Ratio 0.1655603 0.0576394 2.87 0.004 0.0525591 0.2785615 
Usnews 0.0270123 0.0120692 2.24 0.025 0.0033507 0.0506739 
board_sele~y 0.0044076 0.0123775 0.36 0.722 -0.0198583 0.0286735 







Table 20b. Quadratic Models, Impact by Race, Blacks 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 571 
Model 70.7212082 29 2.43866235  F( 29,   541) = 22.17 
Residual 59.5122179 541 0.1100041  Prob > F      = 0 
Total 130.233426 570 0.228479695  R-squared     = 0.543 
     Adj R-squared = 0.5185 
     Root MSE      = 0.33167 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.0025134 0.0036048 0.7 0.486 -0.0045677 0.0095945 
min2 -0.0000369 0.0000327 -1.13 0.261 -0.0001011 0.0000274 
Male 0.1011499 0.042007 2.41 0.016 0.0186331 0.1836667 
TOTDEBT 2.21E-06 2.51E-06 0.88 0.38 -2.73E-06 7.14E-06 
education 0.1839806 0.0585449 3.14 0.002 0.0689773 0.2989839 
engineering 0.1382083 0.0838699 1.65 0.1 -0.0265422 0.3029589 
health_prof 0.2712323 0.0983427 2.76 0.006 0.0780519 0.4644126 
public_aff~s 0.0300036 0.0988933 0.3 0.762 -0.1642584 0.2242656 
bio_science 0.0559946 0.122524 0.46 0.648 -0.1846866 0.2966758 
math_science 0.3382608 0.0639844 5.29 0 0.2125724 0.4639492 
social_sci~e -0.0480557 0.060175 -0.8 0.425 -0.1662611 0.0701496 
History -0.6045972 0.2071421 -2.92 0.004 -1.011499 -0.1976957 
psychology 0.0215531 0.1255355 0.17 0.864 -0.2250437 0.26815 
humanities 0.0809784 0.1067551 0.76 0.448 -0.1287269 0.2906837 
Other 0.09196 0.0626472 1.47 0.143 -0.0311017 0.2150216 
GPACUM -0.0002113 0.0004693 -0.45 0.653 -0.0011331 0.0007105 
JOBEXPR 0.1654657 0.0360004 4.6 0 0.094748 0.2361834 
Parttime -0.7666528 0.0552059 -13.89 0 -0.875097 -0.6582086 
Inschool 0.0405834 0.0379193 1.07 0.285 -0.0339037 0.1150706 
public_sec -0.1889145 0.0438952 -4.3 0 -0.2751404 -0.1026887 
self_emp 0.6319903 0.3457135 1.83 0.068 -0.047115 1.311096 
AGEATBA 0.0249808 0.0036129 6.91 0 0.0178839 0.0320778 
unemployed -0.3084665 0.0646871 -4.77 0 -0.4355352 -0.1813977 
out_force -0.5152416 0.1274616 -4.04 0 -0.7656219 -0.2648613 
Private 0.0679475 0.0474471 1.43 0.153 -0.0252556 0.1611506 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0003033 0.0008505 -0.36 0.722 -0.001974 0.0013675 
Ratio 0.2784049 0.2114105 1.32 0.188 -0.1368811 0.693691 
Usnews -0.0468041 0.0338602 -1.38 0.167 -0.1133178 0.0197095 
board_sele~y 0.0573841 0.0264344 2.17 0.03 0.0054575 0.1093107 




Table 20c. Minority Quadratic Model, Impact by Race, Hispanic 
 
Source SS df MS  Number of obs = 184 
Model 43.7834089 29 1.50977272  F( 29,   154) = 4.48 
Residual 51.8455 154 0.336659091  Prob > F = 0 
Total 95.6289089 183 0.522562344  R-squared = 0.4578 
     Adj R-squared = 0.3558 
     Root MSE = 0.58022 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Minority 0.0032878 0.009566 0.34 0.732 -0.0156096 0.0221853 
min2 -0.0000167 0.0000977 -0.17 0.865 -0.0002096 0.0001763 
Male 0.0575857 0.1151863 0.5 0.618 -0.1699635 0.2851348 
TOTDEBT 5.44E-06 7.52E-06 0.72 0.471 -9.43E-06 0.0000203 
education -0.0319553 0.2314385 -0.14 0.89 -0.4891593 0.4252487 
engineering 0.3522499 0.2628476 1.34 0.182 -0.1670024 0.8715022 
health_prof 0.3773341 0.2352071 1.6 0.111 -0.0873148 0.8419829 
public_aff~s -0.3166159 0.3213196 -0.99 0.326 -0.9513788 0.3181471 
bio_science 0.2381795 0.3098436 0.77 0.443 -0.3739129 0.8502719 
math_science -0.1147647 0.2513846 -0.46 0.649 -0.6113719 0.3818425 
social_sci~e -0.1300706 0.1952598 -0.67 0.506 -0.5158041 0.2556628 
History 0.0221468 0.6266172 0.04 0.972 -1.215728 1.260022 
psychology -0.1674612 0.2974545 -0.56 0.574 -0.7550789 0.4201565 
humanities -0.6404107 0.2134029 -3 0.003 -1.061986 -0.2188358 
Other -0.3298693 0.1754896 -1.88 0.062 -0.6765468 0.0168083 
GPACUM 0.0016427 0.0012245 1.34 0.182 -0.0007764 0.0040618 
JOBEXPR 0.3002901 0.1021622 2.94 0.004 0.09847 0.5021103 
Parttime -0.6048032 0.1502862 -4.02 0 -0.9016917 -0.3079147 
Inschool -0.1364413 0.1248329 -1.09 0.276 -0.3830472 0.1101645 
public_sec -0.1439195 0.1286345 -1.12 0.265 -0.3980355 0.1101965 
self_emp 0.9498684 0.6240982 1.52 0.13 -0.2830301 2.182767 
AGEATBA 0.00425 0.0089719 0.47 0.636 -0.0134739 0.021974 
unemployed -0.7468756 0.4463461 -1.67 0.096 -1.628627 0.1348758 
out_force -0.5810444 0.2713978 -2.14 0.034 -1.117188 -0.0449013 
Private -0.108881 0.1396799 -0.78 0.437 -0.384817 0.167055 
CB93_CARNE~E -0.0025003 0.0024225 -1.03 0.304 -0.0072859 0.0022852 
Ratio 0.1572089 1.540185 0.1 0.919 -2.885409 3.199827 
Usnews 0.177732 0.0853995 2.08 0.039 0.0090263 0.3464377 
board_sele~y -0.1084818 0.0786251 -1.38 0.17 -0.2638047 0.0468412 
_cons 9.084477 0.5230199 17.37 0 8.051257 10.1177 
 
